scholarly journals Protest Leadership and Repertoire: A Comparative Analysis of Peasant Protest in Hunan in the 1990s

2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu Zhang

Based on detailed ethnographic fieldwork, this paper compares two cases of peasant protest against heavy taxes and fees in a northern Hunan county in the 1990s. It argues that peasant protest did not arise spontaneously. Rather, it erupted when leaders emerged who used central policy documents on lowering peasant taxes and fees to mobilise peasants. Protest leaders were articulate and public-spirited peasants who had received political training from the local party-state. Furthermore, the number of leaders, their education level, and their relationship with the local party-state explain why the repertoire and the scope of the two protests varied. Protests led by less educated veteran Communist Party cadres tended to be milder and smaller than those led by better-educated peasants more distant from the local party-state. This paper helps us to understand the process of peasant mobilisation in contemporary China and explains why peasant protest varies across cases.

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-52
Author(s):  
A.B. GULARYAN ◽  

The purpose of the article is to use archival material collected in the archives of Orel, Voronezh, Omsk and Novosibirsk to reveal the role of party and Komsomol activists in the leadership of the OGPU bodies in the regions of Orel and Omsk. The comparative analysis showed that similar processes took place in the regions. The OGPU bodies were locally controlled by the party apparatus, but, in turn, they monitored the behavior of ordinary communists and Komsomol members, and in some cases during the period of party purges, the leading employees as well. In some cases, there was ‘linkage’ between the Chekist and the Party-Chekist leadership, which allowed to weaken the control of party bodies. In addition, from the mid-1920s the process of removing the OGPU from the local party bodies control was launched, which remained only for the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. This, according to the author of the article, contributed to the «great purge» of 1937.


Asian Survey ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (5) ◽  
pp. 870-888
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai ◽  
Zheng-Wei Lin

Rumors are a set of collective discussions used by cadres or the masses to attain specific goals. Both political elites and the general public reveal their dissatisfaction or concern with the Chinese Communist Party regime through the dissemination of politically charged rumors, fueled by the party-state system’s habit of withholding information and amplified by traditional Chinese superstition.


Asian Survey ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Gorman

This article explores the relationship between netizens and the Chinese Communist Party by investigating examples of “flesh searches” targeting corrupt officials. Case studies link the initiative of netizens and the reaction of the Chinese state to the pattern of management of social space in contemporary China.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-54
Author(s):  
Fiona Haig

Democratic centralism was the Leninist-Bolshevik pyramidal model of internal organization in operation in all communist parties for most of the 20th century. Thus far, the question of whether it functioned consistently across the non-ruling parties has not been addressed explicitly or systematically. This article examines the implementation of this essential internal dynamic in a French and an Italian communist party federation in the early postwar period. Drawing on new personal testimonies from more than 50 informants, and inedita archival evidence, this analysis reveals not only similarities but also clear functional disparities between the two cases.


2000 ◽  
Vol 163 ◽  
pp. 806-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Read

While observers of China have always paid attention to the “base-level” administrative institutions and mass organizations created by the Communist party-state, urban Residents' Committees (RCs; jumin weiyuanhui) have received relatively little study in recent years. Though the RCs remain pervasive in most areas of most cities and engage the energies of millions of activists and volunteers, this neglect is understandable. During the Mao era, Western writing on neighbourhood organizations emphasized their role in helping to police and administer the harsh political order that gripped the cities. In the 1980s and 1990s, the authorities have yielded much greater space to a private sphere in which law-abiding individuals are relatively free from intrusion. Instruments of state penetration such as the RCs have seemed less worthy of analysis. They also lack the requisite autonomy to qualify as part of an emergent civil society, and moreover their limited progress in serving as a focus for democratic participation earns them much less international attention than their rural equivalents, the Villagers' Committees. They may even seem worthy of derision rather than study; merely mentioning the term juweihui often brings an amused smile to people's faces, as it connotes ageing, officious busy bodies poking into people's personal matters.


Modern China ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 322-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ding Xiaodong

This article argues that the Chinese Communist Party has adopted a unique understanding of law. Unlike the liberal view and the unwritten constitution view, which generally consider law as positive norms that exist independently of politics, the party understands law as a reflection of the party’s and the people’s will and a form of the party’s and the people’s self-discipline. In the party’s view, liberal rule of law theories are self-contradictory, illusive, and meaningless. This article argues that the party views the people as a political concept and itself as a political leading party, marking a fundamental difference from a competitive party in a parliamentary system. The legitimacy of the party’s dominant role and the party-state regime, therefore, depends on whether the party can continue to provide political momentum to lead the people and represent them in the future.


