Child Protection through the Criminal Law

Author(s):  
Kenneth McK. Norrie

The earliest criminal law dealing with children differently from the adult population was that concerned with sexual offences. This chapter explores the changing policies of the law, from the late 19th century fear of girls being exposed to immorality and boys being exposed to homosexuality, through the more protective 20th century legislation which nevertheless hung on to old ideas of immorality and criminality, until the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 focused almost (but not quite) exclusively on protection from harm and from exploitation. The chapter then turns to the crime of child cruelty or neglect from its earliest manifestation in the common law to its statutory formulation in Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act 1889, which, re-enacted in 1937, took on a form that, for all intents and purposes, remains to this day. The last part of the chapter explores the legal basis for the power of corporal punishment – the defence previously available to parents, teachers and some others to a charge of assault of a child, known as “reasonable” chastisement. Its gradual abolition from the 1980s to 2019 is described.

2021 ◽  
pp. 61-84
Author(s):  
Omri Ben-Shahar ◽  
Ariel Porat

This chapter illustrates personalized law “in action” by examining it in three areas of the law: standards of care under the common law tort doctrine of negligence, mandated consumer protections in contract law, and criminal sanctions. In each area, the chapter examines personalization of commands along several dimensions. In tort law, standards of care could vary according to each injurer’s riskiness and skill, to reduce the costs of accidents. In contract law, mandatory protections could vary according to the value they provide each consumer and differential cost they impose on firms, to allocate protections where, and only where, they are justified. And in criminal law, sanctions would be set based on what it takes to deter criminals, accounting for how perpetrators differ in their motives and likelihood of being apprehended, with the potential to reduce unnecessary harsh penalties.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David McQuoid-Mason

The practice of “ukuthwalwa” has been described as a “mock abduction” or an “irregular proposal” aimed at achieving a customary law marriage. It has been said that ukuthwalwa may be used for a number of purposes, such as: (a) to force the father to give his consent; (b) to avoid the expense of a wedding; (c) to hasten matters if the woman is pregnant; (d) to persuade the woman of the seriousness of the suitor’s intent; and (e) to avoid payment of lobolo. At common law the courts have stated that ukuthwalwa should not be used “as a cloak for forcing unwelcome attentions on a patently unwilling girl”, and have held that abduction by way of  ukuthwalwa is unlawful. However, it has been suggested that if there is a belief by the abductor that the custom of ukuthwalwa was lawful the abduction would lack fault, and that if the parents or guardians consented to the taking it would not be abduction, because abduction is a crime against parental authority. Where the parents or guardians consent to the abduction the crime may amount to assault or rape. Some of these potential lacunae in the law seem to have been addressed by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. There has recently been public outrage about the practice of ukuthwalwa in the Eastern Cape in which girls between the ages of 12 and 15 years of age were being abducted and forced into marriages against their consent. This aspect of ukuthwalwa is a breach of the common law and the repealed section of the Sexual Offences Act (s 9 of the SexualOffences Act 23 of 1957. It is also completely contrary to the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996) and the Sexual Offences Amendment Act (Chapters 2 and 3 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act). Part of the problem may be that some rural communities think that cultural practices trump constitutional rights, whereas according to the law the reverse applies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Seyed Mohammad Mousavi ◽  
Arash Babaei ◽  
Shamsollah Khatami ◽  
Yousef Jafarzadi

<p>One characteristic of the force of law in the country, the integrity of the rules in all areas of all aspects of creation into account the distinction between crime and the crime and failed or incomplete in acts of crime and crime as the withdrawal. In this respect the rules on penalties culpability in the crime has been proposed that the content of the crime with absolute responsibility of these categories has manifested. Under the Articles 144 and 145 of the Latest version Islamic criminal law (2013), Create unintentional offenses, subject to verification of the fault committed. In crimes ranging from quasi-intentional unintentional deviation as retaliation book rules apply. Legislator to commit a fault, the reason for the error is considered criminal, which has always been considered an objective measure and a ruler (in Article 145), while the common law under subsection (1) "criminal law to crimes" adopted 1981 crime start as the offense is punishable total. This study showed that certain similarities between the laws. In this context, the two internal laws and the common law can be found, in which the underlying offense of absolute liability is not fixed in the courts. Always treat judges and lawyers in the face of legal texts are not consistent because of the lack of transparency and clarity of the rules. In particular, in the common law, when a crime for the first time in cour t, and a warrant has been issued about it in terms of predicting the law and with regard to the interpretation of judges, procedural difference is more tangible.</p>


Criminal Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 304-354
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and comprehensive, the Textbook on series provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. This chapter discusses inchoate crimes. A person does not break the criminal law simply by having evil thoughts. Where, however, a person takes steps towards effecting that plan to commit a substantive offence which is more than merely preparatory, he may in the process commit one of the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, or encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence. The chapter examines relevant offences in the Serious Crime Act 2007 concerning encouraging or assisting and the Act’s abolition of the offence of incitement. It outlines the legal protection from prosecution provided to particular vulnerable victims who might otherwise be liable for encouraging others to commit offences against them, such as some child victims of sexual offences. The chapter analyses the statutory offence of conspiracy and outlines common law offences of conspiracy to defraud and conspiracy to corrupt public morals or to outrage public decency. It examines the requirements for liability for attempt. The Law in Context feature examines critically the growing range of inchoate offences for terrorist offences.


