Psychopathy and Moral Dilemma Judgments: A CNI Model Analysis of Personal and Perceived Societal Standards

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-58
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Research on moral dilemma judgment suggests that higher levels of psychopathy are associated with a greater preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments. The current research investigated whether this association reflects (1) differences in the understanding of what society considers right or wrong or (2) differences in personal standards about the acceptability of certain actions. Using the CNI model, we further explored whether the obtained differences are rooted in differential standards regarding the significance of consequences, moral norms, or general action preferences. The results suggest that (1) both differences in personal standards and differences in perceived societal standards contribute to associations between psychopathy and moral dilemma judgments and (2) personal and perceived societal standards play different roles for different determinants of moral dilemma judgments. Implications for clinical and moral psychology and for research at their intersection are discussed.

2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722098799
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner ( deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good ( utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies ( N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.


2021 ◽  
pp. 216770262110438
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Craig S. Neumann ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

A major question in clinical and moral psychology concerns the nature of the commonly presumed association between psychopathy and moral judgment. In the current preregistered study ( N = 443), we aimed to address this question by examining the relation between psychopathy and responses to moral dilemmas pitting consequences for the greater good against adherence to moral norms. To provide more nuanced insights, we measured four distinct facets of psychopathy and used the CNI model to quantify sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction over action ( I) in responses to moral dilemmas. Psychopathy was associated with a weaker sensitivity to moral norms, which showed unique links to the interpersonal and affective facets of psychopathy. Psychopathy did not show reliable associations with either sensitivity to consequences or general preference for inaction over action. Implications of these findings for clinical and moral psychology are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (7) ◽  
pp. 1013-1026 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meike Kroneisen ◽  
Daniel W. Heck

Research on moral decision making usually focuses on two ethical principles: the principle of utilitarianism (= morality of an action is determined by its consequences) and the principle of deontology (= morality of an action is valued according to the adherence to moral norms regardless of the consequences). Criticism on traditional moral dilemma research includes the reproach that consequences and norms are confounded in standard paradigms. As a remedy, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I). In two studies, we examined the link of basic personality traits to moral judgments by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. As predicted, high Honesty–Humility was selectively associated with sensitivity for norms, whereas high Emotionality was selectively associated with sensitivity for consequences. However, Conscientiousness was not associated with a preference for inaction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.V. Molchanov ◽  
O.V. Almazova

The paper presents results of an empirical study of adolescents' concepts of responsibility in different types of moral dilemmas characterized by violations of moral norms. The study proved that the type of moral dilemma and the context of interaction of its participants determine the adolescents' readiness to recognize the responsibility of the main character of the dilemma for violating the norm. In dilemmas of asocial type adolescents are more willing to recognize the responsibility of the offender whose behavior leads to obvious damage for one of the participants in the interaction. As for prosocial dilemmas and dilemmas of confronting norms, adolescents tend to deny the responsibility of the offender. The paper provides a comparative analysis of empirically identified types of adolescent concepts of responsibility, including the differentiated responsibility with egoistic orientation, high responsibility, low responsibility and ‘polar’ responsibility. The authors highlight the ambiguity of the relationship between adolescents’ evaluation of behavior, their readiness to recognize responsibility in moral transgression, and their judgment about the necessity of punishment. The paper concludes with the discussion concerning the relationship between the level of development of moral judgments/moral reasoning and the concepts of responsibility in adolescents.


Author(s):  
Henry Richardson

This concluding chapter restates the book’s central arguments in a simple, linear order, highlighting its conclusions about the nature of the moral community, the proper analysis of dyadic rights and duties, and the possibility of moral authority. It explains how this argument clears away a threshold objection to constructive ethical pragmatism (CEP) and how the book’s accounts of practical intelligence, moral psychology, and objectivity further support this normative ethical view. It considers how the central argument might be extended by dropping the assumption that moral authority is limited to specifying objective moral norms and by relaxing the expository focus on cases of two intelligent individuals working things out together at the input stage. Against the former of these broadenings, it notes the value of the way that the account, as developed, enables us to reconcile morality’s possibly eternal objective core with the possibility of our contingently adding to its objective content.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karolina-Dzhoanna Gomes ◽  
Nonna Eyngorn

Feelings such as moral disgust, protest and antipathy are increasingly understood as the most important aspects of cognitive processes in moral psychology and reveal the complex structure of human nature and culture. Transgressive fiction, cinema or visual arts which are characterized by a graphic representation of violence and different traumatic experiences, are a strong ethical stimulus. In this article, transgressive art is viewed through the prism of its multimodality. The article examines both the positive and negative roles of transgressive art in the constitution and the confirmation of the boundaries and limits of social acceptability. By acknowledging the risks of aestheticization of violence that can expand the ethical boundaries of a person as a witness, this study also elicits that transgressive art offers a safe environment for exploring taboos without consequences for the audience. Although transgressive art depicts various violations of moral norms, it does not deny the boundaries of what is permitted, but only confirms them. Keywords: transgressive art, multimodality, transgression, moral norms, public morality, ethical boundaries, screen violence


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heikki Haara ◽  
Aino Lahdenranta

In this paper, we argue that Samuel Pufendorf's works on natural law contain a sentimentalist theory of morality that is Smithian in its moral psychology. Pufendorf's account of how ordinary people make moral judgements and come to act sociably is surprisingly similar to Smith's. Both thinkers maintain that the human desire for esteem, manifested by resentment and gratitude, informs people of the content of central moral norms and can motivate them to act accordingly. Finally, we suggest that given Pufendorf's theory of socially imposed moral entities, he has all the resources for a sentimentalist theory of morality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 203-226
Author(s):  
Richard Price

Abstract Some have argued for the relevance for normative ethics of empirical research in international relations on the origins and role of moral norms. Building on such arguments, the paper considers the relevance of contemporary research in moral psychology and neuroscience for the ethics of war. Research in those fields has implications for our understanding of the sources and nature of moral beliefs and judgement, and thus may shed light on efforts to morally bound violence. In this chapter I consider how such research helps us understand the norm of non-combatant immunity, and explore the implications for understanding the effectiveness of such norms and for normative practice.


Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan ◽  
Russell Powell

The idea of moral progress played a central role in liberal political thought from the Enlightenment through the nineteenth century but is rarely encountered in moral and political philosophical discourse today. One reason for this is that traditional liberal theorists of moral progress, like their conservative detractors, tended to rely on underevidenced assumptions about human psychology and society. For the first time in history, we are developing robust scientific knowledge about human nature, especially through empirical psychological theories of morality and culture that are informed by evolutionary theory. In addition, the social sciences now provide better information about which social arrangements are feasible and sustainable and about how social norms arise, change, and come to shape moral thought and behavior. Accordingly, it is time to revisit the question of moral progress. On the surface, evolutionary accounts of morality paint a pessimistic picture, suggesting that certain types of moral progress are unrealistic or inappropriate for beings like us. In brief, humans are said to be “hard-wired” for rather limited moral capacities. However, such a view overlooks the great plasticity of human morality as evidenced by our history of social and political moral achievements. To account for these changes while giving evolved moral psychology its due, we develop a dynamic, biocultural theory of moral progress that highlights the interaction between adaptive components of moral psychology and the cultural construction of moral norms and beliefs; and we explore how this interaction can advance, impede, and reverse moral progress.


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