Transcendental Phenomenology and Unobservable Entities

Perspectives ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Berghofer
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract Can phenomenologists allow for the existence of unobservable entities such as atoms, electrons, and quarks? Can we justifiably believe in the existence of entities that are in principle unobservable? This paper addresses the relationship between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and scientific realism. More precisely, the focus is on the question of whether there are basic epistemological principles phenomenologists are committed to that have anti-realist consequences with respect to unobservable entities. This question is relevant since Husserl’s basic epistemological principles, such as the “principle of all principles,” seem to suggest that epistemic justification is limited to what can be originally given in the sense that if an object cannot be given in an originary presentive intuition, then one cannot be justified in believing that this object exists. It is the main aim of this paper to show (i) that interpretative reasons exist for not reading Husserl in such a way and (ii) that systematic reasons exist as to why phenomenologists should not subscribe to this criterion. I shall put forward a different criterion of justification that satisfies the spirit of Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and allows for justifiably believing in the existence of unobservable scientific entities.

scholarly journals SEEKING ANSWERS: LEARNING, KNOWLEDGE AND PHILOSOPHY

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simón Busch Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Dynamic Process ◽  
Scientific Models ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
Traditional Definition ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

<p>The present essay intends to explore the relationship between science and philosophy from an epistemological viewpoint, discussing the relevance of scientific realism for developing a fruitful feedback between philosophy and science. First, I argue that changing the traditional definition of knowledge should not imply skepticism. Instead, scientific models of the mind can serve as an epistemological guide for defining the acquisition of knowledge as a dynamic process, where the learner interacts with reality. Second, I argue that these models can portray reality, though not in a direct and complete way. In this sense, science is regarded as providing a diversely-grained group of models that can be compared by philosophy in order to improve philosophical discussions.<br /><br /></p>

scholarly journals THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY OF E. HUSSERL IN THE CONTEXT OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (RL. 2020. vol.1. no. 2) ◽  
pp. 20-27
Author(s):  
Svetlana Berdaus
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Science Teaching ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Scientific Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Fundamental Requirement ◽  
First Philosophy

The article examines the problem of the relationship between critical and dogmatic types of thinking in the context of the project of scientific philosophy created by Husserl. The point of view is expressed according to which the program of science teaching of Husserl was not completed at the end of the descriptive stage, but, on the contrary, was continued and expanded at the stage of transcendental phenomenology. Based on the material of the first part of the lectures “First Philosophy” belonging to this stage, it is demonstrated how Husserl, with the help of historical-eidetic reduction and the concept of the unity of motivation, outlines the way for the “naïve” philosopher to master the principles of critical thinking. These principles, coupled with phenomenological reduction, form a special disposition of the dogmatic and the critical in the project of phenomenology as a rigorous science, where the dogmatic and the critical merge into the fundamental requirement of the philosopher's self-reflection and responsibility.

scholarly journals On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Significant Advance ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Orthodox View

I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.

scholarly journals Heidegger, the Given, and the Second Nature of Entities

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 256-274
Author(s):  
Graham Bounds
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Second Nature ◽  
The World ◽  
Space Of Reasons ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
The Given ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract In this paper I draw from Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of the 1920s to outline some basic features of his theory of intentionality that I believe have not been fully appreciated or utilized, and that allow for both novel and fruitful interventions in questions about meaning, the relationship between mind and the world, and epistemic justification, principally as they appear in John McDowell’s synoptic project in Mind and World. I argue that while elements of McDowell’s picture are ultimately unsatisfying and problematic, much of his conceptual framework can and should be put into dialogue with Heidegger’s, and that in so doing we make available powerful resources for amending the McDowellian account. Moreover, these emendations have attractive implications for his distinctive desiderata. In particular, they provide original conceptions of normativity’s place in nature, of the boundaries of the space of reasons, and of the relationship between the answerability of thought both to the world and to human beings as a rational community.

