scholarly journals Resilience by solidary ties

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 211
Author(s):  
Antonio Alaminos Chica ◽  
Irina Pervova

This article considers an empirical approach to the relationships among three well known concepts: “Benevolence” (Schwartz), Solidarity and Resilience ("Subjective wellbeing scale" - SWB). The first concept refers to cultural values, the second one to social networks and the third to the ability to recover from crisis. The measurement of solidarity has been done from the point of view of supportive ties. The baseline hypothesis considers that the presence of a high value in Benevolence contributes to the involvements in solidarity networks. Participation in supportive relationships facilitates recovery from personal crisis. Using data from the European Social Survey (ESS6), we conclude from this structural analysis that the resilience reflected in a society is partly a consequence of the supportive networks shaped by the presence of benevolence values.

2016 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-407
Author(s):  
Bruno Arpino

Split-ballot data are often used to study double standards. The key problem of this design is that individual double standards cannot be identified. I propose a simple two-step approach based on a matching pre-processing of the data to estimate individual double standards. Once this preliminary first step is completed, any statistical technique (e.g., regression models) can be applied on the new data. I apply the method to gender double standards on attitudes toward the age one leaves home by using data from the third round of the European Social Survey. The proposed method simplifies regression analyses of the effects of covariates on double standards and offers new opportunities for research on double standards.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
MARIUS R. BUSEMEYER ◽  
ALEXANDER H. J. SAHM

Abstract Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.


2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dana Hamplova

In this article, educational homogamy among married and cohabiting couples in selected European countries is examined. Using data from two waves (2002 and 2004) of the European Social Survey, this article compares three cultural and institutional contexts that differ in terms of institutionalization of cohabitation. Evidence from log-linear models yields two main conclusions. First, as cohabitation becomes more common in society, marriage and cohabitation become more similar with respect to partner selection. Second, where married and unmarried unions differ in terms of educational homogamy, married couples have higher odds of overcoming educational barriers (i.e., intermarrying with other educational groups).


Author(s):  
Dimiter Toshkov

AbstractThe link between age and happiness has been the subject of numerous studies. It is still a matter of controversy whether the relationship is U-shaped, with happiness declining after youth before bouncing back in old age, or not. While the effect of age has been examined conditional on income and other socio-demographic variables, so far, the interactions between age and income have remained insufficiently explored. Using data from the European Social Survey, this article shows that the nature of the relationship between age and happiness varies strongly with different levels of relative income. People in the lowest decile of the income distribution experience a ‘hockey stick’: a deep decline in self-reported happiness until around age 50–55 and a small bounce back in old age. The classic U-curve is found mostly in the middle-income ranks. For people at the top of the income distribution, average happiness does not vary much with age. These results demonstrate the important role of income in moderating the relationship between age and happiness.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Márton Hadarics

We investigated how attitudes towards social equality can influence the relationship between conservation motivation (or openness) and personal ideological preferences on the left-right dimension, and how this relationship pattern differs between Western and Central & Eastern European (CEE) respondents. Using data from the European Social Survey (2012) we found that individual-level of conservation motivation reduces cultural egalitarianism in both the Western European and the CEE regions, but its connection with economic egalitarianism is only relevant in the CEE region where it fosters economic egalitarianism. Since both forms of egalitarianism were related to leftist ideological preferences in Western Europe, but in the CEE region only economic egalitarianism was ideologically relevant, we concluded that the classic “rigidity of the right” phenomenon is strongly related to cultural (anti)egalitarianism in Western Europe. At the same time, conservation motivation serves as a basis for the “rigidity of the left” in the post-socialist CEE region, in a great part due to the conventional egalitarian economic views.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Richardson

