scholarly journals THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCE IN THE AREAS OF STATE SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN LIGHT OF THE 1997 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

2017 ◽  
pp. 209-222
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Urbaniak

Pursuant to Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, executive power is vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers. Implemented in Poland, the dualism of the executive branch creates a problem with the division of duties and competence between the cabinet and the head of state.  This paper analyses the division of powers within the executive branch in the areas of state security and foreign policy. The analysis of the constitutional provisions and the political practice indicates that the model of cooperation between the President and the cabinet as adopted in the Constitution of 1997 is ineffective and leads to political conflicts. In view of the Polish political conditions, it is advisable to amend the Constitution in order to move away from the mixed model towards either the presidential model or the parliamentary-cabinet model of the executive branch of government.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Đorđije Blažić ◽  
◽  
Anika Kovačević ◽  

The author analyzes the provisions of the Vidоvdan Constitution which regulate the position and competence of the executive branch. With the Vidovdan Constitution, the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed a constitutional parliamentary and hereditary monarchy in which the King has a central constitutional position and the position of an undisputed holder of executive power. The executive power is made available to the king, which is exercised by the ministers for him, with him and his subordinates. Ministers form the Council of Ministers (Government) and are at the head of certain administrative departments. Although the Constitution proclaimed parliamentarism, there was no classic parliamentary responsibility of ministers before the Assembly. The king was a political factor that enters the field of competence of other holders of power, and thus the division of power provided by the constitution "falls away". The king's power extends to the civil and military field of life of the state, to the external and internal spheres. Although the adoption of the Vidovdan Constitution aimed to create a unified system of organization and division of power, the internal state and political situation in the country, after the adoption of the Constitution, became more complicated and filled with frequent ministerial crises and conflicts of political parties. The King's domination and his frequent "going out" outside the constitutional framework resulted in increasing centralization and, in the end, a coup d'etat and the establishment of King Alexander Karadjordjevic's personal dictatorship.


Author(s):  
Clay Silver Katsky

While presidents have historically been the driving force behind foreign policy decision-making, Congress has used its constitutional authority to influence the process. The nation’s founders designed a system of checks and balances aimed at establishing a degree of equilibrium in foreign affairs powers. Though the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the country’s chief diplomat, Congress holds responsibility for declaring war and can also exert influence over foreign relations through its powers over taxation and appropriation, while the Senate possesses authority to approve or reject international agreements. This separation of powers compels the executive branch to work with Congress to achieve foreign policy goals, but it also sets up conflict over what policies best serve national interests and the appropriate balance between executive and legislative authority. Since the founding of the Republic, presidential power over foreign relations has accreted in fits and starts at the legislature’s expense. When core American interests have come under threat, legislators have undermined or surrendered their power by accepting presidents’ claims that defense of national interests required strong executive action. This trend peaked during the Cold War, when invocations of national security enabled the executive to amass unprecedented control over America’s foreign affairs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-252
Author(s):  
Milan Rapajić

One of the characteristics of the system of government in the Fifth French Republic is the strengthened position of the head of state, but also the existence of the first minister as a constitutional category with a significant role. The constitution provides the political responsibility of the government with the Prime Minister and ministers before parliament. Certain French writers have opinion that the Prime Minister appears as the central figure of the constitutional structure. The Prime Minister shall direct the actions of the Government. This is 21 of Constitution. Also, there are specific powers that put the Prime Minister in the position of its real head of government. Among the prime minister's most important powers is his right to elect members of the government. It is the right to propose to the President of the Republic the appointment but also the dismissal of members of the government. The Prime Minister is authorized to re-sign certain acts of the President of the Republic. In case of temporary impediment of the head of state, the Prime Minister chairs the councils and committees for national defense, as well as the Council of Ministers. The paper analyzes the constitutional provisions that lead to the conclusion that the position of the Prime Minister is institutionally constructed as strong. Political practice, with the exception of periods of cohabitation, has indicated that most prime ministers have been overshadowed by mostly powerful heads of state. For that reason, it is necessary to analyze the political practice of all eight presidential governments. A review of the already long political life that has lasted since 1958. points to the conclusion that in its longest period, presidents of the Republic dominated the public political scene. The Prime Minister has a more pronounced role in the executive branch during cohabitation periods. However, nine years in three cohabitations cannot change the central conclusion of this paper that the dominant political practice of the Fifth Republic has led to the Prime Minister being essentially in the shadow of the head of state.


