Time in the Phenomenology of Perception

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-785
Author(s):  
Eugene F. Bertoldi

The chapter on time is one of the central investigations in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout preceding chapters of that work one meets the claim that theoretical difficulties raised by the type of description of the perceiving subject that Merleau-Ponty offers are to be resolved in the investigation of time. For example, in describing perception, it begins to seem that the perceiving subject is neither a pure for-itself, nor an in-itself, but rather belongs to some category intermediate between these two. How is such an ambiguity to be understood ? Merleau-Ponty tells us that:On the level of being one will never understand that the subject must be at once naturans and naturatus, infinite and finite. But if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing and the other, we shall understand that there is nothing to understand beyond this.

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1123-1140
Author(s):  
Wojciech Starzynski

L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine Résumé: Le texte est une tentative d'analyse phénoménologique (principalement inspiré de Ricœur) du thème de l'admiration, que Descartes dans les Passions de l’âme décrit comme passion première et principale. Envisagé comme principe de la subjectivité, cette passion expliquerait l'accès non théorique au monde et à soi-même, et permet de comprendre la constitution du sujet passionnel. En analysant ce sujet, appelé par Descartes l'union de l'âme et du corps, les catégories traditionnelles d'attention, d'imagination et enfin de volonté et de temporalité se trouvent profondément reformulées. Dans le mode admiratif spécifique d’un tel sujet, qui se caractérise par interaction dynamique de l'âme et du corps, on peut parler des étapes successives de la vie passionnée, au sein de laquelle émergent les autres passions “principales” (l'amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse), pour trouver enfin son accomplissement dans une expérience éthique de la générosité. Mots-clés: passion; admiration; union de l’âme et du corps; Descartes; Ricoeur. A admiração como princípio fenomenológico da subjetividade Resumo: O texto é uma tentativa de análise fenomenológica (principalmente inspirada por Ricoeur) do tema da admiração, que Descartes n’As paixões da alma descreve como paixão primeira e principal. Considerado como princípio da subjetividade, essa paixão explicaria o acesso não teórico ao mundo e a si mesmo, e permite compreender a constituição do sujeito passional. Analisando esse sujeito, chamado por Descartes a união da alma e do corpo, as categorias tradicionais de atenção, imaginação e, enfim, de vontade e temporalidade se encontram profundamente reformuladas. No modo admirativo específico de um tal sujeito, que se caracteriza pela interação dinâmica da alma e do corpo, podemos falar das etapas sucessivas da vida apaixonada, ao seio da qual emergem as outras paixões « principais » (o amor, o ódio, o desejo, a alegriae a tristeza), para encontrar, enfim, sua realização numa experiência ética da generosidadade. Palavras-chave : paixão; admiração ; união da alma e do corpo ; Descartes ; Ricoeur. Admiration as a phenomenological principle of human subjectivity  Abstract: The text is a phenomenological analysis (mainly inspired by Ricœur) of the theme of admiration, which Descartes in the  Passions of the Soul describes as a first and main passion.  Considered  as a principle of subjectivity, this passion would explain the non-theoretical access to the world and to oneself, and allows us to understand the constitution of such passionate subject. Analyzing this subject, called by Descartes the union of the soul and the body, the traditional categories of attention, imagination and finally, those of will and temporality are  deeply  reformulated. In the specific admiring mode of the  subject, which is characterized by dynamic interaction of the soul and body, we can speak of the successive stages of passionate life, in which emerge the other “principal  passions"  (love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness),  to  finally find its culmination in an ethical experience of generosity. Key words: passion; admiration; union of the soul and body; Descartes; Ricoeur. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4 (254) ◽  
pp. 183-196
Author(s):  
Patrizia Breil

Phenomenology has been well-received in pedagogy from the very beginning. With direct reference to Husserl, Aloys Fischer calls for a Descriptive Pedagogy. Only on the basis of a close description of educational processes similar to the phenomenological reduction can the educational sciences rediscover their actual subject matter. In this article the author traces the development of phenomenological thought in educational theory with a special focus on the notions of corporeality and negativity. As a necessary condition of perception in general, corporeality constitutes an important factor in the structural being-to-the-world of the human being. Apart from being able to sense its surroundings the body can also be perceived as part of these surroundings. Due to this double role, the subject opens up to foreign influences and negativity. Thus, the other plays an important role in the constitution of the identity of the subject. Through corporeality, a sphere of intersubjectivity is opened up. A recapitulation of Käte Meyer-Drawe’s Pedagogy of Inter-Subjectivity and Wilfried Lippitz’ Theory of Bildung and Alterity shows how these thoughts can be made useful for pedagogical discussion. Hereby, sociality and alterity prove to be foundational categories for educational settings in general. Finally, the author gives an outlook on current developments in phenomenological pedagogy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 84-94
Author(s):  
Aleksei S. Bokarev ◽  
◽  
Yulia V. Tkachuk ◽  

