Liberals Possess More National Consensus on Political Attitudes in the United States: An Examination Across 40 Years

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (8) ◽  
pp. 935-943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ondish ◽  
Chadly Stern

Do liberals or conservatives have more agreement in their political attitudes? Recent research indicates that conservatives may have more like-minded social groups than do liberals, but whether conservatives have more consensus on a broad, national level remains an open question. Using two nationally representative data sets (the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies), we examined the attitudes of over 80,000 people on more than 400 political issues (e.g., attitudes toward welfare, gun control, same-sex marriage) across approximately 40 years. In both data sets, we found that liberals possessed a larger degree of agreement in their political attitudes than did conservatives. Additionally, both liberals and conservatives possessed more consensus than did political moderates. These results indicate that social–cognitive motivations for building similarity and consensus within one’s self-created social groups may also yield less consensus on a broad, national level. We discuss implications for effective political mobilization and social change.

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria D. H. Koeppel ◽  
Matt R. Nobles

This research examines female gun ownership trends from 1973 to 2010. Nationally representative General Social Survey data are used to compare rates for male and female gun ownership. In light of the specific marketing trends by gun manufacturers beginning in the mid-1990s as well as previous findings within the literature, we test (a) whether an increase in female gun ownership is observed from 1973 to 2010, (b) whether female gun owners report increased fear of crime, and (c) the extent to which other gun-owning motivations, especially hunting, shape women’s gun ownership. Our analysis confirms a decline in women’s gun ownership, but in contrast to previous studies emphasizing a link between fear of crime and female gun ownership, we find that hobbies and lifestyle factors may better explain women’s interests in firearms. We could conclude by highlighting avenues for new research that better take into account the heterogeneity of gun ownership in the United States.


2020 ◽  
pp. 103-124
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy

This chapter explores the ‘culture wars’ both in Europe and in the United States. In Europe, ‘values’ have probably never before been mentioned so frequently in discourse and political debates as they have since the 2000s. This trend actually dates to the American ‘culture wars’, which have been going on since the 1970s. The expression ‘culture wars’ denotes the war on values within American society, a war pitting liberal culture, which stands against discrimination and in favour of abortion rights, gun control, and some form of social security, against a ‘Christian right’ led by evangelical Protestants in the southern United States, whose core political issues are the fight against abortion and same-sex marriage, and who oppose gun control, universal health care, immigration, and affirmative action. Things are more complex in Europe because the two fronts do not coincide. In the debate on values, the internal front pits Christian conservatives against secularists of all persuasions, liberals and populists alike; the main issues revolve around abortion and same-sex marriage. The external front, on the other hand, puts the idea of ‘Europe’ in opposition to Islam: the issue is concerned with the cultural antagonism between Muslim immigrants and Europeans and with European societies' fear of becoming ‘Islamized’.


Author(s):  
Kimberly R. Huyser ◽  
Sofia Locklear

American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) Peoples are diverse, but their diversity is statistically flattened in national-level survey data and, subsequently, in contemporary understandings of race and inequality in the United States. This chapter demonstrates the utility of disaggregated data for gaining, for instance, nuanced information on social outcomes such as educational attainment and income levels, and shaping resource allocation accordingly. Throughout, it explores both reasons and remedies for AIAN invisibility in large data sets. Using their personal identities as a case in point, the authors argue for more refined survey instruments, informed by Indigenous modes of identity and affiliation, not only to raise the statistical salience of AIANs but also to paint a fuller picture of a vibrant, heterogeneous First Peoples all too often dismissed as a vanishing people.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 2854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Spang ◽  
Bret Stevens

Given the high proportion of water consumption for agriculture, as well as the relatively common occurrence of crop losses in the field, we estimate the amount of water embedded in crops left on the farm. We are particularly interested in understanding losses associated with fruits and vegetables, having a higher level of harvesting selectivity and perishability (and thus, losses) than grain crops. We further refined the study to focus on potatoes, as they represent the largest acreage under cultivation of all fruit and vegetable crops in the U.S. We attempt to get the most complete understanding of pre-harvest and harvest loss data for potatoes by leveraging three centralized data sets collected and managed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). By integrating these three distinct data sets for the five-year period 2012–2016, we are able to estimate water consumption for potato cultivation for total in-field losses by production stage and driver of loss for seven major potato-producing states (representing 77% of total U.S. potato production). Our results suggest that 3.6%–17.9% of potatoes are lost in the field with a total estimated blue water footprint of approximately 84.6 million cubic meters. We also find that the leading driver for crop loss for in-field potato production is harvest sorting and grading, accounting for 84% of total lost production at the farm. We conclude with a discussion of opportunities for improved national level data collection to provide a better understanding of in-field crop losses over time and the resource footprints of these losses.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L Whitehead

While a growing body of research focuses on Americans’ attitudes toward same-sex couples as parents, very few include measures of religion and those that do fail to capture its multidimensional nature. Furthermore, many past studies rely on convenience samples of college students, or samples gathered outside the United States. Multivariate analyses of the 2012 General Social Survey – a nationally representative sample of adults in the United States – reveal that a slim majority of Americans still do not believe same-sex couples can parent as well as male-female couples and the religious beliefs, behaviors, and affiliations of Americans are significantly and at times differentially associated with appraisals of same-sex couples’ parenting abilities. It appears that while religion is generally associated with more negative appraisals of the parenting abilities of same-sex couples, it is not uniformly so. Americans’ immediate religious and cultural context can shape their appraisals of homosexuality in diverse ways.


