scholarly journals FOREIGN POLICY OF PEDRO SÁNCHEZ: ONE YEAR ON

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Natalia Anikeeva ◽  

The article analyzes the foreign policy of Spain, as well as the foreign policy strategy (2021–2024), adopted in early 2021, a year after Pedro Sánchez took office as chairman of the coalition government. The appearance of this document took place against the backdrop of the inauguration of the new US President Joe Biden. P. Sánchez’s government expressed the hope that Spain and the EU will be able to improve relations with the United States in various spheres of activity. The new foreign policy strategy was influenced by the global financial and economic crisis provoked by the development of the coronavirus pandemic. In the summer of 2021, another important event for Spanish foreign policy took place. Jose Manuel Albarez was appointed to the post of Foreign Minister, who replaced Arancha Gonzalez Lai. The author comes to the conclusion that relations with Morocco are traditionally important for the foreign policy of Spain. Latin America will play an important role in the new strategy. The place of Spain in the establishment of a dialogue between the EU and Latin American states was especially marked.

2009 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantin K. Khudoley ◽  
Stanislav L. Tkachenko

Over the two decades of post-Soviet history of modern Russia, its foreign policy has gone through several distinct periods and long-term trends. The periodization of the new Russia’s foreign policy includes a “romantic” or “Kozyrev’s” period, during which the leaders of a democratic Russia tried to integrate the country into a system of institutions and partnerships with the leading Western states. Kozyrev’s departure from his post as foreign minister in January 1996 and the arrival of a new foreign minister, who would later become the Prime Minister, a “political heavyweight” of modern Russia Yevgeny Primakov, marked a change in the strategic direction of the country’s foreign policy. The key definition of this period was “multipolarity.” The arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin in early 2000, marked a new stage in the development of Russia’s diplomacy. At first it was characterized by attempts to build relations of partnership on an equal footing with Washington and NATO countries in the anti-terrorist coalition, and then, from about 2003, by a gradual build up of contradictions between Russia and the United States. During this period (2000-2008) a special feature of Russia’s foreign policy was its increased assertiveness in relation to the neighboring CIS countries. After the election of Dmitry Medvedev as president in March 2008 Russia has been busy searching for a new strategy for its foreign policy, which would retain some of the achievements of previous periods, but would also be more cooperative toward the leading nations of the world. Such policy should create a favorable external climate for the modernization of Russia’s political system and its national economy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Natalia B. Pomozova ◽  

The complex development of China and its transformation into a superpower arouses the US fears, what results in the trade and economic wars between the two countries, as well as in a discursive confrontation. As the conflict between the United States and China escalates, the struggle will intensify not only for markets, but also for the hearts and minds of Europeans (in this article, in particular, Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy are considered). Reflection on Beijing’s behavior in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic will become one of the important sociological factors that will affect the attitude of European citizens towards China, what, in turn, will have a significant impact on the implementation of the PRC’s foreign policy strategy.


1985 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-727 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Cohen

The global debt problem influences the foreign-policy capabilities of the United States through its impact on the government's “linkage strategies” in foreign affairs. In some circumstances policy makers are forced to make connections between different policy instruments or issues that might not otherwise have been felt necessary; in others, opportunities for connections are created that might not otherwise have been felt possible. The Polish debt crisis of 1981–82, the Latin American debt crisis of 1982–83, and the IMF quota increase in 1983 are suggestive in this regard. Linkage strategies bred by the debt issue are more apt to be successful when the interest shared by the United States with other countries in avoiding default is reinforced by other shared economic or political interests. They will also be more successful to the extent that the government can supplement its own power resources by relating bank decisions to foreign-policy considerations. Power in such situations, however, is a wasting asset, even when employed indirectly through the intermediation of the IMF.


Author(s):  
Valerie M. Hudson ◽  
Lauren Eason

Drawing on the cases of the United States and Sweden, this chapter considers the conceptual and practical issues associated with the implementation of a feminist foreign policy (FFP). While Foreign Minister Margot Wallstrom of Sweden is perhaps the most vocal and overt advocate of the concept, the US State Department under Hillary Clinton also arguably promoted policies that were feminist in nature. This chapter examines the conceptualization of the term “feminist foreign policy,” probing dimensions, contestations, and inconsistencies. It explores the inherent pitfalls and misconceptions surrounding FFP, as well as the positive contributions of policies that promote gender equality. This chapter concludes that while FFP is not inherently pacifist, it does prioritize peace, and thus engaging in military interventions and alliances requires careful consideration under feminist just war principles. Moreover, this chapter argues that the dissemination of gender equality norms act as a mechanism that facilitates a more stable, secure, and peaceful nation.


