scholarly journals Two Embassies of Bagrat IV to Constantinople: Dating, Causes, and Aftermath

Author(s):  
Dmitry A. Kosourov ◽  

This article is devoted to a new consideration of the issue of the number and dating of the embassies of king Bagrat IV of Georgia (1027–1072) to Constantinople during the reign of the Byzantine emperor Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–1055). Contrary to I. A. Javakhishvili’s point of view, generally accepted in historiography about the existence of the only embassy of Bagrat IV to Byzantium in 1054–1057, the author promotes the hypothesis about the existence of two embassies, in 1047 and 1050–1052/1053 respectively. This hypothesis is proved, in addition to the source analysis of the Georgian text of the Chronicle of Kartli, by referring to Byzantine and Armenian narrative sources, as well as by using information from the recently explored manuscript Q-1376 from the Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts. A comparison of data from sources allows the author to link the reason for the two embassies of the Georgian king to Byzantium with the escalation of the internal Georgian conflict between Bagrat IV and Liparit IV Baghuashi, Duke of Kldekari after the Battle of Sasireti in 1046. Also, the article highlights several new features in it, in particular, the conditions of truces between the two sides, the date of Liparit’s liberation from the Seljuk captivity, as well as the possible participation in the conflict of Leonti Mroveli, a famous Georgian historian of the eleventh century. Also, the article examines the consequences of the two trips of Bagrat IV to Constantinople for the Byzantine foreign policy on its eastern borders and, more particularly, clarifies the dating and circumstances of the military campaign of raiktor Nikephoros against the Shaddadid emir of Dvin Abu’l-Aswar in 1049, as well as the role of Georgian noblemen in this campaign.

2013 ◽  
Vol 05 (03) ◽  
pp. 5-16
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

The new foreign policy team is more professional and with an Asian focus than its older counterpart. Although still fragmented, it may have stronger leadership and better coordination. This is critically important because China is at a defining moment as to its international role. Xi Jinping's closer ties with the military and his hands-on style may encourage assertive nationalism and more active role of the military in foreign affairs.


Author(s):  
OLEKSANDR PAHIRIA

The article examines one of the little-studied aspects of the subversive operation of Poland and Hungary against Carpatho-Ukraine, namely the military cooperation between the Carpathian Sich and the Czechoslovak Army and security agencies (StOS, gendarmery, state police, and financial guard) in the protection of the borders of the autonomous region against attacks by Polish and Hungarian saboteurs in fall 1938 – early 1939. Drawing on Czech and Polish archival materials, as well as memoirs, the author establishes the role of Czechoslovak officers in the provision of arms, ammunition, and training for the Carpathian Sich units, as well as in their engagement in joint intelligence and counter-sabotage activities in the border areas with Poland and Hungary. Such actions produced a joint Czech-Ukrainian response to the undeclared "hybrid war" waged by Poland and Hungary against Carpatho-Ukraine, which final aim was to establish a common frontier in the Carpathians. Despite its largely secondary (auxiliary) function in this operation, the Carpathian Sich members were able not only to demonstrate efficiency in the fight against Hungarian and Polish militants but at the same time to become a source of information for the Czechoslovak intelligence. From the point of view of the Czechoslovak command's interests, the Carpathian Sich served as a "non-state actor," who was trying to counter-balance the enemy's non-regular formations. The mentioned military cooperation marked the first stage in relations between the Carpathian Sich and the Czechoslovak military that started in the first half of November 1938 and ended in mid-January 1939 with the nomination by Prague of Czech general Lev Prchala as the third minister in the autonomous government of Carpatho-Ukraine. For the Carpathian Sich, the cooperation with the Czechoslovak security agencies produced their first combat experience and served as the source of replenishment of its scarce arsenal. Keywords: Carpatho-Ukraine, Carpathian Sich, sabotage, Poland, Hungary, "Lom" operation.


Subject Russian foreign policy in 2016. Significance Russian foreign policy is driven by an amalgam of realpolitik, nationalism and anti-Western ideology, and consists of both defensive and offensive strategies. The robust, confrontational approach championed by President Vladimir Putin in recent years has produced successes in such areas as the military campaign in Syria, but an undecided outcome in Ukraine and mixed results in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Impacts A NATO summit this July may result in a tougher, more coordinated stance on Russia. Following its official partial withdrawal from Syria, the Russian military will conduct selective attacks. Russia will need careful diplomacy to keep Belarus and Kazakhstan from drifting away as allies.


