Cyber Defense as a part of Hazard Mitigation: Comparing High Hazard Potential Dam Safety Programs in the United States and Sweden

Author(s):  
Rosemary A. Burk ◽  
Jan Kallberg

AbstractCyber security tends to only address the technical aspects of the information systems. The lack of considerations for environmental long-range implications of failed cyber security planning and measures, especially in the protection of critical infrastructure and industrial control systems, have created ecological risks that are to a high degree unaddressed. This study compares dam safety arrangements in the United States and Sweden. Dam safety in the United States is highly regulated in many states, but inconsistent over the nation. In Sweden dam safety is managed by self-regulation. The study investigates the weaknesses and strengths in these regulatory and institutional arrangements from a cyber security perspective. If ecological and environmental concerns were a part of the risk evaluation and risk mitigation processes for cyber security, the hazard could be limited. Successful environmentally-linked cyber defense mitigates the risk for significant damage to domestic freshwater, aquatic and adjacent terrestrial ecosystems, and protects ecosystem function.

First Monday ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Lawson ◽  
Michael K. Middleton

During the two and a half decades leading up to the Russian cyber attacks on the 2016 U.S. presidential election, public policy discourse about cybersecurity typically framed cybersecurity using metaphors and analogies to war and tended to focus on catastrophic doom scenarios involving cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. In this discourse, the so-called “cyber Pearl Harbor” attack was always supposedly just around the corner. Since 2016, however, many have argued that fixation on cyber Pearl Harbor-like scenarios was an inaccurate framing that left the United States looking in the wrong direction when Russia struck. This essay traces the use of the cyber Pearl Harbor analogy and metaphor over the 25-year period preceding the Russian cyber attacks of 2016. It argues that cyber Pearl Harbor has been a consistent feature of U.S. cybersecurity discourse with a largely stable meaning focused on catastrophic physical impacts. Government officials have been primarily responsible for driving these concerns with news media uncritically transmitting their claims. This is despite the fact that such claims were often ambiguous about just who might carry out such an attack and often lacked supporting evidence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 121-128
Author(s):  
S. CIAPA

The article considers the legal and organizational aspects of ensuring the protection of the critical information infrastructure from cyberattacks. Attention is drawn to the positive experience of the United States in ensuring the resilience of the objects of critical infrastructure. The provisions of the new Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine are analyzed, one of the priorities of which is to improve the regulatory framework for cyber security of critical information infrastructure. The shortcomings of the previous Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine (2016) are noted. Contains a detailed analysis of legislation and initiatives on providing cybersecurity. General requirements for cyber protection of critical infrastructure objects are considered. Based on the analysis of the current legislation on cyber security of Ukraine, ways to improve the legal and organizational support for the protection of the critical information infrastructure from cyber attacks are proposed.


Author(s):  
E. V. Batueva

The development of ICT and the formation of the global information space changed the agenda of national and international security. Such key characteristics of cyberspace as openness, accessibility, anonymity, and identification complexity determined the rise of actors in cyber space and increased the level of cyber threats. Based on the analyses of the U.S. agencies' approach, the author defines three major groups of threats: use of ICT by states, criminals and terrorists. This concept is shared by the majority of the countries involved in the international dialogue on information security issues and is fundamental for providing cyber security policy on both national and international levels. The United States is developing a complex strategy for cyber space that includes maximization of ICT's advantages in all strategically important fields as well as improvement of national information systems and networks security. On the international level the main task for the American diplomacy is to guarantee the U.S. information dominance. The United States is the only country that takes part practically in all international and regional fora dealing with cyber security issues. However process of the development of a global cyber security regime is not going to be fast due to countries' different approaches to key definitions and lack of joint understanding of cyber security issues as well as due to the position of the countries, among all the United States, that are not interested in any new obligatory international norms and principles. Such American policy aims at saving the possibility of using cyberspace capacity in reaching political and military goals, thus keeping the global leadership.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 70-89
Author(s):  
Hala Bou Alwan

