Sanctions and Third-party Compliance with US Foreign Policy Preferences: An Analysis of Dual-use Trade

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110149
Author(s):  
Timothy M. Peterson

Ostensibly bilateral US foreign policy actions, such as sanctions, can influence third-party compliance with US policy preferences. US sanctions simultaneously signal US preferences and demonstrate leverage, which can motivate third parties to avoid or change proscribed behavior proactively. Empirical testing of this strategic behavior typically is difficult given that it predicts non-events in a noisy signaling environment. However, I argue that the global trade of dual-use commodities—those with both civilian and military purposes—is a phenomenon where we can observe this process systematically. I isolate US sanctions that provide relevant context both by stigmatizing the target and signaling that third-party dual-use exports to the target would directly undermine US policy goals. Using newly-coded bilateral data spanning the post-Cold War period, I find evidence that relevant US sanctions are associated with lower third-party dual-use exports to US-sanctioned states. My findings have implications for scholars and policy-makers, suggesting a broad yet shrouded ability of sanctions to advance US foreign policy goals.

Author(s):  
B. Bahriev

The article deals with the features of public diplomacy resource’ application in US foreign policy in Central Asia. The author claims that American public diplomacy which has been actively working in the region since the collapse of the USSR appears to be an important instrument of achievement of not only regional, but also global objectives of the USA. Despite a certain de-emphasis on the Central Asian direction in the American foreign policy at the present stage, the rising Russian public diplomacy activity and increasing Chinese influence in the region forces Americans to look for public diplomacy response in order to secure their positions in this important, from geopolitical viewpoint and energy resource perspective, region. The aforementioned tendencies shape a competitive regional environment for implementation of public diplomacy.


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter reviews US-China-Russia relations in the post-war period, and considers how recent developments affect prospects for the US ‘pivot’. It explains why those driving US foreign policy towards China see the confrontation with Russia in Ukraine as a dangerous and diversionary adventure, leading to Sino-Russian convergence, distracting US attention from East Asia and undermining confidence among the US’s Asian allies of its commitment to the region. It is argued that if the US is to maintain primacy in the 21st century, it must subordinate other foreign policy goals to the paramount objective of containing China’s rise. The US’s failure to do this, instead pitting itself against both Putin in the West and China in the East, means it has driven Russia and China together, quite possibly sacrificing its vital need to contain China for a lesser goal of uncertain outcome in Ukraine.


Author(s):  
David P. Oakley

By taking the first steps to weaken the powerful military services and establishing a unified DoD, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 increased the DoD’s influence in US foreign policy while also creating policy and structure that enabled and required future DoD/CIA collaboration. The failures in the field that motivated defense reform were the same failures that initiated discussions on intelligence support to military operations. Reviews of Operation Urgent Fury and the Beirut barracks bombing criticized the lack of intelligence support to commanders. In this regard, the defense reform enacted by Congress through Goldwater-Nichols was the initial phase of broader national security reforms. Although intelligence reform was initially not embraced to the same degree as defense reform, policy makers, motivated by perceived “intelligence failures,” looked to restructure intelligence for a post–Cold War environment.


2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Todhunter

Abstract The notion that national leaders use foreign policy actions for domestic political benefit is widely accepted in the foreign policy literature, but has only been studied with regard to foreign policy involving the use of force. Literature on third-party mediation has emerged separately and has not taken mediators’ domestic political motivations and constraints into account when explaining mediation occurrence and outcomes. Diplomatic efforts such as mediation should be appealing to leaders seeking to impress their domestic audience because it provides them with a low risk opportunity to appear competent to their domestic audience. While mediation is a regular occurrence in US foreign policy, its public visibility varies greatly. However, models of presidential media coverage suggest that media outlets are likely to pay a disproportionate amount of attention to presidents and their high level surrogates while engaging in diplomacy overseas. The article proposes that the higher the profile of the official an administration sends to mediate a crisis overseas, the greater the increase in the president’s approval rating. Additionally, the public’s attentiveness to foreign policy should condition the effect of a high profile mediator on presidential approval. As foreign policy becomes more salient to the public, the effect of a higher profile mediator on presidential approval should be greater. Empirical results support the argument.


Author(s):  
Ilmi Dwiastuti

AbstractSince the fall of the Shah, the US-Iran relations have changed significantly. During the Shah regime, US-Iran experience a warm relationship through economic and military partnerships, however, it changed since the Iran revolution until today. Iran turned out to be one of the axis of evil during the Bush administration. The fall of the Shah also changes the direction of the foreign policy of the US. It then led to the proposition of whether the US foreign policy has been more anti-Iranian than pro-Arab with the fall of the Shah. This paper seeks to answer this question through historical analysis. It examines the US policy during the Cold War era and the post-Cold War. Therefore, the US policy in the region is not always anti-Iranian than the pro-Arab case. The changed regional architecture influences the priorities of the President of the US at that time to put aside Iran's issue, as it happened on George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama administration. Thus, the characteristic of the leader also heavily influences US posture in Iran, as Bush and Trump's personality and policies are clearly against Iran. However, despite the dynamic relations of the US-Iran, Iran has always been one of the threats for the US interest in the Persian Gulf since the Shah has fallen.


Age of Iron ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Colin Dueck

This final chapter analyzes current geopolitical challenges, and offers US foreign policy recommendations. Leading reasons for existing discontent with the rules-based liberal international order are delineated, and a more realistic understanding proposed. Today’s geopolitical circumstances are outlined, region by region. Policy recommendations then follow, based upon the premise of regionally differentiated strategies of pressure. In sum, the chapter argues for a forward-leaning US foreign policy realism, based upon an understanding that the post–Cold War quarter-century and its competing optimisms are now officially over.


Subject Prospects for US foreign policy in 2022. Significance After a first year in office dominated by the situation at home, the Biden administration aims to deliver a more developed and focused foreign policy agenda in 2022. Many foreign policy goals will remain largely unchanged. While there will be greater efforts to strengthen ties with allies through mechanisms such as the Quad, the emphasis on issues other than those involving China may be increasingly affected by domestic politics.


Author(s):  
Robert G. Patman

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Africa. It first considers the United States’ historical engagement with Africa, particularly during the Cold War era that saw the intensification of US–Soviet Union superpower rivalry, before discussing the rise of a New World Order in the immediate post–Cold War period that held out the possibility of positive US involvement in Africa. It then explores the United States’ adoption of a more realist approach after Somalia, as well as its renewal of limited engagement between 1996 and 2001. It also analyzes US policy towards Africa after 9/11, with emphasis on President George W. Bush’s efforts to incorporate Africa into Washington’s global strategic network as part of the new war on terror, as compared to the approach of the Obama administration calling for political transformation in Africa.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengxin Pan ◽  
Oliver Turner

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from its perceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting a Foucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace its discursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses of the American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce a particular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to better appreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we need to pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discourses about the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principles conventionally associated with neoconservatism.


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