Anomalism and Supervenience: A Critical Survey

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oron Shagrir

The thesis that mental properties are dependent, or supervenient, on physical properties, but this dependence is not lawlike, has been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is put forward explicitly in Donald Davidson's seminal ‘Mental Events.’ On the one hand, Davidson claims that the mental is anomalous, that ‘there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained’ (1970, 208), and, in particular, that there are no strict psychophysical laws. On the other hand, he insists that the mental supervenes on the physical; that ‘mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics’ (1970, 214).

Author(s):  
Ursula Renz

This interlude compares the role that the physical digression plays in the Ethics with the function of physics or neuropsychology in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is argued that, unlike in many contemporary approaches, Spinoza does not pursue a reductionist strategy. Instead, the introduction of the physical digression has two very specific functions. On the one hand, it serves as a model that allows Spinoza to conceptualize differences between specific minds, albeit in a preliminary manner. On the other hand, in support of his introduction of the concept of common notions, the digression also justifies his later claim that, by means of coining scientific concepts, humans are able to form adequate ideas of the properties of natural entities.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-172
Author(s):  
Hane Htut Maung

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.


Problemos ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Dagys

Funkcinės psichinių savybių analizės atveriama jų materialiojo įkūnijimo įvairovės galimybė verčia materialistinį monizmą sąmonės filosofijoje formuluoti ne psichinių ir fizinių savybių tapatumo, bet pirmųjų pareities nuo antrųjų tezę. Pareities sąvoka sąmonės filosofijoje išreiškia minimalius reikalavimus fizikalistinėms teorijoms – paneigus pareities fizikalizmą būtų paneigtos ir stipresnės fizikalizmo versijos. Straipsnyje tyrinėjama fizikalizmo kritika paremta vadinamuoju kokybių perkeitimo galimybės argumentu. Parodoma, kad, viena vertus, toks argumentas negali būti atremtas nuorodomis į empirinius duomenis, nes svarstoma hipotetinė situacija numano jos empirinį nestebimumą; kita vertus, jei svarstoma situacija iš tikrųjų yra galima, tai kokybinės psichinės charakteristikos niekaip nėra susaistytos funkciškai ar fiziologiškai aprašomais ryšiais, vadinasi, antireduktyvistinę išvadą galima grįsti svarstant ne tik atvejus, kai kokybės perkeistos, bet ir kai jų apskritai nėra. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: sąmonės filosofija, fizikalizmas, funkcionalizmas, pareitis, perkeistos kokybės.Supervenience, Physicalist Reduction and Inverted Qualia Jonas Dagys SummaryFunctional analysis of mental properties reveals that these properties are multiply realizable by material properties. Therefore physicalism in philosophy of mind is formulated in terms of supervenience rather than in terms of identity. The concept of supervenience also expresses the minimal commitments of the physicalist theory – refutation of the supervenience physicalism would imply refutation of any stronger version of physicalism as well. The article analyzes the criticism of physicalism based on the possibility of inverted qualia. It is shown that, on the one hand, such possibility cannot be denied on empirical grounds, since the possibility in question is ex hypothesi unobservable; on the other hand, if this situation is in fact possible, then qualitative properties are independent of functional or physiological properties, and therefore the same antireductivist conclusion could be less controversially argued for on the basis of absent rather than inverted qualia.Keywords: philosophy of mind, physicalism, functionalism, supervenience, inverted qualia.ly: Calibri, sans-serif;"> 


1906 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 454-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. M. Leake

In a stretch of arable lands like those of the Ganges Valley, although damage may be caused by occasional floods, which are sudden and of short duration, the more general, and by far the most serious loss is due to deficiency of moisture of the soil: thus the relation of the soil to soil moisture becomes of more than ordinary importance. Dr Voelcker, in his Report on Indian Agriculture, remarks: “In India the relation of soils to moisture acquires a greater significance than almost anywhere else.......” This relation is fundamental, for on it depends the methods for the conservation of soil moisture, for the economical application of irrigation water, and for the treatment of barren and salt lands—all problems of direct interest to agriculturists in the plains of Northern India. The methods for dealing with these problems must be largely—if not entirely—empirical until such time as the behaviour of the soil in its relation to moisture is investigated. The problem in all its various branches is enormous, and in a country in which the seasons follow each other with such rapidity, and vary the one from the other in so marked a manner, it frequently happens that a particular point, if not determined within a period of a few days, must await solution until the following year.


2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-292
Author(s):  
Christian Krijnen

AbstractContemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality. In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is, on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.


