scholarly journals On the measurement of conspiracy beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316801876359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Steven M. Smallpage
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Barack Obama ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Measurement Strategies

Are so-called “birthers” best thought of as true conspiracy theorists, or are they merely partisans expressing a sharp dislike of Barack Obama? Recent work on conspiracy beliefs finds that “birthers” are the product of partisan and ideological motivated reasoning. In this manuscript, we explore how the measurement strategies we employ on public opinion surveys may influence the substantive conclusions we draw about conspiratorial beliefs, rumors, and misinformation. We find that partisan stimuli influence reported beliefs in several different conspiracy theories, and, subsequently, the relationships between individual stated beliefs in those conspiracy theories. The implications of these findings are discussed.

Dilemmas of Distrust: Conspiracy Beliefs, Elite Rhetoric, and Motivated Reasoning

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110345
Author(s):  
Scott Radnitz
Keyword(s):  
Relative Weight ◽  
State Level ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Political Rhetoric ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
The Individual

Conspiracy theories are playing an increasingly prominent role worldwide in both political rhetoric and popular belief. Previous research has emphasized the individual-level factors behind conspiracy belief but paid less attention to the role of elite framing, while focusing mostly on domestic political contexts. This study assesses the relative weight of official conspiracy claims and motivated biases in producing conspiracy beliefs, in two countries where identities other than partisanship are salient: Georgia and Kazakhstan. I report the results of a survey experiment that depicts a possible conspiracy and varies the content of official claims and relevant contextual details. The results show that motivated reasoning stemming from state-level geopolitical identities is strongly associated with higher conspiracy belief, whereas official claims have little effect on people’s perceptions of conspiracy. Respondents who exhibit higher conspiracy ideation are more likely to perceive a conspiracy but do not weight motivated biases or official claims differently from people with lower conspiratorial predispositions. The findings indicate the importance of (geopolitical) identities in shaping conspiracy beliefs and highlight some of the constraints facing elites who seek to benefit from the use of conspiracy claims.

scholarly journals How populism and conservative media fuel conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19 and what it means for COVID-19 behaviors

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316802199397
Author(s):  
Dominik A. Stecula ◽  
Mark Pickup
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Partisan Polarization ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Public Health Officials ◽  
American Society ◽  
Conservative Media ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

Research examining attitudes and behaviors of Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic has largely focused on partisanship as a lens through which many Americans see the coronavirus. Given the importance of partisan affiliation and the degree of partisan polarization in the American society, that is certainly an important driver of public opinion, and a necessary one to understand. But an overlooked set of predispositions might also shape COVID beliefs and attitudes: populism. It is a worldview that pits average citizens against “the elites” and, importantly in the context of a pandemic, it includes anti-intellectual attitudes such as distrust of experts (including scientists). We find that populism is correlated with conspiracy beliefs about COVID-19, above and beyond partisanship. Furthermore, we find that conservative media consumption tends to be a stronger predictor of conspiracy belief among those high in populism than among those low in populism. We also show that these beliefs have consequences: those who believe the conspiracy theories about COVID-19 are less likely to adapt behaviors recommended by public health officials.

Denial and Acknowledgment in Serbia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diane Orentlicher
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Social Identity ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Science Research ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys ◽  
The Rich

A paramount hope of Serbians who supported the ICTY was that its judgments would convince Serbian society that Serbs committed mass atrocities with extensive support from the Serbian government, and would persuade Serbia’s citizens and government to condemn those crimes unequivocally. During the first five or six years following the collapse of the Milošević regime, there was palpable progress in this sphere, a trend many Serbians believe the ICTY influenced. More recent years have, however, seen a rise in denialism. This chapter explores factors that account for each of these trends. Its conclusions reflect the rich insights of Serbians who administered periodic public opinion surveys, as well as social science research illuminating dynamics behind entrenched yet false beliefs, such as confirmation biases, motivated reasoning, social identity, heuristics, and framing effects.

»Sometimes you just have to go in « – The link between conspiracy beliefs and political action

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pia Lamberty ◽  
David Leiser
Keyword(s):  
Longitudinal Study ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Violent Action ◽  
One Year

Even though conspiracy theories often address political issues, the question of how conspiracy beliefs affect people's political action has not been satisfyingly answered. We show how conspiracy beliefs are linked to political action. Study 1 (N = 203) shows that conspiracy beliefs were linked to violence. Study 2 (N = 268) supported the notion that conspiracy beliefs were linked to weaker support for normative actions and stronger support of violent action. In Study 3 (N = 180), we explored experimentally whether conspiracy beliefs increase violent action. The longitudinal Study 4 (N T1 = 523, N T2 = 274, N T3 = 199) showed over a timespan of one year that conspiracy beliefs increased non-normative political action.

scholarly journals COVID-19 conspiracy theories

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen M. Douglas
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Intergroup Relations ◽  
Group Processes ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Potential Impact

Conspiracy theories started to appear on social media immediately after the first news about COVID-19. Is the virus a hoax? Is it a bioweapon designed in a Chinese laboratory? These conspiracy theories typically have an intergroup flavour, blaming one group for having some involvement in either manufacturing the virus or controlling public opinion about it. In this article, I will discuss why people are attracted to conspiracy theories in general, and why conspiracy theories seem to have flourished during the pandemic. I will discuss what the consequences of these conspiracy theories are for individuals, groups, and societies. I will then discuss some potential strategies for addressing the negative consequences of conspiracy theories. Finally, I will consider some open questions for research regarding COVID-19 conspiracy theories, in particular focusing on the potential impact of these conspiracy theories for group processes and intergroup relations.

