The Religious Secession

This chapter assesses the issuance of the encyclical Humanæ vitæ in July of 1968, which imposed on Catholics a stringent code of sexual morality in line with Pius XI's 1930 encyclical Casti connubii, or ‘chastity in marriage’. In particular, Humanæ vitæ rejected all forms of artificial contraception. Many Christians were expecting the Church to adapt to the tide of sexual liberation, but instead, just when birth control pills appeared on the European market, hence proposing an alternative to abortion, the pope issued an encyclical taking a stance against the changing mores. Sexual morality came to be the newest battlefront between religion and Europe's dominant culture, and became central to the way of life promoted by the Church. What once bridged the gap between believers and nonbelievers, namely a shared base of secularized Christian values, had faded or disappeared. This raises some serious questions: If the Church no longer recognizes the dominant culture in Europe today as Christian, who would take the liberty of claiming that Europe's identity is Christian? And how could this Christian identity be reclaimed without a battle for Europe's morals, which would be directed less against Islam than against European society itself? Not only does this change the position of the Catholic Church but it also alters the very meaning of what it is to be a believer in Europe.

Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the debate over Europe's Christian identity. Since the Treaty of Rome, there have been two significant developments for Christianity in Europe. First, secularization has given way to the large-scale dechristianization of European societies in both religious and cultural terms, especially from the protests of 1968 onwards. Second, Islam has arrived in Europe, through immigration and, with Turkey's application for membership of the EU, the proposed expansion of the continent's borders. Thus, the debate over Europe's Christian identity does not rest on a binary opposition between Europe and Islam, but on a triangle whose three poles are: (1) the Christian religion; (2) Europe's secular values (even if they occasionally make reference to a Christian identity); (3) Islam as a religion. However, the debate over Islam are much deeper questions about the very nature of Europe and its relationship to religion in general. The notion that Europe would be fine if only Islam or immigration did not exist is, of course, an illusion. There is a serious crisis surrounding European identity and the place of religion in the public sphere, as can be seen both in Christian radicalization over the issues of abortion and same-sex marriage, and in secular radicalization over religious slaughter and circumcision. This is nothing short of a crisis in European culture.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter discusses how values are returning today in the guise of dominant norms, both in the secular world and in religion. Today's crisis is not simply a crisis of values, but of referring to values at all. For what should values be founded on? On one hand, religions, which are no longer in sync with Europe's dominant cultures, are returning to the public sphere on behalf of a normative demand. On the other hand, the secular culture that professes freedom and rights is coming to a head in a burst of normative production. This is a normativity toward all forms of religion and religiosity, of course, but also normativity with respect to its own foundation, the social contract, and human nature, that of the desiring subject. Ultimately, the chapter argues that it is time to re-examine the question of values, to restore the particular cultural and social aspects of norms and to reinject them into society. In the face of globalization, the issue is at once to be more in touch with society and to act as a counterweight to other influences in the world: only Europe can meet these two objectives.

The End of Christian Europe or the End of Religion?

This chapter addresses how religion is now widely perceived in Europe as a problem. As discussed, there are three discernible fronts in this battle. First, the hardcore secularists: for them, religion is in itself abominable, but their focus today is on the threat posed by Islam, rather than the Church. Then there are the identitarians, for whom Christianity is bound up with Europe's identity, just as long as it does not interfere with their daily life, lecture them on loving their neighbour, or preach to them about ethics and values. Last, there are, of course, faith communities who believe that their own religion is part of the solution and not the problem. The chapter then highlights Europe's relationship with Islam. It also argues that if Christianity's place in society is shrinking, it is because, in addition to the broad trend of secularization, the urge to limit the role of Islam amounts to reducing the religious sphere in general. At the same time, the desire to promote Christian identity as a means to counter the rise of Islam results in the increased secularization of Christianity.

Identity and Values

This chapter explores the ‘culture wars’ both in Europe and in the United States. In Europe, ‘values’ have probably never before been mentioned so frequently in discourse and political debates as they have since the 2000s. This trend actually dates to the American ‘culture wars’, which have been going on since the 1970s. The expression ‘culture wars’ denotes the war on values within American society, a war pitting liberal culture, which stands against discrimination and in favour of abortion rights, gun control, and some form of social security, against a ‘Christian right’ led by evangelical Protestants in the southern United States, whose core political issues are the fight against abortion and same-sex marriage, and who oppose gun control, universal health care, immigration, and affirmative action. Things are more complex in Europe because the two fronts do not coincide. In the debate on values, the internal front pits Christian conservatives against secularists of all persuasions, liberals and populists alike; the main issues revolve around abortion and same-sex marriage. The external front, on the other hand, puts the idea of ‘Europe’ in opposition to Islam: the issue is concerned with the cultural antagonism between Muslim immigrants and Europeans and with European societies' fear of becoming ‘Islamized’.

