scholarly journals POETICS OF LIFELOGGING: ON INTERSUBJECT FORMS OF UTTERANCE IN IGOR KHOLIN’S POEMS

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 84-94
Author(s):  
Aleksei S. Bokarev ◽  
◽  
Yulia V. Tkachuk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Focus Of Attention ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Field Of View ◽  
The World ◽  
Inner World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Literary Metaphor ◽  
Lyrical Subject

The article is addressed to the consideration of the subject organization of lyrics by I. Kholin, a representative of the Lianozovo literary group, who became widely known as the author of the book of poems “Residents of the Barack”. Already in the presented, debut for the poet, composition there were outlined the types of speech widely presented to him, in which the subject is likened to a life-log camera, and the focus of attention is shifted from “Self” to “you”, from internal to external to the speaking world. The term “life-logging”, meaning the automatic fixation of a person's life using a video medium fixed to the body, is used in the article as a literary metaphor, “highlighting” the difficulty of personal speaking and self-expression of the protagonist. However, just as the environment of a life logger who does not fall into his own lens gives him a sufficient (if not exhaustive) idea, the life realities in the subject's field of view can tell about his inner world no less than he by himself. The analysis of a number of poems (the most detailed is considered “Fences. Garbage cans. Posters. Advertising”) allows you to demonstrate the intersubjective nature of life-logic “optics”. The latter is used by Kholin in three different forms: as the “dissolution” of the speaker in the text, as the construction of the statement on behalf of the syncretic subject and as the priority of the “other” over the “self” when creating the verbal “self-portrait” of the hero. The impossibility of distancing from hostile reality, but also the inadequacy of selfdetermination in its conditions, testify to the formation of a kenotic model of the artist's relationship with reality. In Kholin's poetry, the lyrical subject is not only a detached viewer, but also a protagonist who fully shares his sins and suffering with the world.

scholarly journals MF Husain’s Hindi Autobiography Em. Ef. Husain kī kahānī apnī zubānī

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandra Consolaro
Keyword(s):  
Public Spaces ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Imagined Community ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Cultural Artefact ◽  
The World ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
The Subject

Drawing from Elizabeth Grosz’s notion of the body as a socio-cultural artefact and the exterior of the subject bodies as psychically constructed, and Rosi Braidotti’s concept of nomadic identities, in this article I introduce world-renowned Indian painter MF Husain’s verbal and visual autobiography Em. Ef. Husen kī kahānī apnī zubānī as a series of sketches of a performative self, surfing the world in space and time. Bodies and spaces are envisioned as “assemblages or collections of parts” in constant movement, crossing borders and creating relationships with other selves and other spaces. People and places become a catalyst for manifestations of the self in art – MF Husain being foremost a painter – and eventually also in literature. I look for strategies that MF Husain uses in order to construct or deconstruct the self through crossings and linkages. I try to investigate how the self is performed inside and outside private and public spaces, how the complex (sometimes even contradictory) relationship between self and community is portrayed, and how this autobiography does articulate notions of (imagined) community/ies, nationalism, transnational subjectivity, nostalgia.

L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1123-1140
Author(s):  
Wojciech Starzynski
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Mots Clés ◽  
Human Subjectivity ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Phenomenological Principle

L’admiration comme principe phénoménologique de la subjectivité humaine Résumé: Le texte est une tentative d'analyse phénoménologique (principalement inspiré de Ricœur) du thème de l'admiration, que Descartes dans les Passions de l’âme décrit comme passion première et principale. Envisagé comme principe de la subjectivité, cette passion expliquerait l'accès non théorique au monde et à soi-même, et permet de comprendre la constitution du sujet passionnel. En analysant ce sujet, appelé par Descartes l'union de l'âme et du corps, les catégories traditionnelles d'attention, d'imagination et enfin de volonté et de temporalité se trouvent profondément reformulées. Dans le mode admiratif spécifique d’un tel sujet, qui se caractérise par interaction dynamique de l'âme et du corps, on peut parler des étapes successives de la vie passionnée, au sein de laquelle émergent les autres passions “principales” (l'amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse), pour trouver enfin son accomplissement dans une expérience éthique de la générosité. Mots-clés: passion; admiration; union de l’âme et du corps; Descartes; Ricoeur. A admiração como princípio fenomenológico da subjetividade Resumo: O texto é uma tentativa de análise fenomenológica (principalmente inspirada por Ricoeur) do tema da admiração, que Descartes n’As paixões da alma descreve como paixão primeira e principal. Considerado como princípio da subjetividade, essa paixão explicaria o acesso não teórico ao mundo e a si mesmo, e permite compreender a constituição do sujeito passional. Analisando esse sujeito, chamado por Descartes a união da alma e do corpo, as categorias tradicionais de atenção, imaginação e, enfim, de vontade e temporalidade se encontram profundamente reformuladas. No modo admirativo específico de um tal sujeito, que se caracteriza pela interação dinâmica da alma e do corpo, podemos falar das etapas sucessivas da vida apaixonada, ao seio da qual emergem as outras paixões « principais » (o amor, o ódio, o desejo, a alegriae a tristeza), para encontrar, enfim, sua realização numa experiência ética da generosidadade. Palavras-chave : paixão; admiração ; união da alma e do corpo ; Descartes ; Ricoeur. Admiration as a phenomenological principle of human subjectivity  Abstract: The text is a phenomenological analysis (mainly inspired by Ricœur) of the theme of admiration, which Descartes in the  Passions of the Soul describes as a first and main passion.  Considered  as a principle of subjectivity, this passion would explain the non-theoretical access to the world and to oneself, and allows us to understand the constitution of such passionate subject. Analyzing this subject, called by Descartes the union of the soul and the body, the traditional categories of attention, imagination and finally, those of will and temporality are  deeply  reformulated. In the specific admiring mode of the  subject, which is characterized by dynamic interaction of the soul and body, we can speak of the successive stages of passionate life, in which emerge the other “principal  passions"  (love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness),  to  finally find its culmination in an ethical experience of generosity. Key words: passion; admiration; union of the soul and body; Descartes; Ricoeur. Data de registro: 17/11/2020 Data de aceite: 30/12/2020

