Stepping Outside the Echo Chamber: Is Intellectual Humility Associated with Less Political Myside Bias?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shauna Marie Bowes ◽  
Thomas H Costello ◽  
Caroline Lee ◽  
Stacey McElroy-Heltzel ◽  
Don E. Davis ◽  
...  

In recent years, an upsurge of polarization has been a salient feature of political discourse in America. A small but growing body of research has examined the potential relevance of intellectual humility (IH) to political polarization. In the present investigation, we extend this work to political myside bias, testing the hypothesis that IH is associated with less bias in two community samples (N1 = 498; N2 = 477). In line with our expectations, measures of IH were negatively correlated with political myside bias across paradigms, political topics, and samples. These relations were robust to controlling for humility. We also examined ideological asymmetries in the relations between IH and political myside bias, finding that IH-bias relations were statistically equivalent in members of the political left and right. Notwithstanding important limitations and caveats, these data establish IH as one of a small handful psychological features known to predict less political myside bias.

2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722199761
Author(s):  
Shauna M. Bowes ◽  
Thomas H. Costello ◽  
Caroline Lee ◽  
Stacey McElroy-Heltzel ◽  
Don E. Davis ◽  
...  

In recent years, an upsurge of polarization has been a salient feature of political discourse in America. A small but growing body of research has examined the potential relevance of intellectual humility (IH) to political polarization. In the present investigation, we extend this work to political myside bias, testing the hypothesis that IH is associated with less bias in two community samples ( N1 = 498; N2 = 477). In line with our expectations, measures of IH were negatively correlated with political myside bias across paradigms, political topics, and samples. These relations were robust to controlling for humility. We also examined ideological asymmetries in the relations between IH and political myside bias, finding that IH–bias relations were statistically equivalent in members of the political left and right. Notwithstanding important limitations and caveats, these data establish IH as one of a small handful psychological features known to predict less political myside bias.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

In this article, we examine psychological features of extreme political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and right-wing extremists similar to one another and different from moderates? We propose and review four interrelated propositions that explain adherence to extreme political ideologies from a psychological perspective. We argue that (a) psychological distress stimulates adopting an extreme ideological outlook; (b) extreme ideologies are characterized by a relatively simplistic, black-and-white perception of the social world; (c) because of such mental simplicity, political extremists are overconfident in their judgments; and (d) political extremists are less tolerant of different groups and opinions than political moderates. In closing, we discuss how these psychological features of political extremists increase the likelihood of conflict among groups in society.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 114-119
Author(s):  
Ronald F. White

Let’s begin by addressing the most obvious question: given the vast number of books published on political science every year, why would the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences (APLS) and its journal Politics and the Life Sciences expend time, energy, and resources publishing a multiple-author analysis of a series of books that contain little (if anything) about the life sciences, Darwin, or evolution? The answer is that Cass R. Sunstein’s recent research on “nudge science” provides an excellent opportunity for APLS to expand its commitment to interdisciplinarity, especially its long-standing interest in behavioral economics. Sunstein, a prolific author, has written many books and scholarly articles defending “libertarian paternalism.” Libertarian critics have long argued that the conjunction of “libertarian” and “paternalism” is oxymoronic and that the “liberty principle” or the “principle of autonomy” excludes paternalistic intervention on behalf of rational, competent adults. Over the years, with varying degrees of success, Sunstein has addressed many, if not most, lines of criticism emanating from the political left and right. Like many scholars, his views have evolved over time based on that criticism. This introductory essay will focus on some of the more enduring elements of the conceptual framework and issues that underlie nudge science in the larger context of behavioral economics, including choice architecture, political bans and mandates, political nudges, ethics, and paternalistic intervention.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Campbell Jones

This paper arises from a request to report to the Future of Work Commission on the question of the value of work in the past, present, and future politics of the Left. This task is complicated, however, by the complexity of the meaning of the terms Left and Right. It is only when we are clear about the meanings of Left and Right that we can be clear about the very different kinds of politics that will result from taking a Left position on work. This paper seeks to clarify what a Left politics of work might look like today. This requires in the first place an analysis of the respective value of work to the political Left and Right, to which end I argue that what distinguishes the Left and the Right regarding the value of work is not simply the quantity of value or dignity that is attributed to work. Rather, Left and Right depart in a fundamental ontological confrontation regarding the nature of what work is and the existence of the bodies from which work issues. This analysis therefore raises deeper questions regarding the very distinction between the Left and the Right.  


