scholarly journals Participation of the Public in Central and Local Governance: Principles, Statistics and European Experiences for Ukraine

2019 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
V. М. Semianovskyi

Issues of the effective participation and cooperation of the civil society in power bodies have been a central social problem of the globe in the latest times. Although theoretical issues of participatory governance have been well developed and widely implemented, e. g. in business sector, cooperation of Power and Community pose a serious problem in the world and Ukraine in particular. The effectiveness of cooperation between Power and the civil society is downgraded by the issue the current condition of both parties, the quality of their work and their mutual trust. Also, it needs to be born in mind that this problem is a part of the triangle Power – Society – Business, and that the external environment has significant impact in the conditions of globalization. Given the Ukrainian context, it should be considered that the power system here was inherited from the Soviet Union. It is incompatible with the present-day realities, and its reform has been so far ineffective. The data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU) show the vast numbers of officials in local governance and central power bodies, picked up in industry-like administrative departments. The bulky apparatus of public governance being streamlined on the problem solution process in economic industries, social problems, not mentioning the ones of individual humans, can be looked at only before elections.   On the other hand, according to SSSU, Ukraine has a network of rather diverse public organizations, but their total number is small. According to Eurostat, quantitative and qualitative parameters of the civil society in Ukraine lag far behind the European ones. A diversity of goals, weak consolidation of efforts, resources and methods for solving the most important problems are factors complicating the cooperation between Power and Community. Theoretical and practical aspects of the problem related with cooperation of Power and the civil society have been elaborated in Europe since long. Advanced principles and various technologies for its solution have been proposed and implemented. The first typology of the public participation in form of “public participation staircase” was admittedly made by researcher Sh. R. Arnstein. She broke the staircase into the three levels: non-participation, symbolic participation, public power. To boost the effectiveness of collaborative action, the European community has elaborated the Code of recommended norms for the participation of the public in taking public decisions. In fact, this technology is the standard of cooperation between Power and Community in Europe.   The need for reform of the system for cooperation of power bodies with the civil society in Ukraine by use the European experience of cooperation is substantiated. The issues of goals, principles, methods and phases of cooperation between the power and the society, their advantages and drawbacks are highlighted.

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-173
Author(s):  
Fedor L. Sinitsyn

This article examines the development of social control in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev, who was General Secretary of the Communist Party from 1964 to 1982. Historians have largely neglected this question, especially with regard to its evolution and efficiency. Research is based on sources in the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) and the Moscow Central State Archive (TSGAM). During Brezhnevs rule, Soviet propaganda reached the peak of its development. However, despite the fact that authorities tried to improve it, the system was ritualistic, unconvincing, unwieldy, and favored quantity over quality. The same was true for political education, which did little more than inspire sullen passivity in its students. Although officials recognized these failings, their response was ineffective, and over time Soviet propaganda increasingly lost its potency. At the same time, there were new trends in the system of social control. Authorities tried to have a foot in both camps - to strengthen censorship, and at the same time to get feedback from the public. However, many were afraid to express any criticism openly. In turn, the government used data on peoples sentiments only to try to control their thoughts. As a result, it did not respond to matters that concerned the public. These problems only increased during the era of stagnation and contributed to the decline and subsequent collapse of the Soviet system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-70
Author(s):  
Ilia Valerievich Mametev

The article focuses on the problems of shadow economy, such as the illegal activity, as well as a legal activity hidden from the state control, which became an integral part of the life of the Soviet Union in the period of stagnation. The development of the shadow sector was connected, first of all, with the inability of the command-administrative system to take into account the demands of the population for certain goods and services. There have been examined prerequisites for the emergence of the shadow economy and the stages of its development in the society that built communism in the 1960s–1980s. The shadow economy contributed to the growth of corruption and criminalization, initiated the racket in the 1990s and significantly affected the public consciousness of the Soviet citizens and, later, the mentality of modern Russian society