1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Milgate

In the field of criminal law we should be used to the House of Lords changing its mind. In the course of the past three years the House has fundamentally altered its view on the meaning of intention, on the relationship between statutory and common law conspiracy and on the law of impossible attempts. Now we have another about turn. In R. v. Howe and Bannister the House of Lords has unanimously decided that duress can never be a defence to murder. Yet elsewhere in the criminal law (with the exception of some forms of treason) duress operates as a complete defence, leading to acquittal if raised successfully. In making murder an exception to this general rule the House, using its power under the Practice Statement of 1966, has departed from its previous decision in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch which allowed the defence of duress to be raised by principals in the second degree to murder. The Lynch decision, which had stood as part of the common law for some twelve years, is now consigned to the legal scrapheap.


2021 ◽  
pp. 310-359
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and contextual, Criminal Law provides a succinct overview of the key areas on the law curriculum balanced with thought-provoking contextual discussion. This chapter discusses inchoate crimes. A person does not break the criminal law simply by having evil thoughts. Where, however, a person takes steps towards effecting that plan to commit a substantive offence which is more than merely preparatory, he may in the process commit one of the inchoate crimes of attempt, conspiracy, or encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence. The chapter examines relevant offences in the Serious Crime Act 2007 concerning encouraging or assisting and the Act’s abolition of the offence of incitement. It outlines the legal protection from prosecution provided to particular vulnerable victims who might otherwise be liable for encouraging others to commit offences against them, such as some child victims of sexual offences. The chapter analyses the statutory offence of conspiracy and outlines common law offences of conspiracy to defraud and conspiracy to corrupt public morals or to outrage public decency. It examines the requirements for liability for attempt. ‘The law in context’ feature in this chapter examines critically the growing range of inchoate offences for terrorist offences.


1993 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-361
Author(s):  
C. G. Schoenfeld

This article seeks to summarize certain basic conclusions reached during a 30-year attempt to apply psychoanalytic psychology to crime, punishment, and the criminal law. Psychoanalytically derived discoveries about man's instinctual aggressiveness, and innate ways of trying to control it, are presented first. Then the conclusion is advanced that a main function of law is to help to remedy man's inability to control his aggression sufficiently so as to make life in civilized societies possible. An extended historical discussion of the development of the common law and the criminal law follows, leading to the conclusion that the criminal law seeks both to block and to express man's aggressive urgencies. Then, in a psychoanalytically oriented section devoted to criminals and criminality, the conclusion is emphasized that the criminal law's ultimate purpose has been not so much to counter successfully the threats posed by those who break the law, but rather to meet the emotional needs of the law-abiding members of society.


2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-347
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)–(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.


Legal Studies ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-66
Author(s):  
G. L. Peiris

Throughout the spectrum of inchoate crime spanning the concepts of attempt, conspiracy and solicitation or incitement, the most notorious and intractable problems have arisen in the area of attempts. A court in Zimbabwe, echoing the despondency characteristic of current academic writing, has made the comment: ‘There is, perhaps, a no more unsatisfactory branch of our criminal law than the law relating to attempt, and there is not the slightest prospect that with the passage of time it will become less unsatisfactory.’ Sporadic suggestions by Commonwealth courts that the complexity and incoherence of the common law should be rectified at least in part by legislative intervention, has been acted upon in England and New Zealand.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oyebanke Yebisi ◽  
Victoria Balogun

Marital rape is a form of sexual violence, which is often downplayed due to the common law position that a man cannot rape his wife. While certain jurisdictions have enacted laws criminalising it, other jurisdictions have yet to criminalise it. This paper focuses on the criminal aspects of marital rape and examines the laws regarding marital rape in South Africa and the general rape provisions in Nigeria. While marital rape is punishable under South African criminal law, it is not in Nigeria. In this paper, the provisions of the South African Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Other Related Matters) Act of 2007, the Criminal Code Act, and the Penal Code Act – Nigeria in relation to rape and marital rape – are analysed. This paper also discusses the South African Sexual Offences Court, sentencing for rape in the selected countries, and relevant case law. It concludes that South Africa (SA) has a generally good framework with respect to rape and marital rape, but the country should work more on the strict application of the laws in place. It also suggests that Nigeria should establish a sexual offences court using the South African model and should amend the Criminal Law to expressly criminalise marital rape.


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