2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 575-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendon Westler ◽  
Aurelian Craiutu

AbstractThis essay examines the role of “critical spectatorship” in the writings of two distinguished European intellectuals, José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) and Raymond Aron (1905–1983). We begin the paper by commenting on the struggle between civilization and barbarism, a fundamental topic in their works. We then examine the rhetoric of going beyond the political left and right, which both Ortega and Aron used in their writings. Next, we turn to the concept of “critical spectatorship” that is central to their thought and comment on the similarities and differences between their forms of social and political criticism. We conclude by drawing a few conclusions on the relevance of Ortega's and Aron's ideas for us today.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174387212095983
Author(s):  
Nancy Leong ◽  
Kevin M. Whitfield

This commentary examines academic freedom in the context of racist campus speech. Drawing on both historical and contemporary events, it argues that the protection of racist campus speech – and the emphasis from some elements of the political left and right on the importance of of protecting such speech – in fact suppresses ideas and speech from faculty and students of color. In particular, protecting racist campus speech silences anti-racist ideas and speech. This suppression results in substantial harms to academic freedom for groups and ideas that badly need it: faculty and students of color, who are often underrepresented and marginalized on campus, and anti-racist speech, which is frequently treated as unimportant or unintellectual.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noa Katabi ◽  
Hadas Simon ◽  
Sharon Yakim ◽  
Inbal Ravreby ◽  
Yaara Yeshurun

Recent political polarization has highlighted the extent to which individuals with opposing views experience ongoing events in markedly different ways. In this study, we explored the neural mechanisms underpinning this phenomenon. We conducted functional magnetic resonance image (fMRI) scanning right- and left-wing participants watching political videos just before the 2019 elections in Israel. Behavioral results demonstrated significant differences between left- and right-wing participants in their interpretation of the videos' content. Neuroimaging results revealed partisanship-dependent differences in both high-order regions and early-motor and somato-sensory regions, although no such differences were found with regard to neutral content. Moreover, we found that most of the political content was more potent in synchronizing participants with right-wing views, and that this synchronization was observed already in early visual and auditory cortices. These results suggest that political polarization is not limited to higher-order processes as previously thought, but rather emerges already in motor and sensory regions.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Almog Simchon ◽  
William J. Brady ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel

Political polarization, or the ideological distance between the political left and right, has grown steadily in recent decades. There is a rising concern over the role that ‘bad actors’ or trolls may play in polarization in online networks. In this research, we examine the processes by which trolls may sow intergroup conflict through polarizing rhetoric. We developed a dictionary to gauge online polarization by measuring language associated with communications that display partisan bias in their diffusion. We validated the polarized language dictionary in three different contexts and across multiple time periods. We found the polarization dictionary made out-of-set predictions, generalized to new political contexts (#BlackLivesMatter), and predicted partisan differences in public polls about COVID-19. Then we analyzed 383,510 tweets from a known Russian troll source (the Internet Research Agency) and found that their use of polarized language has increased over time. We also compared troll tweets from 3 different countries (N = 798,33) and found that they all utilize more polarized language on average than a control dataset of tweets from regular Americans (N = 1,507,300) and trolls have dramatically increased their use of polarized rhetoric over time. These results illustrate how trolls leverage polarized language. We also provide an open-source, simple tool for exploration of polarized communications on social media.


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