Author(s):  
Barry Loewer

Both folk and scientific psychology assume that mental events and properties participate in causal relations. However, considerations involving the causal completeness of physics and the apparent non-reducibility of mental phenomena to physical phenomena have challenged these assumptions. In the case of mental events (such as someone’s thinking about Vienna), one proposal has been simply to identify not ‘types’ (or classes) of mental events with types of physical events, but merely individual ‘token’ mental events with token physical ones, one by one (your and my thinking about Vienna may be ‘realized’ by different type physical states). The role of mental properties (such as ‘being about Vienna’) in causation is more problematic. Properties are widely thought to have three features that seem to render them causally irrelevant: (1) they are ‘multiply-realizable’ (they can be realized in an indefinite variety of substances); (2) many of them seem not to supervene on neurophysiological properties (differences in mental properties do not always depend merely on differences in neurophysiological ones, but upon relations people bear to things outside their skin); and (3) many of them (for example, ‘being painful’) seem inherently ‘subjective’ in a way that no objective physical properties seem to be. All of these issues are complicated by the fact that there is no consensus concerning the nature of causal relevance for properties in general.


Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umut Baysan

“Realization” is a technical term used by philosophers of mind, philosophers of science, and metaphysicians to denote some dependence relation that is thought to exist between higher-level properties or states and lower-level properties or states. Some philosophers of mind hold that mental properties, such as believing that it is raining, having a painful sensation, and so on, are realized by physical properties. Understood this way, the term was introduced to philosophy of mind literature with the thesis that mental properties are multiply realizable by physical properties. Since different physical properties could realize the same mental property, it is thought that the phenomenon of multiple realization shows that the identity theory, namely the view that mental properties are identical with physical properties, is false. For similar reasons, some philosophers of the special sciences think that higher-level properties, such as biological properties, are realized by properties that are invoked in lower-level sciences such as physics. Some metaphysicians suggest that determinable properties, such as color properties (e.g., being red) are realized by their determinate properties (e.g., being crimson, being scarlet). Some argue that dispositional properties, such as being fragile, are realized by non-dispositional, categorical microstructural properties. It has been customary to think that functional properties, such as being a carburetor, are realized by first-order properties that play the specified functional roles. Due to the widely different usages of “realization,” it is difficult to determine if there should be one relation or several relations that this term denotes. Any relation that is denoted by this term can be seen as a realization relation. This article is about such relations. Whereas some theories explicitly formulate realization relations, some tangential theories that concern related issues (e.g., the mind-body problem) make crucial claims as to what counts as a case of realization. This article introduces the central questions about realization and clarifies the main issues and concepts that are invoked in the relevant literature.


1988 ◽  
Vol 127 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Zamorani ◽  
I. A. Sheikh ◽  
M. Della Rossa ◽  
G. Serrini

ABSTRACTCement samples containing variable amounts of Cr(III) or Ni(II) or Cd(II) as chloride admixtures present in a MLW stream from reprocessing of spent fuel were prepared under established procedure. Due to the high pH generated in the cement clinker hydration, respective metal hydroxides are formed and improve the physical characteristics of the cement matrix. An increase in the value of the compressive strength was observed when about 7% of the above elements were blended in cement. The increase depends on the nature of the element in the sequence Cr >Ni >Cd.The leach tests confirm the formation of insoluble hydroxide presenting a low concentration in the leachate corresponding to 0.05, 0.004 and 0.052 mg.L−1 for Cr, Ni and Cd, respectively. On the other hand, the hydro-lyzed chloride ions seem to react with calcium with consequent increased degradation of the cement matrix.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Walter

Mental causation, our mind's ability to causally affect the course of the world, is part and parcel of our ‘manifest image’ of the world. That there is mental causation is denied by virtually no one. How there can be such a thing as mental causation, however, is far from obvious. In recent years, discussions about the problem of mental causation have focused on Jaegwon Kim's so-called Causal Exclusion Argument, according to which mental events are ‘screened off’ or ‘preempted’ by physical events unless mental causation is a genuine case of overdetermination or mental properties are straightforwardly reducible to physical properties.


2007 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 33
Author(s):  
Dimitris Livanios

<p>The main aim of this essay is to offer a critical survey of the development of Greek collective identities, between 1453 and 1913. That period witnessed dramatic transformations, and the arrival of a modernising and Westernising wave, which crashed onto the Greek shores in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The ensuing clash between Western and modern ideas of nationalism on the one hand, and time-honoured local mentalities nurtured by Orthodoxy and the Ottoman millet system, on the other, was intense. This paper attempts to chart some salient aspects of that struggle, to discuss the evolution of concepts and words, such as "Hellene" [Έ&lambda;&lambda;&eta;&nu;&alpha;&sigmaf;], "Hellenism" [&Epsilon;&lambda;&lambda;&eta;&nu;&iota;&sigma;&mu;ό&sigmaf;], "Roman" [&Rho;&omega;&mu;&iota;ό&sigmaf;] and "Romiosyne" [&Rho;&omega;&mu;&iota;&omicron;&sigma;ύ&nu;&eta;], and to place them within their changing historical context.</p>


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