scholarly journals Comments on the Representation of Romania in the European Council and on its Consequences for Democratic Accountability

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-36
Author(s):  
Constantin Mihai Banu

Abstract The article approaches issues concerning the representation of Romania in the European Council, question that has received significant attention in recent years. Several decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court of Romania were meant to clear up to a certain degree the division of roles between the President of Romania and the Prime Minister in representation in the European Council meetings, while other matters are still waiting for a clearer answer. These developments occurred with parliamentary debates on what is today the Act no 373 of 18 December 2013 on cooperation between the Parliament and the Government in the field of European affairs. The article aims to asses this case-law of the Constitutional Court in the broader framework of EU affairs.

Significance The government led by the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) is under mounting pressure as Slovenia prepares to take over the European Council presidency. This is due mainly to hostility in parliament and society to Prime Minister Janez Jansa, who promotes a popular but divisive form of national conservatism. Impacts A successful no-confidence vote in the government followed by early elections would complicate Slovenia’s handling of its EU presidency. The fall of the current government and its replacement by the centre-left would improve Slovenia’s relations with the EU and United States. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban would lose an ally at EU level if Jansa lost office.


Subject Thai government's clampdown on the opposition and struggle with various crises. Significance The Constitutional Court last week dissolved the opposition Future Forward Party for receiving an illegal loan from its leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. Future Forward had in recent months emerged as a vigorous opponent of the military-backed government. Army Chief Apirat Kongsompong and Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha may be relieved to be rid of the party, but there is unlikely to be any let-up in opposition pressure as the administration grapples with crises relating to military corruption, water shortage and infectious disease. Impacts The military will try to help the government manage an approaching drought and the spread of the Wuhan coronavirus. The central bank will step up currency management to keep Thai exports as competitive as possible amid the economic downturn. Erstwhile Future Forward MPs may form a new opposition party.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-307
Author(s):  
Yan Campagnolo

Canada has the dubious honour of being the sole Westminster jurisdiction to have enacted a near-absolute immunity for Cabinet confidences. Through the adoption of sections 39 of the Canada Evidence Act and 69 of the Access to Information Act in 1982, the federal Parliament has deprived the courts of the power to inspect Cabinet confidences and order their disclosure when the public interest demands it. Why has Parliament enacted these draconian statutory provisions? How have these provisions been interpreted and applied since they have been proclaimed into force? This article seeks to answer these questions based on a detailed examination of the relevant historical records, parliamentary debates, case law and government reports. The first section seeks to demonstrate that the political decision to provide a near-absolute immunity for Cabinet confidences was made at the highest level of the State, by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, based on the debatable justification that the courts could not be trusted to properly adjudicate Cabinet immunity claims. The second section seeks to establish that the government has taken advantage of the inherent vagueness of sections 39 and 69 to give an overbroad interpretation to the term “Cabinet confidences.” In addition, by modifying the Cabinet Paper System, the government has significantly narrowed the scope of an important exception to Cabinet immunity, that is, the “discussion paper exception,” which was initially intended to provide some level of transparency to the Cabinet decision-making process. These problems are compounded by the fact that only a weak form of judicial review is available against Cabinet immunity claims which, in practice, makes it tremendously difficult to challenge such claims.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (11) ◽  
pp. 907-945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Lebeck

The issue of how democratic and constitutional nation states shall square international cooperation with their commitments to constitutionalism, democratic accountability and fundamental rights is a persistent problem that becomes ever more pressing with increasing international integration. The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is well-known for having developed a detailed case law on the extent and forms of delegation of powers from the German state to inter-and supranational organizations.


Author(s):  
Jacek Wojnicki

The Constitution of Montenegro describes the state as a "civic, democratic, ecological state of social justice, based on the reign of Law." Montenegro is an independent and sovereign republic that proclaimed its new constitution on 22th October 2007. The President of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Predsjednik Crne Gore) is the head of state, elected for a period of five years through direct elections. The President represents the republic abroad, promulgates law by ordinance, calls elections for the Parliament, proposes candidates for Prime Minister, president and justices of the Constitutional Court to the Parliament. The President also proposes the calling of a referendum to Parliament, grants amnesty for criminal offences prescribed by the national law, confers decoration and awards and performs other constitutional duties and is a member of the Supreme Defence Council. The official residence of the President is in Cetinje. The Government of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Vlada Crne Gore) is the executive branch of government authority of Montenegro. The government is headed by the Prime Minister, and consists both of the deputy prime ministers as well as ministers. The Parliament of Montenegro (Montenegrin: Skupština Crne Gore) is a unicameral legislative body. It passes laws, ratifies treaties, appoints the Prime Minister, ministers, and justices of all courts, adopts the budget and performs other duties as established by the Constitution. Parliament can pass a vote of no-confidence on the Government by a simple majority. One representative is elected per 6,000 voters. The present parliament contains 81 seats, with a 47-seat majority currently held by the Coalition for a European Montenegro as a result of the 2009 parliamentary election