Author(s):  
Meron Medzini

Golda Meir (b. 1898–d. 1978), Israel’s fourth prime minister, was a major figure in Israeli politics and society from 1928 until her death fifty years later. Born in Kiev, then part of tsarist Russia, she was raised in a poor family that often moved from one house to another. At age five she experienced preparations for a pogrom, and that left its mark on her for life. The family immigrated to the United States in 1906 and settled in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where her father worked as a carpenter. From an early age she came under the influence of her elder sister, Sheyna, who introduced her to Zionism and socialism. When her family refused to let her attend high school, she rebelled and escaped to her sister, then living in Denver. There she met Morris Myerson, who would become her husband. Two years later, back in Milwaukee, she became active in Poale Zion, a Zionist-Socialist movement, and decided to immigrate to Palestine and become part of the effort to rebuild a Jewish state. She was married in December 1917 and left for Palestine in 1921, settling in Kibbutz Merhavia, and began to make her name in Labor Zionist circles. She soon caught the eyes of the movement’s leaders, David Ben-Gurion, Berl Katznelson, David Remez, and Zalman Shazar. The latter two would become her mentors and later her lovers. She advanced slowly in the ranks of Mapai, since 1930 the leading socialist party in Palestine. In the 1930s and early 1940s she held various senior positions in the executive of the Histadrut trade union movement. During Israel’s War of Independence she raised huge sums of money from American Jews that helped pay for weapons. She was a signer of Israel’s Declaration of Independence and was appointed Israel’s first Minister Plenipotentiary to the Soviet Union, a position she held for less than a year. This was followed by a ministerial career that included minister of labor (1949–1956), foreign minister (1956–1966), party secretary (1966–1968) and finally prime minister (1969–1974). Her career came to an abrupt end shortly after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which caught Israel by surprise. Although exonerated by a commission of inquiry that praised her actions on the eve of the war, popular demand led to her resignation in 1974. For many years she was seen as the incarnation of inflexibility in her foreign policy, while she was praised for her social legislation, including the establishment of Israel’s Social Security system in 1952. In recent years there has been a reevaluation of her foreign policy and she is now considered as one of Israel’s more noted national leaders.


Author(s):  
Kai Michael Kenkel

Latin American states have become major providers of troops for UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) since the early 2000s. MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti), the UN mission in Haiti, 55% of whose troops were from the region, was a major watershed for local security cooperation and PKO contributions. Led by Brazil, these states were able to develop a specific approach to peacebuilding that reflects regional strengths and experiences, rooted in minimizing the use of force and bringing successful domestic development policies to bear abroad. This approach also reflects the common security and intervention culture that underpins policy in the region. Two states in particular have taken on a role as major providers of peacekeeping contingents. Tiny Uruguay, with a population of 3 million people, has maintained over 2,000 troops deployed on UN PKOs (more than 10% of its armed forces) since 2005. While Uruguay’s motivations are mostly economic—UN reimbursements exceed the country’s costs—Brazil’s ascendance as a major peacekeeping provider during MINUSTAH was part of a larger emerging-power foreign policy project. Participating in peacebuilding allowed the country to provide security through actions in the development realm, bridging a key gap in many rising states’ capabilities, and to mount an incipient challenge to the Western-led peacebuilding paradigm. The remaining states of Latin America show considerable diversity in their peacekeeping engagement, with many others sending small or token contributions and some no troops at all. Latin American states’ involvement in PKOs cannot be understood without looking at their interaction with patterns of civil–military relations in the region. In the case of such states, the effect of peacekeeping participation on civil–military relations, while a key point in need of monitoring, has not been decisive, as other factors prevail. Finally, PKOs have served as the locus for a significant increase in policy coordination and cooperation in the defense arena in the region. As the UN moves toward stabilization operations which privilege counterterrorism measures over the peacebuilding paradigm that is a strength of Latin American countries, PKOs may lose attractiveness as a foreign policy avenue in the region. Additionally, the swing to the right in recent elections may serve to reduce the appeal of a practice which came to the fore under previous left-wing governments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-151
Author(s):  
Tanya Harmer

This article explains how Latin American governments responded to the Cuban revolution and how the “Cuban question” played out in the inter-American system in the first five years of Fidel Castro's regime, from 1959 to 1964, when the Organization of American States imposed sanctions against the island. Drawing on recently declassified sources from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and the United States, the article complicates U.S.-centric accounts of the inter-American system. It also adds to our understanding of how the Cold War was perceived within the region. The article makes clear that U.S. policymakers were not the only ones who feared Castro's triumph, the prospect of greater Soviet intervention, and the Cuban missile crisis. By seeking to understand why local states opposed Castro's ascendance and what they wanted to do to counter his regime, the account here offers new insight into the Cuban revolution's international impact and allows us to evaluate U.S. influence in the region during key years of the Cold War.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (23) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Alberto Ardila Castro ◽  
Jessica Andrea Rodríguez

China has had a significant incidence in various sectors of African and Latin American politics, economy, and trade. There is no denying that its foreign policy has strategic interests in both regions. One of the most outstanding features of Chinese politics is its desire to promote cooperation to foster a renaissance between Asia and Latin America and Africa. Unlike the old colonial masters, China is committed to providing these regions with new opportunities for development. Bearing in mind Alfred Mahan’s theory of naval power, and the strategic rearguard that, at a given time, it allowed the United States, China is attempting to maintain the strategic center of gravity, which the economic control of Latin America and Africa and its surrounding resources provides to generate a strategic expansion that would ensure its interests and power in the hemisphere. In exchange, China strives to promote economic, commercial, political, and social development in African and Latin American societies.


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