People vary widely in their attitudes towards how much their government should redistribute wealth. Evolutionary theory may shed light on why this variation occurs. Numerous studies have established an association between upper body strength and attitudes towards equality and wealth redistribution in males, showing that physically stronger men are more likely to hold self-serving beliefs on these issues. This effect is typically weaker or absent in women. A question that has received little attention is whether there are similar associations between other aspects of formidability and attitudes towards wealth redistribution. One such aspect is height. I tested this prediction using data from the European Social Survey, in a sample of 27031 people from 20 European countries. Results show that taller people are more likely to have self-serving attitudes towards government redistribution of wealth. The result was robust to numerous control variables and alternative model specifications, but the direct effects of height were small. Taller individuals were less supportive of government wealth redistribution overall, but were especially averse if they were also wealthier. Post-hoc analyses suggested that for lower income deciles, the association was reversed. For these people, there was a positive association between height and support for wealth redistribution. However, effects were equally strong in males and females, and so are not fully consistent with current evolutionary psychological theories of resource distribution.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark John Brandt ◽  
Anthony Aron ◽  
Megan Parker ◽  
Cristina Rodas ◽  
Megan Shaffer

A regularity in US American politics is that liberals have more policy consensus than do conservatives, and both ideological groups have more consensus than moderates (Ondish & Stern, 2018). The idea is that conservatives’ local conformity paradoxically results in less consensus than liberals at the national level. If this is the case, then the liberal consensus effect should also be observed in other countries. We test this using data from Europe. In the European Social Survey (Country N = 38, N = 376,129) we find that on average leftists have more consensus than do rightists; however, we do not find this using the Eurobarometer (Country N = 18, N = 375,830). In both data sources we also observe variation in ideological differences between countries. These results suggest that there is a liberal/leftist consensus effect that can be found in Europe and the United States, but there are also exceptions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Pantelis C. Kostis

The literature regarding cultural background change points out that changes in cultural background can only be slow moving. However, under high uncertainty levels, cultural background may change in the short or medium term as well. In this paper, the effects of uncertainty on cultural behaviors are investigated. Cultural background is captured through the Schwartz’s cultural values, based on the waves provided by the European Social Survey from 2002 up to 2018, performing relative Principal Component Analyses. An Uncertainty Index is constructed based on the volatility of the stock market for all Eurozone countries, from the euro’s adoption in January 2001 up to December 2018. Using an unbalanced panel dataset comprised of 18 Eurozone countries for the time period from 2002 up to 2018, a fixed-effects assessment method, different fixed terms between the examined economies, dummies per wave of the nine total data waves of the European Social Survey and country-specific clustered robust estimates of the standard errors, the main conclusions of the empirical analysis are the following: (a) Uncertainty significantly affects the cultural background of societies and leads to its change; (b) The effects of uncertainty on culture start two years after an uncertainty shock has occurred; (c) The effects of uncertainty on specific cultural values reveals significant effects on all Schwartz’s cultural values. However, the effect is the highest for the dipole “conservatism and autonomy” and the smallest for the dipole “mastery vs. harmony”. (d) When uncertainty is high, this leads to higher levels of hierarchy (authority, humbleness), self-direction (independent thought and action), stimulation (excitement, novelty and challenge in life), affective autonomy (pursuit of actively positive activities: pleasure, exciting life) and mastery (ambition and hard work, daring, independence, drive for success) which means their life’s harmony is disrupted, at least two years later. Thus, countries exhibiting systematically high levels of uncertainty are about to develop a cultural background that is going to hinder economic development, and vice versa.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 883-912 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Stockemer ◽  
Arne Niemann ◽  
Doris Unger ◽  
Johanna Speyer

Between 2015 and 2017, the European Union (EU) was confronted with a major crisis in its history, the so-called “European refugee crisis.” Since the multifaceted crisis has provoked many different responses, it is also likely to have influenced individuals’ assessments of immigrants and European integration. Using data from three waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) — the wave before the crisis in 2012, the wave at the beginning of the crisis in 2014, and the wave right after the (perceived) height of the crisis in 2016 — we test the degree to which the European refugee crisis increased Europeans’ anti-immigrant sentiment and Euroscepticism, as well as the influence of Europeans’ anti-immigrant attitudes on their level of Euroscepticism. As suggested by prior research, our results indicate that there is indeed a consistent and solid relationship between more critical attitudes toward immigrants and increased Euroscepticism. Surprisingly, however, we find that the crisis increased neither anti-immigrant sentiments nor critical attitudes toward the EU and did not reinforce the link between rejection of immigrants and rejection of the EU. These findings imply that even under a strong external shock, fundamental political attitudes remain constant.


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