Phenomenology in Pedagogical Settings. Overview of the current discourse on phenomenological pedagogy

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4 (254) ◽  
pp. 183-196
Author(s):  
Patrizia Breil
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Educational Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Educational Sciences ◽  
Pedagogical Discussion

Phenomenology has been well-received in pedagogy from the very beginning. With direct reference to Husserl, Aloys Fischer calls for a Descriptive Pedagogy. Only on the basis of a close description of educational processes similar to the phenomenological reduction can the educational sciences rediscover their actual subject matter. In this article the author traces the development of phenomenological thought in educational theory with a special focus on the notions of corporeality and negativity. As a necessary condition of perception in general, corporeality constitutes an important factor in the structural being-to-the-world of the human being. Apart from being able to sense its surroundings the body can also be perceived as part of these surroundings. Due to this double role, the subject opens up to foreign influences and negativity. Thus, the other plays an important role in the constitution of the identity of the subject. Through corporeality, a sphere of intersubjectivity is opened up. A recapitulation of Käte Meyer-Drawe’s Pedagogy of Inter-Subjectivity and Wilfried Lippitz’ Theory of Bildung and Alterity shows how these thoughts can be made useful for pedagogical discussion. Hereby, sociality and alterity prove to be foundational categories for educational settings in general. Finally, the author gives an outlook on current developments in phenomenological pedagogy.

Time in the Phenomenology of Perception

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-785
Author(s):  
Eugene F. Bertoldi
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject

The chapter on time is one of the central investigations in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Throughout preceding chapters of that work one meets the claim that theoretical difficulties raised by the type of description of the perceiving subject that Merleau-Ponty offers are to be resolved in the investigation of time. For example, in describing perception, it begins to seem that the perceiving subject is neither a pure for-itself, nor an in-itself, but rather belongs to some category intermediate between these two. How is such an ambiguity to be understood ? Merleau-Ponty tells us that:On the level of being one will never understand that the subject must be at once naturans and naturatus, infinite and finite. But if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing and the other, we shall understand that there is nothing to understand beyond this.

scholarly journals Ethos, Embodiment, Psychosis: Losing One’s Home-Identity Stakes

2020 ◽  
pp. 77-83
Author(s):  
Michèle Gennart
Keyword(s):  
Physical Space ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Cultural Work ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Living Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Family Home

AbstractIn reference to phenomenology, the living body, feeling and acting, is approached as having an essential mediating function: at the same time, it brings us into the world and supports our identity. In “Tania Z’” story, she falls into a serious crisis following her parents’ decision to sell the shared family home. She experiences this not only as a betrayal but also as a loss of the “envelope” that previously allowed her to move safely in the world. She feels hurt even in her own body space and loses her ability to continue living.Tania Z speaks to us in a revealing way of the singular status of the home: a cultural work that can be possessed, transmitted, or destroyed according to certain social rules. But it is also, like the body, a privileged space of the “self,” with the loss of which the subject may be threatened in her or his ability to survive. This is at least what happens in situations of vulnerability where the person needs to rely on a stable physical space to gather as one’s self and feel safe in the world.

scholarly journals Salvador Dalí, i ritratti ibridi degli anni Venti

Venezia Arti ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elide Pittarello
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Luis Bunuel ◽  
Avant Garde ◽  
Salvador Dali ◽  
European Culture ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Porous Boundaries

The life and artworks of Salvador Dalí (1904-1989) are closely interconnected and thoroughly documented. Returning to the hybrid portraits painted by the young artist in the 1920s gives us, on the one hand, the chance to recall a phase in his maturing process which, with few exceptions, is often undervalued by art historians and curators, especially those who are not Spanish. On the other, it can allow us to reaffirm Federico García Lorca’s crucial role in their conception and iconic execution between 1925 and 1927. After the influence of the painter Rafael Barradas from Uruguay, Dalí chose the authoritative model of Picasso, the undisputed master. Encouraged by Luis Buñuel, who had moved to Paris, Dalí visited Picasso in 1926. After that meeting he started to paint multiple heads and self-portraits which include García Lorca’s silhouette. As to avant-garde arts and their porous boundaries, the friendship uniting García Lorca, Buñuel and Dalí was fructuous from the time when they lived at the Residencia de Estudiantes in Madrid. In this institution, open to the most original innovations of European culture, certain aesthetic motives emerged which each developed in his own inimitable way: the subject as a mask, the self being the other, the body reduced into pieces of anatomy, putrefied remains, aberrant mix of organic and inorganic stuff.

