Outline of the Relationship Among Transcendental Phenomenology, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Sciences of Persons

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 139-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick J. Wertz ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
The Relationship

Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Webber
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
The World

The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications displays an apparent ambivalence toward Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favor of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.

Alfred Schutz on Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Emanuel Gros
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Alfred Schutz ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
Human And Social Sciences ◽  
Alfred Schütz ◽  
Do So

AbstractAlfred Schutz is, without a doubt, one of the phenomenologists that contributed the most to the reflection on how to apply insights from phenomenological philosophy to the, empirical and theoretical, human and social sciences. However, his work tends to be neglected by many of the current advocates of phenomenology within these disciplines. In the present paper, I intend to remedy this situation. In order to do so, I will systematically revisit his mundane and social-scientifically oriented account of phenomenology, which, as I shall show, emerges from a theoretical confrontation with the Husserlian distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology.

The Structure, Basic Contents and Dynamics of the Unconscious in Analytical (Jungian) Psychology and Husserlian Phenomenology: Part I1

1997 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-170
Author(s):  
Burt C. Hopkins
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Jungian Psychology ◽  
Cognitive Factors ◽  
Collective Unconscious ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Marked Contrast ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Descriptive Account

AbstractThis paper offers both a phenomenologically psychological and phenomenologically transcendental account of the constitution of the unconscious. Its phenomenologically psychological portion is published here as Part I, while its phenomenologically transcendental portion will be published in the next volume of this journal as Part II. Part I first clarifies the issues involved in Husserl's differentiation of the respective contents and methodologies of psychological and transcendental phenomenology. On the basis of this clarification I show that, in marked contrast to the prevailing approach to the unconscious in the phenomenological literature, an approach that focuses on the emotive and aesthetic factors (rooted in Freud's theory of repression) in the descriptive account of the constitution of an unconscious, there are cognitive factors (rooted in Jung's theory of apperception) that have yet to be descriptively accounted for by phenomenological psychology. Part I concludes with a phenomenologically psychological account of the role these cognitive factors play in the constitution of an unconscious. Part II will show how Jung's claims regarding a dimension of unconscious contents that lacks genealogical links to consciousness proper, that is, the "collective unconscious, " can be phenomenologically accounted for if (1) Jung's methodological differentiation of empirical and interpretative (hermeneutically phenomenological) approaches to the unconscious is attended to and (2) such attention is guided by the phenomenologically transcendental critique of the emotive and aesthetic limitations of both the Freudian and heretofore Husserlian accounts of the descriptive genesis of something like an unconscious.

scholarly journals The Nature and Role of Phenomenological Psychology in Alfred Schutz

2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lester Embree
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Everyday Life ◽  
Social Scientist ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Subjective Meaning ◽  
Central Task ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cultural World

AbstractThe essay reviews how phenomenological psychology can draw on Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in order to clarify the foundations of the cultural sciences and then explicates the theory of this psychology implicit in Schutz's oeuvre.Max Weber has shown that all phenomena of the socio-cultural world originate in social interaction and can be referred to it. According to him, it is the central task of sociology to understand the meaning which the actor bestows on his action (the “subjective meaning” in his terminology). But what is action, what is meaning, and how is the understanding of such meaning by a fellow-man possible, be he a partner of the social interaction, or merely an observer in everyday life, or a social scientist? I submit that any attempt to answer these questions leads immediately to questions with which Husserl was concerned and which he has to a certain extent solved. (Schutz, 1962, p. 145)

scholarly journals THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY OF E. HUSSERL IN THE CONTEXT OF PHENOMENOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (RL. 2020. vol.1. no. 2) ◽  
pp. 20-27
Author(s):  
Svetlana Berdaus
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Science Teaching ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Phenomenological Reduction ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
Scientific Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Fundamental Requirement ◽  
First Philosophy

The article examines the problem of the relationship between critical and dogmatic types of thinking in the context of the project of scientific philosophy created by Husserl. The point of view is expressed according to which the program of science teaching of Husserl was not completed at the end of the descriptive stage, but, on the contrary, was continued and expanded at the stage of transcendental phenomenology. Based on the material of the first part of the lectures “First Philosophy” belonging to this stage, it is demonstrated how Husserl, with the help of historical-eidetic reduction and the concept of the unity of motivation, outlines the way for the “naïve” philosopher to master the principles of critical thinking. These principles, coupled with phenomenological reduction, form a special disposition of the dogmatic and the critical in the project of phenomenology as a rigorous science, where the dogmatic and the critical merge into the fundamental requirement of the philosopher's self-reflection and responsibility.