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 256-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Jacob Steinman ◽  
Athe Bambakidis

Purpose. Estimate the prevalence of and identify characteristics associated with religious congregations' collaboration with health agencies. Design. Cross-sectional analyses of self-report data from the National Congregations Study, a random sample of religious congregations generated from the 1998 General Social Survey. Setting. United States. Subjects. Key informants from 1236 congregations. Each respondent described a single congregation. Measures. Respondents provided open-ended descriptions of congregational programs. Researchers coded program descriptions by content (e.g., domestic violence) and whether the program involved collaboration with a secular agency. Other congregational characteristics (e.g., denomination) were measured by validated measures and linked census tract data. Results. Overall, 11.1% of congregations participated in faith-health collaboration (FHC). Logistic regression analyses found that FHC was more common among congregations with more members, with a small proportion of congregants under 35 years, and with a senior pastor with a graduate degree. Other effects were conditional; for instance, denominational differences varied depending on urban/suburban/rural location and the proportion of low-income members. Conclusion. This study provides the first national estimates of the prevalence of FHC. Such collaborative efforts may require different approaches in different areas. These results can help practitioners identify congregations that may be more willing to collaborate.


Author(s):  
Christina Ladam ◽  
Ian Shapiro ◽  
Anand Sokhey

As the most common form of voluntary association in America, houses of worship remain an unquestionably critical component of American civil society. Major approaches to studying religion and politics in the United States are described, and the authors present an argument for focusing more attention on the organizational experience provided by religious contexts: studying how individuals’ social networks intersect with their associational involvements (i.e., studying religion from a “interpersonal” perspective) may actually shed new light on intrapersonal, psychological constructs like identity and religiosity. Evidence is presented from two nationally representative data sets that suggests considerable variance in the degree to which individuals’ core social networks overlap with their houses of worship. This variance exists within and between individuals identifying with major religious traditions, and such networks are not characterized solely by agreement (as theories of self-selection might suggest).


Author(s):  
Gwyneth McClendon

Despite predictions that urbanization, economic development and globalization would lead to the recession of religion from public life, populations around the world continue to be highly religious. This pattern holds in most parts of the Global South and also in some advanced industrial democracies in the North, including in the United States. In grappling with the influence (or lack thereof) of religion on political life, a growing body of literature pays attention to how clergy–congregant communication might shape listeners’ political attitudes and behaviors. Considerable debate remains as to whether clergy–congregant communication is likely to change political attitudes and behavior, but there is a greater consensus around the idea that exposure to religious communication can at the very least prime (that is, increase the salience of) certain considerations that in turn affect how people evaluate political issues and whether they participate in politics. Religious communication is more likely to exert a persuasive and a priming influence among those already inclined to select into the communication and when the source of the communication is credible. More research is needed on the duration of religious primes and on the effects of religious communication in different political and social contexts around the world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengjie Lyu ◽  
Wangyang Li ◽  
Yu Xie

It is well known that children’s academic performances are affected by both their family backgrounds and contextual or structural factors such as the urban–rural difference and regional variation. This article evaluates the relative importance of family background versus structural factors in determining children’s academic achievements across three different societies: China, the United States of America, and Germany, analyzing data from five large-scale, high-quality, and nationally representative data sets. The results reveal two main findings: (a) family socioeconomic status exerts much stronger positive effects on children’s academic achievement in the USA and Germany than in China; and (b) structural factors (such as those measured by location and urban/rural residence) play much smaller roles in the USA and Germany than in China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 527-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candis Watts Smith ◽  
Rebecca J. Kreitzer ◽  
Feiya Suo

Although many scholars who study the role of racial animus in Americans’ political attitudes and policy preferences do so to help us understand national-level politics, (racialized) policy is largely shaped at the state level. States are laboratories of policy innovation whose experiments can exacerbate or ameliorate racial inequality. In this article, we develop state-level scores of racial resentment. By using linear multilevel regression and poststratification weighting techniques and by linking nationally representative survey data with US Census data, we create time-varying, dynamic state-level estimates of racial resentment from 1988 to 2016. These measures enable us to explore the extent to which subnational levels of racial attitudes fluctuate over time and to provide a comparative analysis of state-level racial resentment scores across space and time. We find that states’ levels of racial animus change slowly, with some exhibiting increases over time while others do just the opposite. Southern states’ reputation for having the highest levels of racial resentment has been challenged by states across various regions of the United States. Many states had their lowest levels of symbolic racism decades ago, contrary to the traditional American narrative of racial progress.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document