Author(s):  
Hoe Su Fern

This chapter examines the role of the arts and artists in rejuvenating urban spaces in Singapore, where place management ideas are currently being used to rejuvenate parts of the city centre. Coexisting alongside state-driven initiatives are artist-led strategies where local art practitioners and organizations activate latent and/or under-utilized spaces. Through an analysis of policy documents and qualitative ethnographic fieldwork, this study explores the interplay between top-down aspirations and formal place management efforts, and the organic ways artists have activated and engaged with spaces. Ultimately, I argue that there is a need to balance formal governance structures with more support for artists engaging in organic, ground-up initiatives.


2004 ◽  
Vol 179 ◽  
pp. 703-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hon S. Chan

Nomenklatura, which establishes Party and governmental leadership in China, is a key instrument of Communist Party control. Changes in the nomenklatura reveal shifts and strains in Chinese governmental and personnel management. This research report analyses the latest nomenklatura configuration, established in 1998, and compares it to the 1990 one. It reveals that the major thrust in 1998 was to reform state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and argues that the Party faces a difficult trade-off between maintaining political primacy and achieving economic flexibility. It shows that the changes in the 1998 nomenklatura clearly encapsulate the contradictory desires of the party-state – economic modernization through marketization combined with continued political control. Central control for some strategic SOEs now exists alongside much looser control of smaller enterprises.


Author(s):  
Yu Tao

The relationship between religion and protest has been thoroughly discussed in various academic disciplines of social sciences, but there is far from consensus on the topic. Scholars differ significantly in their opinions on how religious values and doctrines shape the mechanisms which link protest and religion, and on how interaction between religious groups, the state, and other secular and religious groups may increase or reduce the likelihood of protests. Contemporary China provides an ideal setting in which to further advance scholarly understanding of roles that religion plays in protest, thanks to its richness, diversity, and complexity of religion, protest, and their relationship. In contemporary China, due to the inherent, profound, and possibly deliberate ambiguities within the state’s legal and regulatory arrangements on religious affairs, the boundaries between government-sanctioned churches and “underground” churches are often blurred. Many Christianity-related protests directly respond to government crackdowns, which are aimed not only at those congregations and groups that are normally considered as “underground,” “unofficial,” or “independent,” but also at churches that have long been tolerated or even officially recognized by the state. Further, while many Christianity-related protests are closely associated with the clash of ideologies in contemporary China, the specific causes of protests differ significantly among Catholic and Protestant churches, and Christian-inspired groups. The ideological incompatibility between the ruling Communist Party and the Catholic Church in China is epitomized by their struggle for authority and influence over the Chinese Catholic community. Until the provisional agreement signed between Beijing and the Vatican in September 2018, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Holy See had been competing fiercely for the authority to approve the ordination of new bishops, with such confrontations triggering numerous protests among Chinese Catholics. Unlike the Catholic Church, many of the Protestant churches that have emerged in the post-Mao era—including most “house” churches that do not affiliate with the state-sanctioned church—have no direct link with the transnational denominations which were active in China before the communist takeover in 1949 and are operated solely by Chinese citizens. However, while many Chinese Protestants display affection toward China and a sense of responsibility for improving their country, some influential Protestant church leaders have turned their progressive theology into social activism since the turn of the 21st century, leading to various forms of protests against the authoritarian policies and politics in contemporary China. Ideological and theological conflicts between different religions or religious schools may also trigger the Chinese state’s suppression of certain religious groups and activities, which often in turn cause protests. In particular, the Communist Party tends to impose extremely harsh repercussions on religious groups that are accused by mainstream Christianity of being “heterodoxies,” like the Shouters and the Disciples. These religious groups are often labelled as “evil cults” and their leaders and members often face legal action or even criminal charges. The protests organized by these religious groups have not only targeted the government but also the mainstream Christian churches that criticize them from a theological point of view. Given the profound ideological and political incompatibility of the CCP and various Christian groups, it is unlikely that Christianity can replicate the close collaborations that Buddhism and Daoism have developed with the CCP since the early 1980s.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document