AbstractDespite an ongoing drive by governments and law enforcers around the world to improve the sophistication of their risk mitigation measures, cyber-attacks are continually increasing. A study from Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) shows more than 4,000 ransomware attacks occurred daily in 2016. That's a 300 percent increase over 2015, where 1,000 ransomware attacks were seen per day. Cyber criminals are successfully penetrating even the most high-profile companies and governmental agencies. The breach at the NSA was truly alarming and just one recent example of the dire situation the country, and world, face as cybercrime intensifies and the cyber security talent shortage becomes more serious.Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to focus on cyber education at the national, government, and law enforcement level examining the methodology to set the tone from the top ensuring alignment between governments, law enforcers, private sector, and academic level. It also examines the gaps in cyber laws and educational governance initiatives and their impact on efficient execution of cyber policies for various regions of the world with a focus on the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America.Finally, this article recommends policy guidelines and a compliance manual framework for governments and law enforcers to consider ensuring that cyber risks are properly addressed and mitigated in a structured and coherent way.


2020 ◽  
Vol 78 (10) ◽  
pp. 866-883 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer L Harris ◽  
Jennifer L Pomeranz

Abstract Children’s diets in their first 1000 days influence dietary preferences, eating habits, and long-term health. Yet the diets of most infants and toddlers in the United States do not conform to recommendations for optimal child nutrition. This narrative review examines whether marketing for infant formula and other commercial baby/toddler foods plays a role. The World Health Organization’s International Code of Marketing Breast-milk Substitutes strongly encourages countries and manufacturers to prohibit marketing practices that discourage initiation of, and continued, breastfeeding. However, in the United States, widespread infant formula marketing negatively impacts breastfeeding. Research has also identified questionable marketing of toddler milks (formula/milk-based drinks for children aged 12–36 mo). The United States has relied exclusively on industry self-regulation, but US federal agencies and state and local governments could regulate problematic marketing of infant formula and toddler milks. Health providers and public health organizations should also provide guidance. However, further research is needed to better understand how marketing influences what and how caregivers feed their young children and inform potential interventions and regulatory solutions.


Author(s):  
Steven A. Arndt

Over the past 20 years, the nuclear power industry in the United States (U.S.) has been slowly replacing old, obsolete, and difficult-to-maintain analog technology for its nuclear power plant protection, control, and instrumentation systems with digital systems. The advantages of digital technology, including more accurate and stable measurements and the ability to improve diagnostics capability and system reliability, have led to an ever increasing move to complete these upgrades. Because of the difficulties with establishing digital systems safety based on analysis or tests, the safety demonstration for these systems relies heavily on establishing the quality of the design and development of the hardware and software. In the United States, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established detailed guidelines for establishing and documenting an appropriate safety demonstration for digital systems in NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition,” Chapter 7, “Instrumentation and Controls,” Revision 5, issued March 2007 [1], and in a number of regulatory guides and interim staff guidance documents. However, despite the fact that the United States has a well-defined review process, a number of significant challenges associated with the design, licensing, and implementation of upgrades to digital systems for U.S. plants have emerged. Among these challenges have been problems with the quality of the systems and the supporting software verification and validation (V&V) processes, challenges with determining the optimum balance between the enhanced capabilities for the new systems and the desire to maintain system simplicity, challenges with cyber security, and challenges with developing the information needed to support the review of new systems for regulatory compliance.


2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Holmes ◽  
Nicolas Luco ◽  
Fred Turner

An unprecedented level of data concerning building performance in the Canterbury earthquake sequence of 2010–2011 has been collected by the Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission of Inquiry. In addition to data from a technical investigation undertaken by the New Zealand Department of Building and Housing on four specific buildings, the Royal Commission has collected data from many other invited reports, international peer reviews of reports, submitted testimony, and oral testimony and examination at public hearings. Contained in the Commission's seven-volume final report are 189 specific recommendations for improvements in design codes and standards, hazard mitigation policy, post-earthquake building safety and occupancy tagging, and other topics. Some of these recommendations are unique to New Zealand's system of government, engineering practice, or codes and standards, but many are applicable in the United States.


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