Author(s):  
Kevin Featherstone ◽  
Dimitris Papadimitriou

In recent years, significant attention has focused on the reform ‘failures’ of Greece in the context of its European Union membership and the implementation of its bailout commitments. Systemic public-policy constraints are increasingly recognized, but our understanding of how the senior echelons of the Greek government are able to coordinate the policy process remains rather incomplete. This chapter examines the evolution of the Greek core executive since the transition to democracy in 1974 and offers an appraisal of the efforts of successive Greek prime ministers to manage government business. The main argument put forward is that the extensive formal powers afforded to the prime minister by the Greek Constitution have not materialized in an effective system of governance at the top of the government. In reality, the structure is one of a ‘solitary centre’ amidst a ‘segmented government’ in which the prime minister lacks the necessary resources to effectively coordinate and control its direction. The chapter discusses the reasons behind this discrepancy by reference to both structural and agency-driven explanations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-107
Author(s):  
Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez ◽  
Philippe De Lombaerde

Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 is an ambitious text which tries to strike a balance between laying a strong foundation for economic modernization and liberalization, on the one hand, and the creation of a Social State of Law and the protection of an impressive list of constitutional rights, on the other. Because of the doctrine that has been developed by the Constitutional Court since then, it has been considered as one of the most activist courts worldwide, next to courts such as the South African court. One of the factors that has thereby complicated its task is the fact that, since the 1990s, the government has actively multiplied its international economic commitments. In this article, case law of the Colombian Constitutional Court is analyzed, with a focus on balancing: (a) between the binding character of (regional and bilateral) free trade commitments and the constitutional competences of the sub-national level, and (b) between international free trade commitments and the protection of constitutional social rights. Both cases shed light on the balancing task of the court in a complex international context, in the presence of a multi-level regulatory architecture.


Author(s):  
Luka Anđelković

The article discusses the elements of proportionality as the most important requirement that must be satisfied in the limitation of human rights. There are four major elements of this principle: legitimacy, adequacy, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu. Legitimacy means that limitation must pursue a legitimate aim. Adequacy means that the chosen measure must be suitable for achieving that aim. Furthermore, the government may only use the least restrictive measure for achieving the aim, the one that causes least damage to protected rights and interests. In order to be deemed proportionate, the limitation must satisfy the test of proportionality stricto sensu, which means that achieving a particular aim must be important enough to justify the damage which will be caused to individual rights. This article particularly focuses on the application and the significance of these elements in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court of Serbia.


Significance Since coming into power on the back of public protests in April-May 2018, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has committed to a robust overhaul of state institutions including the judiciary, where the Constitutional Court is a high priority. To move forward, the government has to tackle multiple legacy issues and resistance to change within state institutions. Impacts An all-new government faces teething problems including lack of capacity. The unexplained resignations of Armenia's intelligence and police chiefs hint at frictions within the governing team. Down the road, the government plans reforms to the electoral process and the political party system. Closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey are an obstacle to growth.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26

This section comprises international, Arab, Israeli, and U.S. documents and source materials, as well as an annotated list of recommended reports. Significant developments this quarter: In the international diplomatic arena, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 2334, reaffirming the illegality of Israeli settlements and calling for a return to peace negotiations. Additionally, former U.S. secretary of state John Kerry delivered a final address on the Israel-Palestine conflict, outlining a groundwork for negotiations. Two weeks later, international diplomats met in Paris to establish incentives for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas to return to the negotiating table. Despite international discussions of peace talks and the impediment settlements pose to a two-state solution, the Israeli Knesset passed the controversial Regulation Law, enabling the government to retroactively legalize settlements and confiscate Palestinian land throughout the West Bank. Meanwhile, U.S. president Donald Trump took office on 20 January 2017, and he wasted no time before inviting Netanyahu to the White House for their first meeting, in February.


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