Vier Modelle des Menschseins

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 471-487
Author(s):  
Matthias Wunsch

Abstract The conflict over the classic problem of philosophical anthropology, i. e., what man actually is, is not only a conflict about what – X – determines something to be human. It also requires clarification of the manner in which something is determined to be human by the X in question. There being different options for the latter, the classic anthropological conflict concerns not only definitions of being human, but also models of being human. The present paper investigates four such models: the addition model, the interior model, the privation model, and the transformation model. While the first will serve as a baseline for comparison, the three other models will, in order to escape the danger of making too formal an argument, be discussed exemplarily, i. e. by focusing in each case on a certain proponent of the respective model. Those proponents will be Martin Heidegger for the interior model, Arnold Gehlen for the privation model, and Helmuth Plessner for the transformation model.

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-213
Author(s):  
Pieter Tijmes

AbstractThis paper discusses some cultural implications of technology for the place where we live. Two opposed thinkers, Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas, give an account of the cultural impact of technology and articulate the meaning of the place we live in. The paper proposes a systematic point of view that might take their contradictory positions into account. Helmuth Plessner can serve as a mediator with his theory of eccentricity. First, I turn to Ernst Juenger who frames the fundamental issue of modem technology ushering in a revolutionary period of history. Juenger's work is important to consider since his influence on Heidegger is large and not well known.


Author(s):  
Andrus Tool

Wilhelm Dilthey initially studied theology in Germany but later shifted to philosophy and history. He tackled the specific nature of human sciences in relation to natural sciences and initiated a debate on the connection between understanding and explanation in scientific knowledge. In addition to his own school, he exerted influence on fellow philosophers Martin Heidegger, Helmuth Plessner, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This chapter explores the formation of Dilthey’s philosophical views, including the principle of phenomenality, the theory of human sciences, and the role of inner experience as the main source of cognition in human sciences. It also discusses his later work and his arguments concerning empirical factuality, congealed objectivity, and processual reality. Finally, the chapter examines how ideas similar to those of Dilthey have influenced organizational culture and dynamics.


2006 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joachim Fischer

ZusammenfassungVorgeschlagen wird, die ‚Philosophische Anthropologie‘ als eine dritte Position in der sich neu formierenden deutschen Nachkriegssoziologie zu beobachten. Inspiriert durch die im Schelerschen Theorieprogramm einer ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘ miteinander verbundenen Denker Helmuth Plessner und Arnold Gehlen, die beide von der Philosophie zu soziologischen Lehrstühlen wechselten, entwickelte sich (trotz der persönlich-akademischen und politisch- biografischen Divergenzen zwischen den Hauptprotagonisten) ein Netzwerk von Soziologen (Schelsky, Bahrdt, Popitz, Claessens et al.), die die Grundannahmen der ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘ teilten und aus dieser Voraussetzung die soziologische Forschung in Schlüsselthemen der bundesrepublikanischen Soziologie dominierten (Technik- und Industriesoziologie, Familiensoziologie, Stadtsoziologie, Soziologie der Macht etc.). So gesehen, war die Theorie der ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘ in der deutschen Soziologie bis Mitte der 1970er Jahre möglicherweise ebenso einflussreich wie die Frankfurter Schule (Horkheimer, Adorno) oder die Kölner Schule (René König). Nicht zuletzt entwickelten sich die beiden großen originären Theorieprojekte der westdeutschen Soziologie bei Habermas und Luhmann als Transformationen von Konzepten der ‚Philosophischen Anthropologie‘.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dobeson

This article introduces the basic notions of the widely neglected Philosophical Anthropology of Helmuth Plessner. Instead of defining man as a privileged holder of consciousness, Plessner claims that all living organisms can be defined by their specific relation to their physical boundaries. In contrast to other living organisms such as plants and animals, however, the ‘eccentric’ nature of man allows for a comparatively high degree of freedom from the physical environment, which enables him to transcend, objectify, and deconstruct the boundaries of the same. The article concludes by outlining Plessner’s original contribution to contemporary debates in social theory, in particular constructivism and post-humanist studies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 85-101
Author(s):  
Anna Krzyżak ◽  
Mirosław Michalik

The article deals with the concept of silence developed by Marcel Marceau, one of the founders of contemporary mime. An analysis of the concept of silence is proposed, starting from a broader research, linguistic and philosophical perspective, encompassing the ideas of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merlau-Ponty, Józef Tischner and Martin Buber, which aims at an interpretation of Marceau’s theatrical concept, which is presented in his work and statements and contains many elements of philosophical anthropology. For Marceau, the human stands in the center, working in a world where words fail. Mime artist and spectator conduct a distinctive dialogue without using words, thus giving rise to reflections and leading to catharsis. Because the scope of the concept is wide, it has been included in the cognitive framework of the anthropology of silence, proving that Marceau’s concept enriches the debate on the anthropology of silence and opens the perspective for further research on his concept of theater.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-250
Author(s):  
Matthias Wunsch

Philosophical anthropology offers two ways of structuring the concept of person, either by locating the essence of man in his being a person or by providing a bio- philosophy of personhood. Building on the work of Helmuth Plessner, this essay aims at conciliating both structurings. It argues for the thesis that personhood is the life-form of man and discusses the main structural features of human life-form.


2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 346-365
Author(s):  
Erik Bengtson ◽  
Mats Rosengren

In this article we argue that Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms is an indispensible philosophical-anthropological companion to rhetoric. We propose that appropriating Cassirer's understanding of symbolic forms enables rhetoric to go beyond the dominant perspective of language oriented theory and fully commit to a widened understanding of rhetoric as the study of how social meaning is created, performed and transformed. To clearly bring out the thrust of our enlarged rhetorical-philosophical-anthropological approach we have structured our argument partly as a contrastive critique of Thomas A. Discenna's recent (Rhetorica 32/3; 2014) attempt to include Cassirer in the rhetorical tradition through a reading of the 1929 debate in Davos between Cassirer and Martin Heidegger; partly through a presentation of the aspects of Cassirer's thought that we find most important for developing a rhetorical-philosophical-anthropology of social meaning.


2019 ◽  

This anthology discusses digitalisation as a versatile complex of topics from a specific theoretical perspective: the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner. Thus, it pursues the question of whether and how far the relationship between humans and the world is being changed and characterised by digitalisation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Stewart Rukgaber

Abstract This article argues that shame is fundamentally interpersonal. It is opposed to the leading interpretation of shame in the field of moral psychology, which is the cognitivist, morally rationally, autonomous view of shame as a negative judgment about the self. That view of shame abandons the social and interpersonal essence of shame. I will advance the idea, as developed by the tradition of philosophical anthropology and, in particular, in the works of Helmuth Plessner, Erwin Straus, F. J. J. Buytendijk, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that shame is a heteronomous affective response that is caused by a breakdown in our fundamental interpersonal connection with others. It is a feeling that comes from the denial of our basic need to live with others in a state of trusting acceptance.


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