The Russian Economy: Putin's Pause

2001 ◽  
Vol 100 (648) ◽  
pp. 336-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Millar

Putin appears to have more in common with Brezhnev than with his more decisive predecessors. Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin risked their positions in attempts to de-Stalinize the Soviet Union. … Putin's rule seems to be more pause than reform, which is, incidentally, what the public wants.

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-173
Author(s):  
Fedor L. Sinitsyn

This article examines the development of social control in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, who was General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1964 to 1982. Historians have largely neglected this question, especially with regard to its evolution and efficiency. Research is based on sources in the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Moscow Central State Archive (TSGAM). During Brezhnevs rule, Soviet propaganda reached the peak of its development. However, despite the fact that authorities tried to improve it, the system was ritualistic, unconvincing, unwieldy, and favored quantity over quality. The same was true for political education, which did little more than inspire sullen passivity in its students. Although officials recognized these failings, their response was ineffective, and over time Soviet propaganda increasingly lost its potency. At the same time, there were new trends in the system of social control. Authorities tried to have a foot in both camps - to strengthen censorship, and at the same time to get feedback from the public. However, many were afraid to express any criticism openly. In turn, the government used data on peoples sentiments only to try to control their thoughts. As a result, it did not respond to matters that concerned the public. These problems only increased during the era of stagnation and contributed to the decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet system.


2018 ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Bogdan Koszel

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has become Germany’s main Central European partner. The economic interests and hopes of gigantic contracts to modernize the Russian economy have played a colossal role in German policy. The Government of Chancellor Angela Merkel aspired to shape the Eastern policy of the European Union, and it was highly favorable towards the strategy of Russian modernization to be implemented with the participation of Western partners, as proposed by President Medvedev in 2009. However, this project never went beyond the stage of preliminary agreements, and both sides are increasingly disappointed with its progress. Germany continues to aspire to play the role of the leading EU member state involved in the transformation process in Russia, yet this is no longer treated in terms of the ‘Russia first’ attitude without any reservations. Germans are becoming increasingly aware that their efforts are doomed to fail without true Russian efforts aimed at the democratization of both their public life and economic structures.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Ilia Valerievich Mametev

The article focuses on the problems of shadow economy, such as the illegal activity, as well as a legal activity hidden from the state control, which became an integral part of the life of the Soviet Union in the period of stagnation. The development of the shadow sector was connected, first of all, with the inability of the command-administrative system to take into account the demands of the population for certain goods and services. There have been examined prerequisites for the emergence of the shadow economy and the stages of its development in the society that built communism in the 1960s–1980s. The shadow economy contributed to the growth of corruption and criminalization, initiated the racket in the 1990s and significantly affected the public consciousness of the Soviet citizens and, later, the mentality of modern Russian society


1995 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 213-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Albini ◽  
R.E. Rogers ◽  
Victor Shabalin ◽  
Valery Kutushev ◽  
Vladimir Moiseev ◽  
...  

In analyzing Russian organized crime, the authors describe and classify the four major forms of organized crime: 1) political-social, 2) mercenary, 3) in-group, and 4) syndicated. Though the first three classifications of the aforementioned types of organized crime existed throughout Soviet history, it was the syndicated form that began to emerge in the late 1950's, expanding during the corrupt Breznev years (1964–82), exploding during perestroika, and reaching pandemic levels after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. The abrupt transformation of the Russian society from a centralized command economy to one driven by the forces of market capitalism created the socio-pathological conditions for the malignant spread of mercenary and especially syndicated organized crime. New criminals syndicates were created by an alliance of criminal gangs/groups and former members of the Soviet Union's communist nomenklatura (bureaucracy) and the consequence was the criminalization of much of the Russian economy. The social structure of these syndicates is based on a loose association of patron-client relationships rather than a centralized hierarchical system; their function is to provide illicit goods/services desired by the people. The authors conclude their study by emphasizing that what has taken place in Russia is not peculiar to the Russian people, but exemplifies what can happen to societies that experience rapid and intense social change.


