More than Mere Weather: James's Talks to Students About Life

2003 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall D. Wight

William James addressed the last 3 lectures in Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (1899/1958) specifically to students. The first of these lectures, “The Gospel of Relaxation,” encouraged students to be both relaxed and active. The second, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” promoted awareness of and empathy for the diversity of individual human interest. The last lecture, “What Makes Life Significant,” argued that neither ideals nor passion alone gave life meaning but that the 2 in confluence yield significance. In all, James shared insights suggesting how students might improve their lives.

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-49
Author(s):  
Paul Kucharski

My aim in this essay is to advance the state of scholarly discussion on the harms of genocide. The most obvious harms inflicted by every genocide are readily evident: the physical harm inflicted upon the victims of genocide and the moral harm that the perpetrators of genocide inflict upon themselves. Instead, I will focus on a kind of harm inflicted upon those who are neither victims nor perpetrators, on those who are outside observers, so to speak. My thesis will be that when a whole community or culture is eliminated, or even deeply wounded, the world loses an avenue for insight into the human condition. My argument is as follows. In order to understand human nature, and that which promotes its flourishing, we must certainly study individual human beings. But since human beings as rational and linguistic animals are in part constituted by the communities in which they live, the study of human nature should also involve the study of communities and cultures—both those that are well ordered and those that are not. No one community or culture has expressed all that can be said about the human way of existing and flourishing. And given that the unity and wholeness of human nature can only be glimpsed in a variety of communities and cultures, then part of the harm of genocide consists in the removal of a valuable avenue for human beings to better understand themselves.


2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (135) ◽  
pp. 803-821
Author(s):  
Xingming Hu ◽  

ABSTRACT William James makes several major claims about truth: (i) truth means agreement with reality independently of the knower, (ii) truth is made by human beings, (iii) truth can be verified, and (iv) truth is necessarily good. These claims give rise to a few puzzles: (i) and (ii) seem to contradict each other, and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv) has counter-intuitive implications. I argue that Richard Gale's interpretation of James' theory of truth is inadequate in dealing with these puzzles. I propose an alternative interpretation and show how it can solve these puzzles.


1978 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 348-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne C. Thompson

In August 1914 Kurt Riezler accompanied Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg to the Supreme Headquarters in Koblenz and Luxembourg. His duties were not clearly defined and included a variety of things: He worked on war aims, parliamentary speeches, revolutionary movements, and domestic political questions. He helped interpret the chancellor's policies to the press, establish guidelines for censorship, and write anonymous articles supporting Bethmann Hollweg's policies. He could be called Bethmann Hollweg's assistant for political warfare.Unlike most Germans Riezler sensed from the beginning that a German victory was not assured. On August 14, 1914, in his first diary entry after the outbreak of war, he noted that although “everybody was apparently happy to be able for once to dedicate himself unreservedly to a great cause, … no one doubts or appears to consider even for an instant what a gamble war is, especially this war.” Riezler also realized that the “ideas of 1914” would not retain their strength forever. “Just as the storm frightens the vermin out of the air—when it becomes quieter again, everything crawls out of its refuge—and emerges again in the state as well as in individual human beings.” This realization protected Riezler from the naive belief that Germany could bear a long war without an obvious effort to achieve a negotiated peace, without a new European order which at most allowed Germany indirect control, and without domestic political concessions to the German masses.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-37
Author(s):  
Indra P. Tiwari

Human beings as natural persons as well as other juristic persons are expected to contribute to the society as part of social responsibility in addition to their defined legal and professional responsibilities with a view to continuously building a better and equally equitable, peaceful and sustainable society. If defined “social responsibility” as the voluntary contribution of the juristic and natural persons, i.e. government, corporations/ companies, organizations/ associations, and individual human beings, should the matter of contributing for the betterment of the society through social responsibility be left to the contributor? Contrarily, in a situation of functioning within the stringent laws, rules and regulation of the Government by all juristic and natural persons, should we expect something more than their legal and main responsibilities from them on the name of social responsibilities? Do society, moreover communities and individuals, expect special/additional social responsibilities from all persons, and if so, what sorts of responsibilities are included with what priorities? Similarly, are there different approaches in defining responsibilities of various persons, juristic and natural? If yes, in what situations and what conditions? Debates are going on about the functions and procedures for undertaking social responsibilities as well. This paper in the above context is discussing the objectives and missions, functions, structure(s), processes, the expectations from social responsibilities fulfilled and unfulfilled, and the impacts in the society as expected and not expected, thereby open up the areas for comprehensive and holistic discussion.