Author(s):  
Loammi Wolf

The previous Westminster criminal justice system entailed a different kind of separation of powers insofar as it concerns the role of state prosecutors. In the Westminster system prosecutors are part of the executive branch, whereas they were a split-off from the judiciary in constitutional states and function like a de facto second organ of the third branch of state power. Currently executive interference in state prosecutions often leads to pre-trial inequality. A further difficulty arises from the unconsidered manner in which the former royal prerogative of pardoning was retained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It used to be a royal veto of judicial sentences in the constitutional monarchy of the former Westminster model. Although the corresponding veto of parliamentary legislation by the head of state did not survive into modern times, the pardoning power has not been discontinued. Section 84(2)(j) thus causes an irreconcilable conflict with section 165(5) of the Constitution which guarantees the legally binding force of judicial decisions. It undermines the rule of law and leads to post-trial inequality in the execution of sentences. The parole system, which dates back to 1959, likewise allows the executive to overrule judicial sentences and is in conflict with section 165(5). The perpetuation of the status quo in criminal justice is in effect leading to a re-Westminstering of the constitutional state.


Glasnik prava ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol XII (2) ◽  
pp. 37-53
Author(s):  
Jakub Leković

The constitutional reforms of 2017 in the Republic of Turkey continued with the noticeable tendency of strengthening the executive power embodied in the institution of the head of state. Finally, this institution is constitutionally designed in a form that provokes significant debates in the legal and political public, which makes the subject interest even more provocative and attractive. The paper tries to present the understanding of the existing system of government in Turkey with the dominant position of the institution of the President of the Republic. In order to complete the objective notion of central research, it is first necessary to analyze the development of recent Turkish constitutional history during this century and explore the personal element of the institution of the head of state recognizable in the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In order to fully master the problem in question, it is necessary to pay appropriate attention to the institution of the army. Finally, the concluding epilogue of the conducted research can be a contribution to the discussions on the qualification of the type of government system of the state in question.


2019 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 235-249
Author(s):  
Dawid Michalski

In the interwar period, intensified activity aimed at constitutional legislation is observed. This also concerned the Second Republic of Poland and the Republic of Finland, in which breakthrough acts were adopted. In Poland, two uniform constitutions were in force, significantly affecting the evolution of the state system in this period – the March Constitution of 1926 and the April Constitution of 1935. In Finland, one constitution was created, but of a complex nature – four legal acts were adopted in the period of 1919-1928. While in the Second Republic of Poland, in principle until the so-called May coup in 1926, the parliamentary tendencies were observed, in the Republic of Finland from the beginning, the executive power was equipped with strong competences, but within the parliamentary system. In Poland, as a result of adoption of the April Constitution, the state system was strongly turned towards authoritarianism. Both states saw their chance of maintaining independence in the pro-authoritarian tendencies, especially in the period preceding the II World War, due to the difficult geopolitical situation. In Poland, the authorities wanted to eliminate the chaos created by typical parliamentary governance. In Finland, this was not only related to the tradition of a strong executive, but more to the fear of potential revolutionary activities (like the Civil War of 1918) in the future that the head of state would be able to prevent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 2178
Author(s):  
Galym KOZHAKHMETOV ◽  
Guldana KUANALEEVA ◽  
Saulen NURZHAN

This article consecrates topical issues of executive power, which points to one of the most acute problems of world society. The executive branch is recognized as one of the three branches of the unified state power by the current constitutional doctrine and practice of the Republic of Kazakhstan - a unitary state with a presidential form of government. The process of management constant development has a direct impact on the system of executive power and the structure of individual executive bodies, generates the demand for an in-depth analysis of this influence, its consideration in the creation and functioning of an integral, rational, effective state mechanism. In order to create a modern complex theoretical vision for the scientific legal foundations of a strong and effective executive branch operating in the public system of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is established as a democratic, legal, social and secular state, the highest value of which is a human, his rights and freedoms, in this study are considered the theoretical concepts, practical aspects of the concept and executive power place as a full-fledged element of the state - the object of the constitutional, administrative and legal sanctions; system, structure, legal and organizational forms of executive bodiesactivity; as well as the main problems of legislative regulation, further construction and functioning of the executive power in Kazakhstan.Recommendations and proposals have been developed to improve a number of legal measures for the executive power enhancement. The analysis of the main historical studies that explain the nature of executive power in foreign countries and in Kazakhstan and its main role in the development of the state and law is carried out.