Author(s):  
P. Timofeev ◽  
M. Khorolskaya

The article is devoted to the role of Franco-German tandem in the development of the European defense by 2020, including EU PESCO projects as well as bilateral initiatives outside of PESCO framework. The study uses an innovative approach applying the methods of statistical and cluster analysis to the three waves of PESCO projects. It enables to identify the contribution and the level of cooperation of the Franco-German tandem in the PESCO implementation process. It is demonstrated that besides France and Germany, EU Mediterranean states are also leading in terms of the number of projects so it would be more exact to talk about the central role of the European “big four” (France, Italy, Spain, Germany) as an engine of PESCO process. At the same time, France and Germany actively develop two ambitious bilateral projects outside of the PESCO framework – these are Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and Main Group Combat System (MGCS), the models of innovative fighter jet and tank, based on the “system of systems” principle. These projects demonstrate the two countries’ ambitious plans, although it is too early to evaluate the results since the projects are to be implemented by the mid-2030s. Nevertheless, several factors complicating the military cooperation of the two sides are identified. Those include the lack of a common approach towards conceptual issues causing the development of new weapons; the absence of a joint view on the participation of third states in French-German projects outside of PESCO (only Spain is accepted to work on FCAS, no third state is allowed to participate in MGCS construction); the competition between French and German manufacturing companies regarding the projects’ leadership and the two countries’ different export policies. Although the idea of the EU strategic autonomy promoted by the Franco-German tandem has been actively developing since 2017, today these two countries do not determine the PESCO process and do not agree on all the issues. Thus France and Germany still have a significant amount of work to do in this area.


Author(s):  
Jochen Burgtorf

The chapter discusses the two major international military orders of the high Middle Ages, the Templars and the Hospitallers. It outlines their origins in the twelfth-century Crusader kingdom of Jerusalem, as well as the factors that contributed to their emergence, such as pilgrimage, the eleventh-century Church reform, knighthood and chivalry, the Crusades, and the role of the papacy. It then considers the comparative historiography of Templars and Hospitallers, including the scholarly debate on the Templars’ suppression and the Hospitallers’ survival. The chapter goes on to address the question of the military orders’ identity by examining the extent of the Templars’ charity and hospitality, the question of the Hospitallers’ militarization, and the genesis of the concept of an ‘order state’. It concludes with suggestions for future research.


Author(s):  
Nataliya S. Kozyakova

We examine the problems that occupied the main place in Austria’s foreign policy in the mid-1950s of 20th century and characterized its role in international relations during the specified period. The role of Austria in the international arena has increased the country’s entry into the path of neutrality. It also opened up wide opportunities for it to participate in the activities of vari-ous international organizations extensively. Using the method of source analysis, the active partic-ipation of Austria in the work of the UN is considered, its authority and support for the sufficient work of this organization, which allowed it to be elected for three years as a member of the main body of the UN – a member of the Economic and Social Council in 1963 and 1976, in 1973 and 1974 – a member of the UN security, and in 1972 it became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. According to Austria’s first statement to the Security Council, the country planned to provide the widest possible extent of its impartial services to the UN’s main political body, using the wide opportunities given to it by its independence and neutrality. Having analyzed the main directions and aspects of Austrian foreign policy in the second half of the twentieth century, we conclude that, having adopted a justified course in foreign policy in 1955, based on permanent neutrality, the Second Austrian Republic further has provided the guarantee and basis of its independence.


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7 (105)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Alexey Komarov

The article examines the evolution of the Soviet leadership’s attitudes regarding Finland’s desire to position itself as a neutral country. Finland’s efforts to promote the idea of its neutrality became especially active after World War II. In this way the representatives of the Finnish political class tried to enhance their profile on the international arena and distance themselves from the military clauses of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual assistance signed by the USSR and Finland in 1948. Both in Moscow and Helsinki it was understood that neutrality can play the role of an important foreign policy instrument. The Finns tried to use this instrument to weaken Soviet influence on the country, to facilitate rapprochement with other Nordic countries and, ultimately, with the West as a whole. The Soviet leadership regarded these activities negatively. However, within the framework of general deconstruction of the foreign policy priorities’ system created by Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s predecessors, the Soviet side in 1989 finally and unconditionally recognized Finland’s neutrality. After the collapse of the USSR the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1948 was substituted by another document, namely the Treaty on the Foundations of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Finland signed on January 20, 1992. During the elaboration of the new agreement the Russian side would have had no objection against recognizing Finland as a neutral state, but Helsinki, considering the transition from the bipolar system of international relations to the unipolar one, showed no interest to this.


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