scholarly journals Psychological Features of Extreme Political Ideologies

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

In this article, we examine psychological features of extreme political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and right-wing extremists similar to one another and different from moderates? We propose and review four interrelated propositions that explain adherence to extreme political ideologies from a psychological perspective. We argue that (a) psychological distress stimulates adopting an extreme ideological outlook; (b) extreme ideologies are characterized by a relatively simplistic, black-and-white perception of the social world; (c) because of such mental simplicity, political extremists are overconfident in their judgments; and (d) political extremists are less tolerant of different groups and opinions than political moderates. In closing, we discuss how these psychological features of political extremists increase the likelihood of conflict among groups in society.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shauna Marie Bowes ◽  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Caroline Lee ◽  
Stacey McElroy-Heltzel ◽  
Don E. Davis ◽  
...  

In recent years, an upsurge of polarization has been a salient feature of political discourse in America. A small but growing body of research has examined the potential relevance of intellectual humility (IH) to political polarization. In the present investigation, we extend this work to political myside bias, testing the hypothesis that IH is associated with less bias in two community samples (N1 = 498; N2 = 477). In line with our expectations, measures of IH were negatively correlated with political myside bias across paradigms, political topics, and samples. These relations were robust to controlling for humility. We also examined ideological asymmetries in the relations between IH and political myside bias, finding that IH-bias relations were statistically equivalent in members of the political left and right. Notwithstanding important limitations and caveats, these data establish IH as one of a small handful psychological features known to predict less political myside bias.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-334
Author(s):  
Viktor Pál ◽  
Leonardo Valenzuela Perez

Authoritarian regimes are often seen to be hostile toward the environment, albeit there is a growing body of literature suggesting a more nuanced image when it comes to authoritarian governments and the environment. However, several aspects of human-nature relationship need further clarification in non-democratic systems, both on the political left and right. In this article we aim to address that challenge by analysing Cold War economic and environmental goals and responses of the right-wing military junta in Chile under Pinochet and the Hungarian state-socialist, USSR-satellite regime under Kádár. By analysing two radically different political and economic approaches to economic catchup, while mitigating environmental costs on the way, this study aims to understand better the ecological motivations in authoritarian regimes operating diverse political and economic agendas.


Author(s):  
Arthur Brittan

Symbolic interactionism is in the main a US sociological and social psychological perspective that has focused on the reciprocal relationship between language, identity and society. Philosophically it has largely been associated with pragmatists such as James (1907), Mead (1934), Dewey (1922) and Pierce (1958), although in the European context it has affinities with hermeneutics and phenomenology. In addition, it has links with various ‘dramaturgical’ approaches to communication that emphasize the interactive processes underpinning the construction, negotiation, presentation and affirmation of the self. In brief, symbolic interactionism is premised on the supposition that human beings are ‘active’ and not ‘reactive’. Although it is not easy to spell out the central propositions of Symbolic Interactionism in a systematic way, nevertheless, most of its proponents are committed to an interactive view of self and society, that is, they take issue with those views that see the social world as a seamless unity that completely encapsulates and determines individual conduct.


Author(s):  
Svetlana Gorobievschi ◽  
Lavinia Nădrag

Throughout the knowledge-based human society development, the human factor in organizational management has become a competitive factor due to its professional competence and social skills. The authors of this research have set the aim of characterizing the entrepreneur from the social-psychological perspective that influences his/her ethical behavior. The authors have dealt with the typological and psychological traits from a theoretical perspective, have summarized the concept of temperament and character showing that there is interaction between them; also, they have characterized and classified them into groups, providing several examples. In the practical part, the authors conducted tests on students at the Technical University of Moldova using psychological evaluation tests of temperament and character, proposed by scholars well-known in this field.


2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Wetherly

AbstractIn a series of writings in recent years, Anthony Giddens has pursued two broad interconnected themes: reflection on the future of radical politics in a world in which, it is claimed, received political ideologies of Right and Left are exhausted; and, analysis of the character of what Giddens calls ‘second-phase’ modernisation. The connection between the two themes is straightforward: it is because the world has changed in profound ways that radical politics cannot be continued in the old way. Both of these themes are analysed at length in Beyond Left and Right. In this work, Giddens describes a long-run shift in our relationship to social and technological change manifest in the advance of ‘manufactured uncertainty’ or risk. This has been accelerated by a (more recent) shift from ‘simple’ to 'reflexive’ (or ‘second-phase’) modernisation which is a compound of a related series of developments during the post-war period – the ‘social revolutions of our time’ (globalisation and the rise of a posttraditional reflexive social order).


1962 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-391
Author(s):  
H. Tint

The patriotism of the French underwent a far-reaching reorientation between 1871 and 1940. Understood as the readiness to do one's best for one's country, if necessary by fighting for it, the most significant change that affected French patriotic feeling during this period is its shift from the political left to the right. Popular response to the republican call to arms after the fall of the Empire in 1870 was to know no future parallel in its magnitude and enthusiasm. Excluded from positions of political prominence, the working classes and their leaders soon came to think that if they had a patrie, it was not the Third Republic. On the other hand, the right after a century of forgetfulness, rediscovered the old patriotic slogans as the left discarded them. And it used them with considerable skill to its political advantage. But the difference between left- and right-wing patriotism is that defeat in 1870 brought to power a man determined to fight against heavy odds, Gambetta; while defeat in 1940 brought to power a man determined to capitulate before the enemy, Pétain. And yet it has to be recognized that the origins of this transformation are to be found in the policies of the same Gambetta who, no doubt deservedly, is commonly hailed as the Jacobin hero of French resistance in 1870–1.


2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722199761
Author(s):  
Shauna M. Bowes ◽  
Thomas H. Costello ◽  
Caroline Lee ◽  
Stacey McElroy-Heltzel ◽  
Don E. Davis ◽  
...  

In recent years, an upsurge of polarization has been a salient feature of political discourse in America. A small but growing body of research has examined the potential relevance of intellectual humility (IH) to political polarization. In the present investigation, we extend this work to political myside bias, testing the hypothesis that IH is associated with less bias in two community samples ( N1 = 498; N2 = 477). In line with our expectations, measures of IH were negatively correlated with political myside bias across paradigms, political topics, and samples. These relations were robust to controlling for humility. We also examined ideological asymmetries in the relations between IH and political myside bias, finding that IH–bias relations were statistically equivalent in members of the political left and right. Notwithstanding important limitations and caveats, these data establish IH as one of a small handful psychological features known to predict less political myside bias.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


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