Author(s):  
Jacek Wojnicki

The Constitution of Montenegro describes the state as a "civic, democratic, ecological state of social justice, based on the reign of Law." Montenegro is an independent and sovereign republic that proclaimed its new constitution on 22th October 2007. The President of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Predsjednik Crne Gore) is the head of state, elected for a period of five years through direct elections. The President represents the republic abroad, promulgates law by ordinance, calls elections for the Parliament, proposes candidates for Prime Minister, president and justices of the Constitutional Court to the Parliament. The President also proposes the calling of a referendum to Parliament, grants amnesty for criminal offences prescribed by the national law, confers decoration and awards and performs other constitutional duties and is a member of the Supreme Defence Council. The official residence of the President is in Cetinje. The Government of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Vlada Crne Gore) is the executive branch of government authority of Montenegro. The government is headed by the Prime Minister, and consists both of the deputy prime ministers as well as ministers. The Parliament of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Skupština Crne Gore) is a unicameral legislative body. It passes laws, ratifies treaties, appoints the Prime Minister, ministers, and justices of all courts, adopts the budget and performs other duties as established by the Constitution. Parliament can pass a vote of no-confidence on the Government by a simple majority. One representative is elected per 6,000 voters. The present parliament contains 81 seats, with a 47-seat majority currently held by the Coalition for a European Montenegro as a result of the 2009 parliamentary election


Author(s):  
Vladimir Novikov

The paper considers the dynamics of the domestic political process in the Republic of Abkhazia in 2018. The pivot of this process was the presidential election campaign that started in 2018. The author makes an attempt to analyze the activities of both the current authorities and the opposition. The events of early 2018 related to the pardon of Georgy Lukava revitalized the slogan of early resignation of President Raul Khajimba that was taken off after the December 2016 agreements. The main dilemma the opposition faces now is that it cannot ignore the street protest but at the same time does not aspire the repetition of 2014 events. Special attention is paid to the positioning of ex-President Alexander Ankvab in relation to the authorities and the opposition. The struggle is also considered within originally pro-authorities forces (evidenced by the rivalry around the position of prime-minister and searching of an alternative to Khajimba as President) which, up to December 2018, led to some signs of split among Khajimba’s supporters. The author makes some short-term forecasts; in particular, he suggests that ex-Chairman of the State Security Council Astamur Tarba (who announced in March 2019 his intention to be nominated to the presidency) could count upon former supporters of Khajimba who had been disappointed in the current Head of State. Analyzed are also attempts to create “a third force” (“Common Cause”) as an alternative to both the authorities and the opposition. In conclusion, the pre-election alignment of forces and possible results of the election are considered, with special attention to the influence of Aslan Bjania’s illness on the electoral process.


Author(s):  
Christopher W. Morris

States claim sovereignty, that is, to be the ultimate source of political authority in their realm. The classical conception of sovereignty defended by early modern thinkers such as Hobbes and Rousseau would give the sovereign extraordinary powers, the authority to rule on just about any matter concerning its subjects and territory. Few today defend this classical conception of sovereignty as unconstrained authority; most everyone thinks that the powers of the state are constrained and limited. Constrained states can still be very powerful, and today many argue that the power of the executive branch of government, in particular, ought to be less constrained than it is thought to be. This chapter argues that the concept of the sovereignty of the state, whether understood in a classical way or as limited, gives little support to those who argue that the executive branch ought to be relatively unconstrained in the realm of security and foreign affairs. The doctrine of the sovereignty of the state does not single out any branch of government for distinctive powers. While there may be reasons intrinsic to sovereignty to attribute greater powers to states, these reasons don’t privilege the executive branch of government. Our executive branches are not sovereigns.


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