Author(s):  
Justine Buck Quijada

Chapter 2 presents the Soviet chronotope embodied in Victory Day celebrations. Victory Day, which is the celebration of the Soviet victory over Germany in World War II, presumes the familiar Soviet genre of history, in which the Soviet Union brought civilization to Buryatia, and Buryats achieved full citizenship in the Soviet utopian dream through their collective sacrifice during the war. The ritual does not narrate Soviet history. Instead, through Soviet and wartime imagery, and the parade form, the public holiday evokes this genre in symbolic form, enabling local residents to read their own narratives of the past into the imagery. This space for interpretation enables both validation as well as critique of the Soviet experience in Buryatia. Although not everyone in Buryatia agrees on how to evaluate this history, this genre is the taken-for-granted backdrop against which other religious actors define their narratives.


1966 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 3-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Griffith

The radical worsening of Sino-Soviet relations began in the spring of 1958 and the “ point of no return ” occurred at the latest in the summer of 1959. Indeed, since 1958 the public dispute has followed a cyclical course of escalation and partial détente. Each cycle has made Moscow-Peking relations worse than before and given other communist parties more autonomy from the Soviet Union. The apparent partial détentes have ostensibly been caused by Soviet and Chinese moves toward reconciliation, but these actually have been tactical maneuvers intended by each primarily to worsen the other's position and to gain support within other communist parties.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Charkviani

Abstract It is a widely accepted notion that the major change brought by the 2003 November revolution in Georgia was the reform of the public services. Two major tasks were to be achieved for the state institutions: to monopolize the use of legitimate power on the state territory and to start providing services to the citizens. Police reform was at the heart of both these objectives. The major obstacle identified on the way of this reform was corruption. Indeed it was widely known that posts in police forces were to be purchased; policemen were involved in organized crime, extortion, and other illegal pursuits. But the corruption itself was the effect of the broader system in which patrimonial system of not distinguishing between the public office and private sphere was hybridized with the legal-rational rule, having its origin in the Soviet Union. The main subject of our research is to analyze the model of informal power network in Georgian police, to describe its configurations and identify its social actors. For the theoretical approach in our study we will use different theories describing informal institutes and the reasons of their existence. One of the main theoretical sources for our analysis will be the theoretical concept of Helmke and Levitsky. Helmke and Levitsky are describing four types of informal institutions which we plan to apply to Georgian police system and identify which of them is more relevant for Georgian reality. Also we will refer to such theories as: Mark Granoveter's strength of week ties and social “embeddedness” of economic action; Mars and Altman's Cultural Basis of Soviet Georgia; Ledeneva's theory of “Blat”, which is one of most popular analytical theory about informal relations in post-Soviet countries. The main methods we have used are in-depth and narrative interviews. The interviews have been conducted with policemen currently working in different police departments, policemen no more working in this structure, expert and NGO representatives.


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leilah Danielson

AbstractThis article argues that Christian beliefs and concerns shaped the political culture of anti-nuclear activism in the early years of the Cold War. It focuses in particular on the origins of the Peacemakers, a group founded in 1948 by a mostly Protestant group of radical pacifists to oppose conscription and nuclear proliferation. Like others who came of age in the interwar years, the Peacemakers questioned the Enlightenment tradition, with its emphasis on reason and optimism about human progress, and believed that liberal Protestantism had accommodated itself too easily to the values of modern, secular society. But rather than adopt the “realist” framework of their contemporaries, who gave the United States critical support in its Cold War with the Soviet Union, radicals developed a politics of resistance rooted in a Christian framework in which repentance for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the first step toward personal and national redemption. Although they had scant influence on American policymakers or the public in the early years of the Cold War, widespread opposition to nuclear testing and U.S. foreign policy in the late 1950s and 1960s launched them into leadership roles in campaigns for nuclear disarmament and peace.


