Deconstructing Popular Mythologies about Millennials and Party Identification

The Forum ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-294
Author(s):  
John Cluverius ◽  
Joshua J. Dyck

Abstract Americans born before 1980, called Millennials, are repeatedly treated as a singular voting bloc, but much like the Baby Boomers, have been socialized across a series of very different elections. We develop a theory of millennial political socialization that argues that older Millennials are more tied to the Democratic party and more liberal than their younger counterparts. We use the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and an original survey of 1274 Americans conducted before the 2016 elections to test this theory. We find some support for our theory; in addition, we find that younger Millennials are socialized by issues of identity politics and culture – specifically on issues of immigration and the role of race in society. This implies a generation that largely favors Democrats, but whose Republicans are more culturally conservative than middle aged Republican voters.

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316802098744
Author(s):  
Kirby Goidel ◽  
Nicholas T. Davis ◽  
Spencer Goidel

In this paper, we utilize a module from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study to explore how individual perceptions of media bias changed over the course of the 2016 presidential campaign. While previous literature has documented the role of partisan affiliation in perceptions of bias, we know considerably less about how these perceptions change during a presidential election. Consistent with existing theories of attitude change, perceptions of bias polarize with strong Democrats moving toward believing the media were biased against Hillary Clinton (and in favor of Donald Trump) and independent-leaning Republicans moving toward believing the media were biased against Donald Trump. At the end of the 2016 election, more individuals believed the media were biased against their side. These effects were moderated by how much attention individuals paid to the campaign.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1135-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Junn ◽  
Natalie Masuoka

Scholarship on women voters in the United States has focused on the gender gap, showing that, since the 1980s, women are more likely to vote for Democratic Party candidates than men. The persistence of the gender gap has nurtured the conclusion that women are Democrats. This article presents evidence upending that conventional wisdom. It analyzes data from the American National Election Study to demonstrate that white women are the only group of female voters who support Republican Party candidates for president. They have done so by a majority in all but 2 of the last 18 elections. The relevance of race for partisan choice among women voters is estimated with data collected in 2008, 2012, and 2016, and the significance of being white is identified after accounting for political party identification and other predictors.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001112872110647
Author(s):  
Michael A. Hansen ◽  
John C. Navarro

Divisive criminal justice issues are typically framed through gender and racial lenses, with little empirical work considering the increasing role of political partisanship. Using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study ( N = 55,000), we estimate multivariate models of support for four policing and correctional reforms. The models initially point to gender gaps and racial gaps. However, as with many public policy issues, support for criminal justice reforms are largely a product of political partisanship—the gender and racial gaps are largely a consequence of gender and racial gaps in partisanship and appear to be driven by white Republican men. As legislative bodies continue to be overrepresented with individuals with the same demographic profile, criminal justice reform prospects are limited.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maruice Mangum

AbstractThe goal of this article is to examine the association between church attendance and the party identification of black Americans. Using ordinary least squares and logistic regression to analyze data taken from the 1996 National Black Election Study, I find that church attendance has dual effects for determining the party identification of blacks. On one hand, church attendance encourages blacks to be Republican. On the other hand, attending voting churches does not foster Republicanism. Attendance at voting churches influences blacks to be Democrats. Also, blacks who attend voting churches with increasing frequency are likely to identify themselves with the Democratic Party.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110411
Author(s):  
Marco Mendoza Aviña ◽  
André Blais

In late 2017, the first unified Republican government in 15 years enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which cut taxes for corporations and the wealthy. Why did so many citizens support a policy that primarily benefited people richer than them? The self-interest hypothesis holds that individuals act upon the position they occupy in the income distribution: richer (poorer) taxpayers should favor (oppose) regressive policy. Associations between income and policy preferences are often inconsistent, however, suggesting that many citizens fail to connect their self-interest to taxation. Indeed, political psychologists have shown compellingly that citizens can be guided by partisan considerations not necessarily aligned with their own interests. This article assesses public support for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study as well as contemporaneous ANES and VOTER surveys to replicate our analyses, we show that self-interest and partisanship both come into play, but that partisanship matters more. Personal financial considerations, while less influential than party identification, are relevant for two groups of individuals: Republicans and the politically unsophisticated.