The cognitive and behavioral sciences: Real patterns, real unity, real causes, but no supervenience

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 637-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Ross ◽  
David Spurrett
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Behavioral Sciences ◽  
Unity Of Science ◽  
The Relationship

Our response amplifies our case for scientific realism and the unity of science and clarifies our commitments to scientific unity, nonreductionism, behaviorism, and our rejection of talk of “emergence.” We acknowledge support from commentators for our view of physics and, responding to pressure and suggestions from commentators, deny the generality supervenience and explain what this involves. We close by reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and science.

scholarly journals From the Husserlian Transcendental Idealism to the Question on Being

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98
Author(s):  
Anna Varga-Jani
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Edith Stein ◽  
Remarkable Similarity ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

Well known is the fact that Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy I, published in 1913, made a strong disappointment in the phenomenological circle around Husserl, and started a reinterpretation of the husserlian phenomenology. The problem of the constitution was a real dilemma for the studentship of Munich — Göttingen. More of Husserl’s students from his Göttingen years reflected in the 1930th on the transcendental idealism, which they originated from the Ideas and found fulfilled in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and Formal and transzendental Logic. The remarkable similarity between these papers is the questioning on being incorporated in the problematic of the method in the husserlian phenomenology. But this parallelism in the problem reveals the origin of the religious phenomenon in the husserlian phenomenology as well. Adolf Reinach’s religious terms as gratitude (Dankbarkeit), charity (Barmherzigkeit), etc. in his religious Notes, Heidegger’s notion of being as finiteness in Being and Time, Edith Stein’s concept about the finite and eternal being in Finite and Eternal Being are originating in the problem of constitution in the transcendental phenomenology on the one hand, but these phenomenon point at the constitution theologically. In my paper I would like to show the relationship between the critique on the husserlian transcendental idealism and the roots of the experience of religious life by the phenomenological problem of being especially at Edith Stein.

scholarly journals REALISMO SCIENTIFICO SENZA SCIENTISMO: LA PROPOSTA DI HILARY PUTNAM

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Lizzadri
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Logical Empiricist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Actual Nature ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Physical Quantities

The reflection of Hilary Putnam over the scientific realism endured frequent distortions inside the contemporary epistemologic debate. Just recently, in fact, in Philosophy in an Age of Science (2012), Putnam himself wanted to explicitly denounce the undeserved identification of his originary scientific realism with the scientism, as well as the illegitimacy of the resulting criticism of incoherence considering the new appreciation of metaphysics of the Nineties. On the other hand, in Mathematics, matter and method (1975), Putnam has already led a fierce criticism against the logical empiricist scientism and its deceptive and non realistic concept of science. The paper intents to present this criticism starting with the analysis of some essays from the first volume of the Philosophical Papers, in order to bring to the “backlight” surface the actual nature of his scientific realism. The scientific realism will, first of all, show itself like the attitude of the phylosopher, or rather of the scientist, in front of the scientific activity: differently from the non-realistic “deductivism” which prior imposes its own methodological rules as an essential warrancy of truth, the scientific realism refuses such “feticism” of the method, sure that the scientific activity works by itself in the sphere of truth, as in inside the space defined by the relationship between a subject and something else. Such polarity will be verified through Putnam’s criticism against the geo-chronometric conventionalism of Adolf Grünbaum (An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry, 1963), in terms of “existential relevance” of scientific theories, even when recognising conventional elements in the definition with reference to physical quantities.

scholarly journals Structural realism - the search for a bearer of reality

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-624
Author(s):  
Milutin Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theory ◽  
Theory Change ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Physical Structure ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In the last two decades the old debate concerning reality of science shifted from questions regarding scientific entities to questions regarding scientific structures. I will present and assess advantages and drawback of this new realists? focus on structures, and at the same time analyze the wider picture of development of the scientific realism. The structural realism will be tackled in the form encountered in works of John Worrall and James Ladyman. Special attention will be devoted to the relationship of their solutions to the argument based on the scientific revolutions - the pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that these realist?s strategies are not sufficiently convincing to steer us to make a leap in ontology and presume the existence of meta-physical structure (regardless of the question is it scientifically relevant) - in the first place because neither one of them manages to satisfactorily identify a structure, however general, which accumulates in the scientific-theory change.

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