The article is addressed to the consideration of the subject organization of lyrics by I. Kholin, a representative of the Lianozovo literary group, who became widely known as the author of the book of poems “Residents of the Barack”. Already in the presented, debut for the poet, composition there were outlined the types of speech widely presented to him, in which the subject is likened to a life-log camera, and the focus of attention is shifted from “Self” to “you”, from internal to external to the speaking world. The term “life-logging”, meaning the automatic fixation of a person's life using a video medium fixed to the body, is used in the article as a literary metaphor, “highlighting” the difficulty of personal speaking and self-expression of the protagonist. However, just as the environment of a life logger who does not fall into his own lens gives him a sufficient (if not exhaustive) idea, the life realities in the subject's field of view can tell about his inner world no less than he by himself. The analysis of a number of poems (the most detailed is considered “Fences. Garbage cans. Posters. Advertising”) allows you to demonstrate the intersubjective nature of life-logic “optics”. The latter is used by Kholin in three different forms: as the “dissolution” of the speaker in the text, as the construction of the statement on behalf of the syncretic subject and as the priority of the “other” over the “self” when creating the verbal “self-portrait” of the hero. The impossibility of distancing from hostile reality, but also the inadequacy of selfdetermination in its conditions, testify to the formation of a kenotic model of the artist's relationship with reality. In Kholin's poetry, the lyrical subject is not only a detached viewer, but also a protagonist who fully shares his sins and suffering with the world.


2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ted Toadvine

In a 1951 debate that marked the beginnings of the analytic-continental divide, Maurice Merleau-Ponty sided with Georges Bataille in rejecting A. J. Ayer’s claim that “the sun existed before human beings.” This rejection is already anticipated in a controversial passage from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, where he claims that “there is no world without an Existence that bears its structure.” I defend Merleau-Ponty’s counterintuitive position against naturalistic and anti-subjectivist critics by arguing that the world emerges in the exchange between perceiver and perceived. A deeper challenge is posed, however, by Quentin Meillassoux, who argues that the “correlationism” of contemporary philosophy rules out any account of the “ancestral” time that antedates all subjectivity. Against Meillassoux, and taking an encounter with fossils as my guide, I hold that the past prior to subjectivity can only be approached phenomenologically. The paradoxical character of this immemorial past, as a memory of the world rather than of the subject, opens the way toward a phenomenology of the “elemental” past. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the absolute past of nature and the anonymity of the body, as well as Levinas’ account of the elements at the end of the world, I argue that our own materiality and organic lives participate in the differential rhythms of the elements, opening us to a memory of the world that binds the cosmic past and the apocalyptic future.


2020 ◽  
pp. 263-276
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein

This concluding chapter returns to modernity’s defining problematique: ordering, understood coextensively as an epistemological and a political project. It discusses the extent to which the body operated as the great naturaliser of history—working to stabilise political construction, and notably the racialised and gendered figures that entered into the making of the modern category of ‘the human’ from the onset. The chapter also considers the two sets of processes, of putting together and of dividing up, that took the body as their referent and produced, respectively, the state and the individual who bears rights. It then examines the relations between construction, constitution, and another kind of corporeal agency altogether: generation (giving birth). Generation, as the distinctive agentic capacity that indexes only one kind of body, the female one, functioned throughout the seventeenth century as the ‘other’ to constitution, to the agency that was being expended and experimented with to craft the state and the subject of rights. Finally, the chapter looks at the duty of critique, considering it in its relation to agency and to the urgency of taking responsibility for the world in which people live, and therefore for changing it.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54
Author(s):  
Jörg Zimmer

In classical philosophy of time, present time mainly has been considered in its fleetingness: it is transition, in the Platonic meaning of the sudden or in the Aristotelian sense of discreet moment and isolated intensity that escapes possible perception. Through the idea of subjective constitution of time, Husserl’s phenomenology tries to spread the moment. He transcends the idea of linear and empty time in modern philosophy. Phenomenological description of time experience analyses the filled character of the moment that can be detained in the performance of consciousness. As a consequence of the temporality of consciousness, he nevertheless remains in the temporal conception of presence. The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, however, is able to grasp the spacial meaning of presence. In his perspective of a phenomenology of perception, presence can be understood as a space surrounding the body, as a field of present things given in perception. Merleau-Ponty recovers the ancient sense of ‘praesentia’ as a fundamental concept of being in the world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-245
Author(s):  
Erik Ode

Abstract De-Finition. Poststructuralist Objections to the Limitation of the Other The metaphysic tradition always tried to structure the world by definitions and scientific terms. Since poststructuralist authors like Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze have claimed the ›death of the subject‹ educational research cannot ignore the critical objections to its own methods. Definitions and identifications may be a violation of the other’s right to stay different and undefined. This article tries to discuss the scientific limitations of the other in a pedagogical, ethical and political perspective.