scholarly journals La ‘faille’ chez Paul Ricœur. De l’identité symbolique et narrative, à l’identité gestuelle et langagière

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-89
Author(s):  
Guilhem Causse
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Paul Ricoeur ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
The World ◽  
Paul Ricœur

In Fallible man, Ricœur discovers a faille (fault, breach, rift) in the heart of man. Due to this faille, man is fragile: he has to mediate between himself and the world. This mediation puts man at risk of losing himself. Thus, fragile man is also fallible. In Oneself as Another, Ricœur returns to this faille that passes through the heart of the self, between idem and ipse, giving access to the alter. This image, the faille, guides Ricœur in each of these two texts. It gives us access to their continuity but also to the gap that separates one from the other. But if this image has inspired Ricœur, it also gives us the opportunity to criticize his work. Re-reading the Symbolism of Evil, we will highlight a dimension of man little explored by Ricœur and that our current situation pushes us to rediscover: the body and gesture.

scholarly journals Kūniškasis subjektas: Aš kaip „mano skausmas“ ir kaip „mano meilė“

Problemos ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-115
Author(s):  
Olga Shparaga
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
False Consciousness ◽  
The Social ◽  
Strongly Connected ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Classical Philosophy

The key task of my text is the justification of the use of on phenomenological model of the subject designated as a “my pain and my love”. First, such subject is seen as an alternative to the transcendental subject of the classical philosophy, which is characterized first of all as a rational subject. This rational subject is capable to give himself a generally valid rule of knowledge and action. Second, the phenomenological understanding of the subject represents a certain version of the “false consciousness”, which was developed from the “masters of the suspicion” (Marx, Freud, Nietzsche). Philosophy of the “masters” was intended to criticize the autonomy and absolutely self-determination of the rational subject and show the different forms of the conditionality on the Reason. Thirdly, the phenomenological understanding of the subject is a response to the different forms of philosophical reduction of subjectivity and self-consciousness. This response is developed in this text as a discussion with Manfred Frank. The phenomenological subject is the embodied or bodily subject. This embodiment has three dimensions (B. Waldenfels): World-relation (Weltbezug), Self-relation (Selbstbezug) and Others-relation (Fremdbezug). These dimensions allow to speak about the bodily subject as a Self, which is interpreted as my embodiment to the Other. “The I as my pain and my love” is a metaphor of this form of the Self, which means, that self-comprehension originates in the feeling of the pain and of the love, that is, in the certain experience of own body and in the act of love for this concrete Other. Such experience can be designated as a process of identification. The bodily subject as my embodiment to the Other is strongly connected with different praxis of the “socialization of the body”, which are in need of the philosophical analyses and criticism. Phenomenology proposes its own direction of criticism, which intends to justify that difference of the social and cultural praxis themselves is based on the originality of my embodiment to the Other and not vice versa. Thus the explication of the originality of the Self must be connected with the analyses and criticism of the “socialization of the body”, which includes a new non-classical ethical dimension.

scholarly journals Incorporating others: what an extended self tells us about intersubjectivity

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Clara Garavito
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Self ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Extended Self ◽  
Sense Of Ownership ◽  
The World ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
The Subject

Incorporation is the body’s capacity to take something to alter or extend itself. In the literature on the subject, there is a lively debate on what constitutes incorporation. According to the Hypothesis of Extended Mind, whatever extends our cognitive processes is incorporated. At the same time, that object becomes a part of our self-manifestation. However, De Preester, in what I call a narrow version of incorporation, proposes that an object is incorporated to the self only if it is included in the sense of ownership of the body. Here, I explore a broader version of incorporation, related to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of habit and incorporation. From this perspective, incorporation is the way a self expands and alters itself in its dealings with the world. A self, as a lived body, emerges in the self’s constitutive openness to worlds; therefore, objects (and even others) are incorporated in a temporal and situated way if they participate in constitutive experiences. Finally, this perspective explores the idea of a flexible and transparent self rather than a fixed self based on representations of the body.

scholarly journals Well-Being, the Self, and Radical Change

2019 ◽  
pp. 251-270
Author(s):  
Jennifer Hawkins
Keyword(s):  
Well Being ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Change ◽  
Future Time ◽  
Prudential Value ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Subject

Chapter 12 explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of radical change are intuitively prudentially good, many cases of really radical change are not. Yet FBR has trouble explaining this. Many people instinctively reach for the notion of identity to solve this problem—arguing that really radical change cannot be good because it alters who someone is. Yet, as the chapter argues, there are reasons to doubt that appeals to identity are appropriate. The chapter ends with the suggestion that prudential facts may explain why and when retaining identity matters, rather than the other way around, and points to a possible way forward for a theorist of welfare committed to FBR.

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