2002 ◽  
Vol 33 (129) ◽  
pp. 68-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fearghal McGarry

Early in life I had noticed that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which did not bear any relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an ordinary lie. I saw great battles reported where there had been no fighting, and complete silence where hundreds of men had been killed.George Orwell (1943)The Spanish Civil War was one of the most controversial conflicts of recent history. For many on the left, it was a struggle between democracy and fascism. In contrast, many Catholics and conservatives championed Franco as a crusader against communism. Others felt Spain was the beginning of an inevitable conflict between fascism and communism which had increasingly threatened the stability of inter-war Europe. Spain has remained a battleground of ideologies ever since. Many supporters of the Spanish Republic attribute its defeat to the failure of other democratic states to oppose fascism, a policy of appeasement which ultimately led to the Second World War; for others on the left, including Orwell, Spain came to symbolise the betrayal of socialism by the Soviet Union — a disillusioning suppression of liberty repeated in subsequent decades in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. Ireland was no less drawn to Spain than other European nations. Within months of the war breaking out, close to one thousand Irishmen were fighting among the armies of both sides on the frontlines around Madrid. But for most Irish people, influenced by the Catholic church and sensational newspaper reports of anticlerical atrocities, the ideological conflict was perceived to be between Catholicism and communism rather than left and right. The outbreak of the war was followed by an immense outpouring of popular sympathy for Franco’s Nationalists. During the autumn of 1936 the Irish Christian Front organised mass pro-Franco rallies which attracted the support of opposition politicians, clergymen and much of the public. The dissenting voices of support for the Spanish Republic emanating from the marginalised Irish left were ignored or, more often, suppressed. De Valera’s Fianna Fáil government expressed its support for Spain’s Catholics while, somewhat awkwardly, adopting a position of neutrality for reasons of international diplomacy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
V. М. Semianovskyi

Issues of the effective participation and cooperation of the civil society in power bodies have been a central social problem of the globe in the latest times. Although theoretical issues of participatory governance have been well developed and widely implemented, e. g. in business sector, cooperation of Power and Community pose a serious problem in the world and Ukraine in particular. The effectiveness of cooperation between Power and the civil society is downgraded by the issue the current condition of both parties, the quality of their work and their mutual trust. Also, it needs to be born in mind that this problem is a part of the triangle Power – Society – Business, and that the external environment has significant impact in the conditions of globalization. Given the Ukrainian context, it should be considered that the power system here was inherited from the Soviet Union. It is incompatible with the present-day realities, and its reform has been so far ineffective. The data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU) show the vast numbers of officials in local governance and central power bodies, picked up in industry-like administrative departments. The bulky apparatus of public governance being streamlined on the problem solution process in economic industries, social problems, not mentioning the ones of individual humans, can be looked at only before elections.   On the other hand, according to SSSU, Ukraine has a network of rather diverse public organizations, but their total number is small. According to Eurostat, quantitative and qualitative parameters of the civil society in Ukraine lag far behind the European ones. A diversity of goals, weak consolidation of efforts, resources and methods for solving the most important problems are factors complicating the cooperation between Power and Community. Theoretical and practical aspects of the problem related with cooperation of Power and the civil society have been elaborated in Europe since long. Advanced principles and various technologies for its solution have been proposed and implemented. The first typology of the public participation in form of “public participation staircase” was admittedly made by researcher Sh. R. Arnstein. She broke the staircase into the three levels: non-participation, symbolic participation, public power. To boost the effectiveness of collaborative action, the European community has elaborated the Code of recommended norms for the participation of the public in taking public decisions. In fact, this technology is the standard of cooperation between Power and Community in Europe.   The need for reform of the system for cooperation of power bodies with the civil society in Ukraine by use the European experience of cooperation is substantiated. The issues of goals, principles, methods and phases of cooperation between the power and the society, their advantages and drawbacks are highlighted.


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