The Self-Secularization of Religion

This chapter focuses on the Catholic Church's transition to modernity, which did not initially occur by way of theological reform. It came about through pastoral and missionary praxis as well as the rise in power of lay Christian actors: between two popes known for their intransigence, Pope Leo XIII, without compromising on any religious dogma, opened the way for the Church to engage with secular politics. Moreover, Pope Leo XIII took into account the ‘social question’, acknowledging that people were no longer living in a traditional society. The issue was no longer to bring the faithful back to church. The Church now had to reach out to secular society, which meant organizing open, socially oriented pastoral work and using secular political instruments—in other words what was to become Christian democracy—which no longer required religious observance but simple adherence to secularized Christian values. Ultimately, for global Catholicism, the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) hailed the adaptation of theology and ritual to modernism, ending a decades-long fight. Some have described it as a Protestant approach, or a Catholic version of the self-secularization of religion.

The Turning Point of the 1960s

This chapter looks at several key moments in the 1960s: After Vatican II and the triumph of religion's self-secularization came the encyclical Humanæ vitæ in 1968, advocating a maximalist position forbidding any sexual activity not intended for procreation. Catholics did not understand this position that had seemingly come out of the blue. Secularists were outraged at the reactionary pope. Why, when the Church Council had elaborated a theology of modernity, would Pope Paul VI reaffirm traditional norms? He did so because he realized there had been a radical change in shared values, meaning that ‘natural’ law and morality were no longer in accordance. Society's values were no longer secularized Christian values; new values had been founded on individualism, freedom, and the valorization of desire. Moreover, at a time when the Church and secular society seemed to have reconciled over the defence of common values, the 1960s witnessed the affirmation of a new anthropological paradigm that shattered this common base. A wave of youth revolts swept through the world during the ten years between 1963 and 1973. In Western Europe and the United States, these youth movements brought about a radical change in the system of dominant values, which gradually became enshrined in law everywhere over the fifty years that followed 1968.

Another Source of Morality?

This chapter details the Catholic Church's struggle with modernism during 1864–1964. This was a century of tension, even conflict, but also one of misunderstanding between the Church and European states. The quarrels affected all of Europe, and they all resulted in disqualifying religion as the source of shared values, although in different ways. Ultimately, in the 1960s, they produced another divorce between Catholicism and secularism, which this time pertained not to the source of values but to the very definition of what is good. The chapter then considers the Catholic Church's reaction against modernism. In the eyes of the Church, the rejection of ‘modernism’ pertained to two essential points: its role in society and its authority in matters of values. The first conflict was political. It pitted the Church not only against secular and anticlerical forces but also against conservative states that professed to be Christian.

Does Secularization Mean Dechristianization?

This chapter examines secularization. Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, there has no longer been only one form of Christianity: a choice has to be made between Protestantism and Catholicism. But more important is the development, from the eighteenth century onward, of what is commonly called secularization. The term actually refers to two different phenomena, which may or may not coincide. The first form of secularization is based on a legal and constitutional concept: the autonomy of the political sphere, leading either to the separation of the state from religious institutions, or to the political takeover of the religious sphere. The second form of secularization is sociological in nature: it denotes the decline in religious observance and the disappearance of religion as the focus of social and cultural life. This is what is called dechristianization in Europe. However, the decline in religious practice across Europe does not necessarily make references to religious identity irrelevant. That people no longer believe in God does not mean society is no longer Christian in its values, such as respect for human dignity, and its institutions.

Europe’s Christian Heritage

This chapter discusses Europe's Christian heritage. The importance of Christianity in European history, even in the very idea of Europe, cannot be doubted. The area which can be called Europe today roughly corresponds to eleventh-century Latin Christendom, and it is self-evident that the main legal and political concepts that structured state-building, and later European integration, were forged in a Christian milieu. The chapter then looks at key moments in Christianity's history: the emergence of the Protestant Reformation; and the Wars of Religion. Following the Age of Discovery and the first phase of colonial expansion, Europe no longer had a monopoly on Christianity. At the very start of the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church quickly undertook a worldwide missionary project. Overseas, it again encountered the problem of tension with European states, but this time in their colonial guise. The nineteenth century was also a period of tension between the Church and European governments, as political anticlericalism mounted. Ultimately, the globalization of Christianity has inherently altered its relationship to Europe. Even if Europe continues to perceive itself as Christian, Christianity is only marginally European.