On Schutz’s conception of science as one of multiple realities

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-297
Author(s):  
Martyn Hammersley
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Multiple Realities ◽  
The World ◽  
Key Features ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Careful Assessment

This article examines Alfred Schutz’s concept of ‘multiple realities’, and in particular, his portrayal of science as one of these realities. It is noted that, while this concept has been widely cited, it has often been interpreted in ways that are at odds with key features of Schutz’s original formulation. A careful assessment is made of the main article he wrote dealing with this topic, focusing on the respects in which the ‘multiple realities’ he discusses are held to differ. Particular attention is given to the relationship between science and what Schutz calls ‘the paramount reality’, that of ‘daily life’. It is suggested that there are some serious problems with the distinctions he makes and that these relate to an ambiguity in his position: that he starts from within phenomenological psychology, drawing on the work of Husserl and James, but moves in a more naturalistic and sociological direction in his account of ‘the world of daily life’. This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of phenomenology and its relationship to social science.

scholarly journals From the Husserlian Transcendental Idealism to the Question on Being

1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98
Author(s):  
Anna Varga-Jani
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Religious Life ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Edith Stein ◽  
Remarkable Similarity ◽  
Phenomenological Philosophy ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

Well known is the fact that Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy I, published in 1913, made a strong disappointment in the phenomenological circle around Husserl, and started a reinterpretation of the husserlian phenomenology. The problem of the constitution was a real dilemma for the studentship of Munich — Göttingen. More of Husserl’s students from his Göttingen years reflected in the 1930th on the transcendental idealism, which they originated from the Ideas and found fulfilled in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and Formal and transzendental Logic. The remarkable similarity between these papers is the questioning on being incorporated in the problematic of the method in the husserlian phenomenology. But this parallelism in the problem reveals the origin of the religious phenomenon in the husserlian phenomenology as well. Adolf Reinach’s religious terms as gratitude (Dankbarkeit), charity (Barmherzigkeit), etc. in his religious Notes, Heidegger’s notion of being as finiteness in Being and Time, Edith Stein’s concept about the finite and eternal being in Finite and Eternal Being are originating in the problem of constitution in the transcendental phenomenology on the one hand, but these phenomenon point at the constitution theologically. In my paper I would like to show the relationship between the critique on the husserlian transcendental idealism and the roots of the experience of religious life by the phenomenological problem of being especially at Edith Stein.

scholarly journals A (re)constituição da Psicologia Fenomenológica em Edmund Husserl

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-138
Author(s):  
Tommy Akira Goto
Keyword(s):  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Scientific Psychology ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
German Philosopher ◽  
Basic Functions ◽  
Object Of Study

The German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), founding father of Phenomenology, was one of the most prominent thinkers of the 20th century, who not only influenced the philosophical trends of his time but also the sciences in general. Nevertheless, psychology was the science which strongly had direct influence of phenomenology which, in its turn, provided the possibility of developing a phenomenological psychology. The aim of this thesis is to (re)constitute, from a historical-critical point of view, the conception of phenomenological psychology in Husserl’s last work: The Crisis of European Sciences and the Transcendental Phenomenology (Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenchaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie). At present, psychologists are developing a large number of versions of phenomenological psychology, particularly in Brazil; however, none of them have rigorously been based on Husserl’s concepts. Thus, in order to have an understanding of what constitutes to Husserl a phenomenological psychology, we present, to start with, a brief introduction to the transcendental phenomenology, explaining the variations of the phenomenological method (i. e. phenomenological levels). After that, we point out the most meaningful aspects of Husserl’s last piece of writing, concentrating our efforts on the revelation the philosopher makes concerning a crisis of the sciences and of reason, as well as his phenomenological criticism on epistemology of Psychology. At last, following Husserl’s analyses of phenomenology and psychology, we conclude that the conception of phenomenological psychology will constitute a universal science of human beings whose object of study is the animistic being. This science will have basic functions such as: a) the rebuilding of the scientific psychology and the explanation of the psychological concepts; b) the constitution of a universal science of the psychic; c) the description of the intentional experiences and d) be a propaedeutic discipline for the transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, the authentic and genuine conception of the phenomenological psychology is important to the psychologists since that it is through the development of this discipline that they will recover the subjectivity as the original source of human life and its correlation with the world-life.

Bodily and Therapeutic Movement

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-63
Author(s):  
Anna Louise Langager ◽  
Tone Roald
Keyword(s):  
Narrative Therapy ◽  
Single Case ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
Video Recording ◽  
Phenomenological Psychology ◽  
Bodily Movement ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Being Moved ◽  
Bodily Movements

Abstract In this article we present a phenomenological single-case study of a client’s experience of her therapist’s bodily movement in the context of narrative therapy. A client was interviewed regarding her experience of selected bodily movements of the therapist based on a video recording of one of her therapeutic sessions. The movements were analyzed through Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s cardinal structures of movement while the interview was analyzed through a modification of Giorgi’s method for phenomenological psychology. We focused on the relationship between the therapist’s bodily movement and therapeutic movement in the client and arrived at general structures of the client’s experience of being moved by movement. The experience comprises three core constituents: ‘shifts in sense of self’, ‘sense of togetherness’ and ‘feelings of mobility’, and reveals that the therapist’s bodily movements can lead to therapeutic changes compatible with the aim of narrative therapy.

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