‘Things are not what they seem to be’: A proposal for the spectrum approach to conspiracy beliefs

2021 ◽  
pp. 103985622110081
Author(s):  
Vladan Starcevic ◽  
Vlasios Brakoulias
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Persecutory Delusions ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Community Or ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs

Objective: Conspiracy beliefs (also known as conspiracy theories) become more prominent at times of heightened uncertainty and inconsistent or conflicting explanations provided by the authorities for events like terrorist attacks or pandemics, such as COVID-19. This article aims to examine the relevance of conspiracy beliefs for psychiatry in the context of the dynamics of trust and mistrust. Conclusions: Conspiracy beliefs may be situated on a spectrum of mistrust-related phenomena, which extends from healthy scepticism to persecutory delusions. They can be conceptualised as unfounded and fixed beliefs held with strong conviction about harm inflicted by powerful groups on the community or another group of people, usually with preserved insight that these beliefs differ from those that most people have and with reasons for having such beliefs not necessarily being implausible. It is important for conspiracy beliefs to be distinguished from persecutory delusions.

scholarly journals The dangers of blind trust: Examining the interplay among social media news use, misinformation identification, and news trust on conspiracy beliefs

2021 ◽  
pp. 096366252199802
Author(s):  
Xizhu Xiao ◽  
Porismita Borah ◽  
Yan Su
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
National Survey ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
News Consumption ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Moderation Model ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Significant Moderator ◽  
News Use

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation has been circulating on social media and multiple conspiracy theories have since become quite popular. We conducted a U.S. national survey for three main purposes. First, we aim to examine the association between social media news consumption and conspiracy beliefs specific to COVID-19 and general conspiracy beliefs. Second, we investigate the influence of an important moderator, social media news trust, that has been overlooked in prior studies. Third, we further propose a moderated moderation model by including misinformation identification. Our findings show that social media news use was associated with higher conspiracy beliefs, and trust in social media news was found to be a significant moderator of the relationship between social media news use and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, our findings show that misinformation identification moderated the relationship between social media news use and trust. Implications are discussed.

Are misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories for political extremists?

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 583-605
Author(s):  
Adam M. Enders ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Conspiracy Theories ◽  
Political Orientations ◽  
Conspiracy Beliefs ◽  
Political Left ◽  
Identity Based ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Political Groups ◽  
Representative Samples

Extremist political groups, especially “extreme” Republicans and conservatives, are increasingly charged with believing misinformation, antiscientific claims, and conspiracy theories to a greater extent than moderates and those on the political left by both a burgeoning scholarly literature and popular press accounts. However, previous investigations of the relationship between political orientations and alternative beliefs have been limited in their operationalization of those beliefs and political extremity. We build on existing literature by examining the relationships between partisan and nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs and symbolic and operational forms of political extremity. Using two large, nationally representative samples of Americans, we find that ideological extremity predicts alternative beliefs only when the beliefs in question are partisan in nature and the measure of ideology is identity-based. Moreover, we find that operational ideological extremism is negatively related to nonpartisan conspiracy beliefs. Our findings help reconcile discrepant findings regarding the relationship between political orientations and conspiracy beliefs.

Has Anyone Seen It?

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmar Radin ◽  
Aleksandar Džakula
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Sentiment ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys ◽  
Health Care Performance ◽  
Policy Arena ◽  
Care Performance

Over the past decade, public opinion surveys have shown that Croats are deeply dissatisfied with their health care system and asses it to be one of the most important issues. However, health care hardly makes it into any political discourse in Croatia. This study analyzes the results of a public opinion survey conducted before the 2007 parliamentary elections to find out what the public sentiment on health care performance in Croatia is and to analyze the reasons why health care is not addressed by political actors. Evidence suggests that while health care is the most salient issue today, the public often understands it poorly. Thus, in a political environment of competing issues, and given the complexity of tacking health care in the policy arena, politicians strategically avoid discussing the issue.

Two Countries, Five Years: Islam in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan through the Lens of Public Opinion Surveys

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Junisbai ◽  
Azamat Junisbai ◽  
Baurzhan Zhussupov
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Regional Differences ◽  
Religious Practice ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Religious Revival ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
Public Opinion Surveys ◽  
Daily Prayer ◽  
Cross National

Drawing on two waves of public opinion surveys conducted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, we investigate the rise in religiosity and orthodoxy among Central Asian Muslims. We confirm that a religious revival is underway, with nearly 100 percent of Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani Muslims self-identifying as such in 2012—up from 80 percent in Kazakhstan in 2007. If we dig a bit deeper, however, we observe cross-national variations. Religious practice, as measured by daily prayer and weekly mosque attendance, is up in Kyrgyzstan, but has fallen in Kazakhstan. While the share of those who express preferences associated with religious orthodoxy has grown in both, this group has more than doubled in Kazakhstan. We attribute these differences to political context, both in terms of cross-national political variation and, within each country, variation based on regional differences.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document