1908 ◽  
Vol 54 (227) ◽  
pp. 704-718
Author(s):  
Lady Henry Somerset

I fully appreciate the very great honour which has been done to me this afternoon in asking me to speak of the experience which I have had in nearly twenty years of work amongst those who are suffering from alcoholism. Of courseyou will forgive me if I speak in an altogether unscientific way. I can only say exactly the experiences I have met with, and as I now live, summer and winter, in their midst, I can give you at any rate the result of my personal experience among such people. Thirteen years ago, when we first started the colony which we have for inebriate women at Duxhurst, the Amendment to the present Inebriate Act was not in existence, that is to say, there was no means of dealing with such people other than by sending them to prison. The physical side of drunkenness was then almost entirely overlooked, and the whole question was dealt with more or less as a moral evil. When the Amendment to the Act was passed it was recognised, at any rate, that prison had proved to be a failure for these cases, and this was quite obvious, because such women were consigned for short sentences to prison, and then turnedback on the world, at the end of six weeks or a month, as the case might be, probably at the time when the craving for drink was at its height, and therefore when they had every opportunity for satisfying it outside the prison gate they did so at once. It is nowonder therefore that women were committed again and again, even to hundreds of times. When I first realised this two cases came distinctly and prominently under my notice. One was that of a woman whose name has become almost notorious in England, Miss Jane Cakebread. She had been committed to prison over 300 times. I felt certain when I first saw her in gaol that she was not in the ordinary sense an inebriate; she was an insane woman who became violent after she had given way to inebriety. She spent three months with us, and I do not think that I ever passed a more unpleasant three months in my life, because when she was sober she was as difficult to deal with-although not so violent-aswhen she was drunk. I tried to represent this to the authorities at the time, but I wassupposed to know very little on the subject, and was told that I was very certainly mistaken. I let her go for the reasons, firstly that we could not benefit her, and secondly that I wanted to prove my point. At the end of two days she was again committed to prison, and after being in prison with abstention from alcohol, which had rendered her more dangerous (hear, hear), she kicked one of the officials, and was accordingly committed to a lunatic asylum. Thus the point had been proved that a woman had been kept in prison over 300 times at the public expense during the last twenty years before being committed to a lunatic asylum. The other case, which proved to me the variations there arein the classifications of those who are dubbed “inebriates,” was a woman named Annie Adams, who was sent to me by the authorities at Holloway, and I was told she enjoyed thename of “The Terror of Holloway.” She had been over 200 times in prison, but directly she was sober a more tractable person could not be imagined. She was quite sane, but she was a true inebriate. She had spent her life in drifting in and out of prison, from prison to the street, and from the street to the prison, but when she was under the bestconditions I do not think I ever came across a more amiable woman. About that time the Amendment to the Inebriates Act was passed, and there were provisions made by which such women could be consigned to homes instead of being sent to prison. The London County Council had not then opened homes, and they asked us to take charge of their first cases. They were sent to us haphazard, without classification. There were women who were habitual inebriates, there were those who were imbecile or insane; every conceivable woman was regarded as suitable, and all were sent together. At that time I saw clearly that there would be a great failure (as was afterwards proved) in the reformatory system in this country unless there were means of separating the women who came from the same localities. That point I would like to emphasise to-day. We hear a great deal nowadays about the failure of reformatories, but unless you classify this will continue to be so.


2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-72
Author(s):  
Håkan Larsson

Håkan Larsson: Sport and gender This article concerns bodily materialisation as it occurs in youth sport. It is based on interviews with teenagers 16 to 19 years of age doing track and field athletics. The purpose of the article is to elucidate how the notion of a “natural body“ can be seen as a cultural effect of sports practice and sports discourse. On the one hand, the body is materialised as a performing body, and on the other as a beautiful body. The “performing body“ is a single-sexed biological entity. The “beautiful body“ is a double-sexed and distinctly heterosexually appealing body. As these bodies collide in teenager track and field, the female body materialises as a problematic body, a body that is at the same time the subject of the girl’s personality. The male body materialises as an unproblematic body, a body that is the object of the boy’s personality. However, the body as “(a problematic) subject“ or as “(an unproblematic) object“ is not in itself a gendered body. Rather, these are positions on a cultural grid of power-knowledge relations. A girl might position herself in a male discourse, and a boy might position himself in a female discourse, but in doing so, they seem to have to pay a certain price in order not to be seen as queer.


Author(s):  
Oyuna Tsydendambaeva ◽  
Olga Dorzheeva

This article is dedicated to the examination of euphemisms in the various-system languages – English and Buryat that contain view of the world by a human, and the ways of their conceptualization. Euphemisms remain insufficiently studied. Whereupon, examination of linguistic expression of the key concepts of culture is among the paramount programs of modern linguistics, need for the linguoculturological approach towards analysis of euphemisms in the languages, viewing it in light of the current sociocultural transformations, which are refer to euphemisms and values reflected by them. The subject of this research is the euphemisms in the English and Buryat languages, representing the semiosphere “corporeal and spiritual”. The scientific novelty consists in introduction of the previously unexamined euphemism in Buryat language that comprise semiosphere “corporeal and spiritual” into the scientific discourse. The analysis of language material testifies to the fact that in various cultures the topic of intimacy and sex is euphemized differently. The lexis indicating the intimate parts of the body is vividly presented in the West, while in Buryat language – rather reserved. The author also determines the common, universal, and nationally marked components elucidating the linguistic worldview of different ethnoses and cultures.


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