2019 ◽  
pp. 20-27
Author(s):  
V.V. Sukhonos

The article is devoted to the constitutional and legal issues of local government organizations. The main attention is paid to the Soviet model of local government, which, in the period of the industrialization of the country, focused on the further strengthening of the Soviet state apparatus, the deployment of the so-called “Soviet democracy” and the fight against bureaucratic defects. However, such a situation as a whole was not typical of the Soviet system. That is why the Bolsheviks attempts to attract the poor sections of the rural population. However, success in this direction was caused not so much by the strengthening of the Soviet economy as a whole, but by the opportunity for the rural poor to plunder wealthy peasants, which had developed because of the dictatorship of the proletariat existing in the USSR. Subsequently, the Bolshevik Party raised the issue of organizing special groups of poverty or factions for an open political struggle to attract the middle peoples to the proletariat and to isolate wealthy peasants (the so-called “kulaks”) during the elections to the Soviets, cooperatives, etc. With the onset of socialist reconstruction, there was a need to organize poverty, because it was an important element and the establishment of “Soviet democracy in the countryside.” The Stalin Constitution of 1936 transformed the Soviets. From 1918, they were called the Soviets of Workers’, Peasants’ and Red Army Deputies, and now, with the entry into force of the Stalin Constitution, the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. This transformation of the Soviets reflected the victory of the socialist system throughout the national economy, radical changes in the class composition of Soviet society, and a new triumph of “socialist democracy”. In addition, the “victory of socialism” in the USSR made possible the transition to universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. On December 24 and 29, 1939, citizens of the Soviet Union elected their representatives to the local Soviets of Workers’ Deputies. 99.21 % of the total number of voters took part in the vote. The election results are another testament to the growing influence of the Bolshevik Party on the population of the Soviet Union, which has largely replaced the activities of the Soviets themselves, including the local ones. Holding elections to the regional, regional, district, district, city, village and settlement councils of workers’ deputies completed the restructuring of all state bodies in accordance with the Stalin Constitution and on its basis. With the adoption in 1977 of the last Constitution of the USSR, the councils of workers’ deputies were renamed the councils of people’s deputies. In 1985, the last non-alternative elections were held for 52,041 local councils, and in 1988, their structure became more complicated: there were presidencies organizing the work of regional, regional, autonomous regions, autonomous districts, district, city and rayon in the cities of Soviets. People’s Deputies. Within the framework of the city (city subordination), village, and town councils, this work is carried out directly by the heads of the designated Councils. On December 26, 1990, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR introduced regular amendments to the Constitution of the USSR, which formally abolished the Presidencies, but did not prohibit their existence. On September 5, 1991, the Constitution of 1977 was effectively abolished. Finally, it happened after December 26, 1991, when the USSR actually ceased to exist. Thus, existing in the USSR during the period of socialist reconstruction and subsequent transformations that began with the processes of industrialization and ended as a result of the collapse of the USSR, the model of local government organization remained ineffective due to its actual replacement by the activities of the governing bodies of the ruling Communist Party. Keywords: Local Government; the system of Councils; local Councils; Council of Deputies of the working people; Council of People’s Deputies; Soviet local government.


2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Crotty

The stalling of civil society development within the Russian Federation and its attendant causes have been a focus of academic study since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Alongside the emergence of a fragmented and chronically under-funded community of advocacy groups, the literature points to a rejection of democratic structures by the Russian populace and an absence of active civil engagement. Consequently, the international community has sought to bolster the growth and development of the Russian third sector by funding projects and organisations with a view to increasing public participation.Utilising research undertaken in Samara oblast of the Russian Federation, this paper examines the role played by overseas donor agencies within the Samara Environmental Movement (SEM). In examining both the quality and quantity of donor assistance received, it reveals a number of dysfunctions arising from this aid, and in particular, a lack of contextualization and mis-direction of the assistance offered vis-à-vis citizen participation, alongside other behavioural impacts of donor funding within the SEM itself.


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (10 (108)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Cécile Druey

During the years that preceded and followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Autonomous Republic of Chechnya in the south of Russia has experienced an intensive movement of civil society mobilisation, nationalist radicalisation and armed conflict. Referring to the case of the society “Kavkaz” as an example for the emerging movement of civil society, this paper traces the mobilising role of history and historical memory during the period of reform under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late-1980s, until the onset of the first Chechnya War in 1994. It argues, that the use of historical memory is not that much a cause, than it is an indicator of conflict and radicalisation in society, and that these processes of radicalisation are closely linked to their context at a local, national and international level. Drawing on data collected from interviews with representatives of the Chechen national movement, from local newspapers and legal acts, the paper tracks the evolution of civil society movements in Chechnya in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Doing so, it departs from a relational approach to conflict analysis (della Porta, 2018; Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou, 2012; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015; Hughes and Sasse, 2016). Located at the intersection between conflict- and memory studies, the paper thus adds insights to the study of the pre-war period in post-Soviet Chechnya, and in general to the conceptual discussion about the link between historical memory, mobilisation, radicalisation and conflict.


Author(s):  
Justine Buck Quijada

Chapter 2 presents the Soviet chronotope embodied in Victory Day celebrations. Victory Day, which is the celebration of the Soviet victory over Germany in World War II, presumes the familiar Soviet genre of history, in which the Soviet Union brought civilization to Buryatia, and Buryats achieved full citizenship in the Soviet utopian dream through their collective sacrifice during the war. The ritual does not narrate Soviet history. Instead, through Soviet and wartime imagery, and the parade form, the public holiday evokes this genre in symbolic form, enabling local residents to read their own narratives of the past into the imagery. This space for interpretation enables both validation as well as critique of the Soviet experience in Buryatia. Although not everyone in Buryatia agrees on how to evaluate this history, this genre is the taken-for-granted backdrop against which other religious actors define their narratives.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Alexander Cooley ◽  
Daniel Nexon

Analysts have pronounced the end of American leadership since at least the 1970s. In the 1980s, some confidently proclaimed that the United States was in decline and Japan was on the rise. But in 1989, Moscow allowed its satellite regimes in Eastern Europe to collapse; in 1991 the Soviet Union fell apart under the pressure of nationalist movements. The resulting American “unipolar moment” was marked by three critical factors: the lack of any great powers both willing and able to challenge US hegemony; the existence of a “patronage monopoly” centered around the United States and its liberal democratic allies; and the development of a transnational civil society composed of liberal nongovernment organizations, international institutions, and activist networks. However, great powers and regional players now challenge US power; Washington has lost its patronage monopoly; and illiberal transnational movements are on the offensive against a retreating liberal international civil society.


2001 ◽  
Vol 100 (648) ◽  
pp. 336-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Millar

Putin appears to have more in common with Brezhnev than with his more decisive predecessors. Khrushchev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin risked their positions in attempts to de-Stalinize the Soviet Union. … Putin's rule seems to be more pause than reform, which is, incidentally, what the public wants.


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