1995 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-245
Author(s):  
Karl E. Scheibe

Abstract This essay examines the conditions surrounding emotional blindness, indiffer-ence, or the syndrome that is known clinically as alexithymia. Indifference to events or circumstances is related to the narrative construction of those events, is selective within the same person, and is dependent upon a person's con-structed identity. Our capacity to story ourselves and the world about us removes our indifference. A clinical case of alexithymia and several biographical examples are employed to illustrate and fortify these points. (Social and Clinical Psychology) Neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiar position in which he stands. William James, 1900, p. 264


Author(s):  
Saulo de Freitas Araujo ◽  
Lisa M. Osbeck

James’s work is admittedly cross-disciplinary to the extent that it defies traditional scholarly boundaries. One of the best examples is the cross-fertilization between his philosophical and psychological ideas, although the precise relation between them is not easy to frame. Notwithstanding this difficulty, one can say that James’s early psychology, developed between the 1870s and 1880s, illuminates many aspects of his later philosophical positions, including pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism. First, James defends the teleological nature of mind, which is driven by subjective interests and goals that cannot be explained by the immediate interchange with the external environment. They are spontaneous variations that constitute the a priori, properly active nature of the human mind. This idea helps him not only explain important features of scientific and philosophical theories, but also reject certain philosophical doctrines such as materialism, determinism, agnosticism, and so on. It represents, so to speak, the relevance of the subjective method for deciding moral and metaphysical issues. Second, James claims that certain temperaments underlie the choice of philosophical systems. Thus, both pragmatism and pluralism can be seen as philosophical expressions of subjective influences. In the first case, pragmatism expresses a temperament that combines and harmonizes the tender-minded and the tough-minded. In the second, pluralism reflects the sympathetic temperament in contrast with the cynical character drawn to materialism. Finally, James proposes a distinction between the substantive and the transitive parts of consciousness, meaning that consciousness has clearly distinguishable aspects as well as more obscure points, although human beings tend to focus only on the first part, ignoring the other. This idea plays a decisive role in the elaboration of radical empiricism. Such illustrations, far from exhausting the relations between James’s psychology and philosophy, invite new insights and further scholarship.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-84
Author(s):  
Ana Honnacker

Humanism is charged with fostering a harmful anthropocentrism that has led to the exploitation of non-human beings and the environment. Posthumanist and transhumanist ideas prominently aim at rethinking our self-understanding and human-nature relations. Yet these approaches turn out to be flawed when it comes to addressing the challenges of the “age of the humanity”, the Anthropocene. Whereas posthumanism fails in acknowledging the exceptional role of human beings with regard to political agency and responsibility, transhumanism overemphasizes human capabilities of controlling nature and only deepens the human-nature dualism. Therefore, a critical and humble version of humanism is suggested as a viable alternative. Drawing on pragmatist thinkers William James and F.C.S. Schiller, a resource for de-centering the human being is provided that critically reflects our role in the larger ecosystem and underlines human potentials as well as human responsibilities.


2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 143-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatjana Hörnle ◽  
Mordechai Kremnitzer

Human dignity can be a protected interest in criminal law. This paper starts with some reflections about the meaning of human dignity and then examines offense descriptions in the German Penal Code and the Israeli Penal Code. These codes are used as sources for identifying possibly relevant prohibitions. One can indeed find numerous examples of offense descriptions that can be justified by pointing to human dignity, either as a main protected interest or as a protected interest in addition to other interests. The protected interest can be either the individual victim's right to human dignity or human dignity as an objective value. Offense descriptions that can be connected to “protection of human dignity” should, for analytical purposes, be divided into three groups: violations of the dignity of individual human beings through acts other than speech; violations of the human dignity of individuals through speech; and media content that does not contain statements about individuals but shows scenes of severe humiliation (e.g., fictional child pornography). Questions that need further discussion primarily concern the second group (what role should free speech play in cases of human dignity violations?) and the third group (does the acknowledgement of human dignity as an objective value mean to endorse a re-moralization of the criminal law?).


1995 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicki L. Lee

This paper considers the question “What is a psychological unit?”. The ubiquity of units in daily life and in science is considered. The assumption that the individual human being or animal is the psychological unit is examined and rejected. The units represented by the data collected in operant laboratories are interpreted as a subset of the well-defined changes that individual human beings or animals can bring about. The departure of this interpretation from the traditional interpretation in terms of the behaviour of the organism is acknowledged. The paper concludes by noting the relation of the present interpretation of operant research to the problem of identifying psychological units.


2014 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Sydow

AbstractThe paper starts with the intuition that morality basically consists in a caring respect for human beings: Moral subjects have to respect human beings in their individual human potential, and they have to do whatever is necessary for this potential to be realized. The main aim of the paper is to defend the claim that this understanding of morality is connected with objectivity as a formal feature of morality. I begin by considering constructivist and cooperation-based accounts of morality. Their explanation of moral objectivity is not compatible with caring respect as fundamental content of morality. (1) Thus, in order to argue for my claim I have to put this explanation of moral objectivity into question. To do so, I turn to its action theoretic background. Since this background consists in a dualistic understanding of action I sketch and argue for a non-dualistic alternative based on the notion of practical conceptual capacities. (2 & 3) This understanding of human agency leads to the conception of objectively good actions in which the subject is determined by the reality of bodily substances. (4) In the final section, I propose to conceive of human beings as a certain kind of bodily substances, namely as bearers of conceptual capacities. Consequently, moral actions can be seen as a certain type of objectively good actions. These actions correspond to what has to be done out of caring respect because this is exactly what bodily substances with conceptual capacities oblige moral subjects to do. (5)


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