Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 073889422110054
Author(s):  
William Spaniel
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Technical Assistance ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Scientific Intelligence ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Acquisition Time ◽  
Nuclear Assistance

Members of the non-proliferation regime give technical assistance to countries contemplating nuclear weapons. This is puzzling: it facilitates the behavior donors wish to stop, and other forms of concessions do not have this drawback. Why do it? I develop a model of uncertainty, bargaining, and nuclear proliferation. In it, assistance hastens acquisition time but also generates a signal about the recipient’s domestic nuclear proficiency. This allows donors to better calibrate other concessions to the recipient. In equilibrium, donors sometimes find the information worth sacrificing bargaining leverage for. However, despite providing information, assistance can cause proliferation if donors believe that the recipient is competent but observe a misleading signal indicating incompetence. This paper works toward understanding how scientific intelligence affects international negotiations, an underexplored subject matter for political scientists.

Supply to Deny: The Benefits of Nuclear Assistance for Nuclear Nonproliferation

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Davis Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Nuclear Nonproliferation ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Nuclear Assistance

Abstract Recent scholarship on nuclear proliferation finds that many forms of nuclear assistance increase the odds that recipient states pursue nuclear weapons programs. While these studies may help us understand select cases of proliferation, they overshadow the role of nuclear supply in bolstering global nonproliferation efforts. After the risks of nuclear assistance became well-known following India's nuclear explosion in 1974, most major suppliers conditioned their assistance on recipients joining nonproliferation agreements. Case studies of states’ decision-making regarding these agreements illustrate how the provision of nuclear technology has been an effective tool in persuading states to join such agreements, the most important of which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). By joining the NPT, states strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and increase the costs of any potential future decision to proliferate. The offer of nuclear assistance has done far more to bolster global nuclear nonproliferation efforts than recent research suggests.

scholarly journals Nuclear Proliferation and Pakistan

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (01) ◽  
pp. 54-70
Author(s):  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari ◽  
Humera Hakro ◽  
Muhammad Ramzan Kolachi
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Qualitative Methodology ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Assistance

Pakistan, India, Israel in addition to North Korea became successful to get sensitive nuclear assistance from other nuclear weapon states and became successful nuclear weapon states. The major objective of this research is to know Pakistan’s nuclear path that what factors motivated it to get nuclear weapons. The qualitative methodology is used and secondary data is being analyzed with content analysis to get the findings. This article tries to look at nuclear proliferation and nuclear non-proliferation regimes to check out Pakistan’s nuclear path. The article finds three things. First, the sense of conventional military inferiority and insecurity against India led Pakistan to follow nuclear path. Second, the cold war in Afghanistan between the United States and the Soviet Union proved to be a blessing in disguise for Pakistan to fulfill its dream of becoming a nuclear weapon state. Third, Pakistan became successful to get sensitive nuclear assistance from the China. Pakistan became successful in achieving the milestone of getting the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons in 1980s era.

Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Fuhrmann
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
The United States ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Know How ◽  
Nuclear Assistance ◽  
The Relationship

Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. In particular, countries that receive peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to initiate weapons programs and successfully develop the bomb, especially when they are also faced with security threats. Statistical analysis based on a new data set of more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed from 1950 to 2000 lends strong support for this argument. Brief case studies of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs provide further evidence of the links between peaceful nuclear assistance and proliferation. The finding that supplier countries inadvertently raise the risks of nuclear proliferation poses challenges to the conventional wisdom. Indeed, the relationship between civilian nuclear cooperation and proliferation is surprisingly broad. Even assistance that is often viewed as innocuous, such as training nuclear scientists or providing research or power reactors, increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will spread. “Proliferation-proof” nuclear assistance does not exist. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs.

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

2009 ◽  
Vol 103 (01) ◽  
pp. 113-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTHEW KROENIG
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Supply Side ◽  
Data Set ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Differential Effects ◽  
Simple Logic ◽  
Nuclear Assistance

Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new data set on sensitive nuclear transfers, this article analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This article presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.

scholarly journals The causes of proliferation of nuclear weapons: The case of the Middle East

Vojno delo ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
Vladislav Stefanović
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
East Region ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
To Come ◽  
Middle East Region

The subject of this paper is nuclear proliferation and its implications for regional and world security. The study seeks to explain the motive of states to come into possession of nuclear weapons. It also looks at the consequences for the region if one of the states comes into possession of nuclear weapons. The subject matter of the study covers the Middle East region to the greatest extent. Since proliferation is also present outside the region, other cases of proliferation will be included in the research. Proliferation cases outside the Middle East region will be a guide to understanding the proliferation developments in this region, and will seek to explain the causes of nuclear proliferation in the world.

Preventing proliferation: the impact on international politics

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International System ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Nuclear Industry ◽  
Economic Exchange ◽  
Military Interventions ◽  
Political Clout ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Pariah States

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.

Semi-Formal Diplomacy

2021 ◽  
pp. 530-542
Author(s):  
Nigel Inkster
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Broad Spectrum ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Mutual Understanding ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Academic Conferences

This chapter assesses semi-official diplomacy in the cyber domain. It begins by describing Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy. Track 2 diplomacy consists of a broad spectrum of activities ranging from academic conferences designed to address specific conflict-related diplomatic issues to much more generic people-to-people contacts designed to create a climate of greater mutual understanding. Meanwhile, Track 1.5 diplomacy seeks to leverage the strengths of both Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy. It became clear from an early stage that the United States, Russia, and China were in a position to determine the strategic evolution of the cyber domain due to their status as global geo-political actors, their advanced cyber capabilities, their possession of nuclear weapons, and their differences in values and ideology. Russia was the first to make a move towards semi-official diplomacy. Whereas Russia has taken a leading role in international negotiations on cyber governance and cybersecurity, China has arguably become more consequential in terms of how its relationship with the United States will shape the normative culture of the cyber domain. The chapter then considers other examples of semi-official diplomacy as well as prospects for further semi-official diplomacy in the cyber domain.

The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Alliance Politics

This chapter introduces the main themes and arguments of the book. It argues that alliances should make problematic instruments for thwarting nuclear proliferation despite the conventional wisdom that they have been partly responsible for keeping the number of states armed with nuclear weapons low. One reason is that they are ultimately unbelievable since states can still decide to forego spending blood and treasure to rescue an ally in dire need. Another reason is that strengthening alliance ties to discourage nuclear proliferation could lead to other undesirable behaviours that might increase the chance of war. In light of this puzzle, this introductory chapter sketches the book’s main argument that alliances can be most useful for preventing potential nuclear proliferation but much less useful for curbing actual nuclear proliferation.

Domestic politics, reputational sanctions, and international compliance

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong Hee Park ◽  
Kentaro Hirose
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Reputational Concerns

The argument that reputational concerns promote compliance is at the center of the literature of international cooperation. In this paper, we study how reputational sanctions affect compliance when domestic parties carry their own reputations in international negotiations. We showed that the prospect of international cooperation varies a lot depending on who sits at the negotiation table, how partisan preferences for compliance are different, and how much international audiences discriminate between different types of noncompliance. We illustrate implications of our model using episodes from the negotiations between the United States and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

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