2007 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Maurice Mangum

The aim of this research is to uncover the nature of the relationship between a black person’s individual circumstances and their perceptions of group interests and party identification, concentrating on explaining blacks’ identification with the Democratic Party. Data taken from the 1996 National Black Election Study is used to estimate blacks’ party identification, testing individual interest and group-interest models. The results of the logistic regressions suggest that individual interests matter when predicting blacks’ party identification. Unlike previous studies, I find that socioeconomic and demographic characteristics vary with blacks’ party identification. Black Americans also rely on group-based political power and economic factors. Blacks’ party identification is driven by evaluations of which political party is most useful to the black community.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-135
Author(s):  
Lucila Mallart

This article explores the role of visuality in the identity politics of fin-de-siècle Catalonia. It engages with the recent reevaluation of the visual, both as a source for the history of modern nation-building, and as a constitutive element in the emergence of civic identities in the liberal urban environment. In doing so, it offers a reading of the mutually constitutive relationship of the built environment and the print media in late-nineteenth century Catalonia, and explores the role of this relation as the mechanism by which the so-called ‘imagined communities’ come to exist. Engaging with debates on urban planning and educational policies, it challenges established views on the interplay between tradition and modernity in modern nation-building, and reveals long-term connections between late-nineteenth-century imaginaries and early-twentieth-century beliefs and practices.


2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 862-880
Author(s):  
Stuart Fox ◽  
Esther Muddiman ◽  
Jennifer Hampton ◽  
Ekaterina Kolpinskaya ◽  
Ceryn Evans

Intergenerational inequalities in economic security, health and political participation are frequently associated with inequalities in access to social capital. Millennials (those born after 1982) are often regarded as the least civically active generation, suggesting that they have less access to social capital, compared to other generations. Numerous studies have linked the decline of religion with falling social capital, as younger generations are deprived of a valuable source of social interaction; others, however, have claimed the link between the two is spurious because Millennials have developed different ways of interacting with social institutions and each other. Despite various studies exploring links between forms of religious and social capital, the role of religious decline in contributing to the intergenerational inequalities of today remains unclear. This study examines how religious capital is related to social capital for Baby Boomers and Millennials in the UK. Our analysis shows that while lower levels of religious capital are contributing to lower levels of social capital among Millennials, religious activity is also a more effective source of social capital for Millennials than their elders. We discuss possible interpretations of our data, including exploring whether greater religious engagement among Millennials may protect against intergenerational inequality and conflict.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 411-438
Author(s):  
Antonio Lillo

AbstractSince the coronavirus outbreak began to spread worldwide in the early months of 2020, English speakers have been coming up with new names for the disease at a rate of knots. The myriad unofficial synonyms for COVID-19 that we currently have at our disposal provide an extreme example of overlexicalisation, and it is not so much the number that is impressive as the sheer speed at which they have been coined. This study is based on a personally compiled corpus of tweets covering the period from late January to late May 2020 and aims to work out what mechanisms underpin the creation and use of some two hundred and seventy synonyms, paying particular attention to the role of slang, wordplay, verbal humour, bigotry and xenophobia. The author identifies and discusses a set of categories that help to better understand the attitudes behind these words, some of which bespeak a desire to confront the grim reality of disease, while others – the majority, in fact – seek to denigrate and stigmatise its “ideal victims” (the baby boomers) or its “evil perpetrators” (the Chinese). In a different context, this study might be deemed just a celebration of the creative levity and wit of English speakers when faced with adversity. In these dark times, it is also a sad testimony to how some of our primitive fears have come to be reflected in our pandemic lexicon.


2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Strate ◽  
Timothy Kiska ◽  
Marvin Zalman

At the November 1998 general election, Michigan citizens were given the opportunity to vote on Proposal B, an initiative that would have legalized physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS initiatives also have been held in Washington State, California, Oregon, and Maine, with only Oregon's passing. We use exit poll data to analyze the vote on Proposal B. Attributes associated with social liberalism—Democratic Party identification, less frequent church attendance, more education, and greater household income—led to increased odds of a “yes” vote. Attributes associated with social conservatism—Republican Party identification and frequent church attendance—led to decreased odds of a “yes” vote. Similar to the abortion issue, PAS's supporters strongly value personal autonomy, whereas its opponents strongly value the sanctity of life. Voter alignments like those in Michigan will likely appear in other states with the initiative process if PAS reaches their ballots.


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