scholarly journals «THE STRUGGLE IS CONTINUING TODAY, WITH ADDED RALLYING CALL: ‘KYIV AGAINST MOSCOW!’»: CONCEPTS OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS IN THE TIME OF COLD WAR

2020 ◽  
pp. 99-107
Author(s):  
Kateryna Kobchenko

The author proposes the overview of the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism after WWII on example of one of the nationalistic organizations, revolutionary or Bandera’s OUN. It is done through the analysis of three program documents published during the period from 1948 till 1968 with every time 10-years distance (two of them of S. Bandera’s authorship), which shows the ways of thinking of its leaders and points of institutional development of this organization. Ukrainian integral nationalism was formed as an ideology and found its institutionalization in the interwar period and in the context of time marked with spreading of authoritarianism and the idea of a strong national leader. During WWII the OUN and the UPA became the main power of the Ukrainian national resistance to the occupational regimes. But in the new political realities after WWII and in the situation of emigration the Ukrainian exile parties incl. nationalists were faced with the new ideological as well as organizational challenges and had to search for the new methods and attitudes to the struggle for Ukraine’s liberation. The key point for the formation of new ideas and political program became the resolutions and declarations of the Fourth Grate Meeting of the Bandera’s OUN in 1968, the first so important party’s assamble in the after war time. The views and ideas of J. Stetsko played a significant role on it, he appeared to be not only a participant of an international anticommunist movement, but also a political thinker who managed to integrate the nationalistic ideology with the new political realities and with the context of international policy of that time. In the questions of anticolonial discourse and anticommunist critic his theses corresponded to the most important ideas of the Cold War period and allowed to actualize the nationalistic ideas on their new stage of development.

Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer

Virtually no one anticipated the ending of the Cold War. Understanding how this long-standing conflict was peacefully resolved can give us insight into how to conclude other seemingly intractable conflicts. Triumphalists believe that President Ronald Reagan “won” the Cold War by building up US military power and threatening the USSR. His hard-line policies forced Moscow to reduce its arsenal, adopt democratic reforms, withdraw from its war in Afghanistan, and ultimately collapse. Triumphalists assert that contemporary leaders should follow Reagan’s example bycompelling adversaries into submission. However, triumphalism is a myth, a series of falsehoods about Reagan’s intentions, his policies, and the impact his administration had on the USSR.Drawing upon American and Soviet sources,this book demonstrates that Reagan’s initial hard-line policies brought the superpowers to the brink of war and made it more difficult for Moscow to disarm and reform. Compellence failed miserably. The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Mikhail Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust. The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced radical new ideas about nuclear disarmament. Consequently, both encountered domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.


Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer

Triumphalism not only claims to explain the surprising end of the Cold War, it also stipulates how to cope with current conflicts. But triumphalism is a series of myths. President Reagan did not seek to destroy the USSR; rather, he sought to improve superpower relations so as to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Moreover, his initial hard-line policies did not compel the USSR to disarm, reform, and collapse. They strengthened the position of Soviet hard-liners who opposed disarmament, made it more difficult for Gorbachev to implement New Thinking, and brought the superpowers to the brink of war. In short, compellence failed miserably. The Cold War was resolved through diplomacy, not threats. President Reagan eventually engaged in meaningful dialogue so as to ease Moscow’s security concerns, build trust, and focus on the superpowers’ mutual interest in eliminating nuclear arms. For his part, Gorbachev sought to end the arms race so as to divert resources to democratization. He too sought dialogue and trust. The ending of the Cold War demonstrates the importance of moral leadership. Reagan and Gorbachev both rose above their differences and introduced new ideas about nuclear security. Consequently, both encountered serious domestic opposition. Each persevered, however, leading their nations toward a safer, more humane future.


1995 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Takahiko Tanaka

The euphoria that followed the end of the Cold War has been gradually replaced in Japan with a sense of uncertainty and, in some quarters, with nostalgia for what seems in retrospect the stable and simple truths of Cold War power politics. Although there is a great need to find new ways of adjusting to the profound transformations that now characterize our age, there is an inclination to base these new methods on old patterns of thought and even to turn to outmoded and obsolete formulations that have been firmly conditioned by old international and domestic circumstances.


Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter explores a variety of questions on how to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, as well as the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war era from arms control to more forcible means to tackle nuclear proliferation. It then considers the emergence of new ideas, first in the Clinton administration, and then in the Bush administration, that focused less on arms control and more on counterproliferation. It also examines a host of problems and dilemmas associated with counterproliferation, the Obama administration's policy of engagement and ‘tough but direct diplomacy’, and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions. Finally, it reflects on future prospects for strategic nuclear arms control.


Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter examines issues regarding the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its implications for international security. It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, and the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war period from arms control to more forcible means to tackle proliferation. It then considers concerns that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s about the continuing utility of arms control as an effective means of dealing with WMDs. It also analyses new ideas that began to take shape, first during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and then under George W. Bush, about more militarily driven approaches, associated with counterproliferation. The chapter concludes with an assessment of ‘the return to arms control’ by the administration of Barack Obama and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions.


2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Marchio

The Planning Coordination Group (PCG) was a nondepartmental government organization created in March 1955 by the Eisenhower administration to generate new ideas and coordinate U.S. political warfare activities aimed at exploiting S viet and East European vulnerabilities. The PCG's demise six months later reflected the continuing problems encountered by the new national security bureaucracy in waging political warfare. The PCG's agenda showcased the Eisenhower administration's efforts to attack Communism and secure freedom in a world in which the number and destructiveness of nuclear weapons were gr wing rapidly. At the same time, the PCG's history illustrates that “aggressive” Cold War policies had not been completely dismissed by the Eisenhower administration, a situation that contributed to the “conflicting approaches” strategy it pursued in 1955 and 1956 and the contradictions that adversely affected its policies in Eastern Europe. Finally, this article highlights Dwight Eisenhower's unwillingness to back his rhetorical support for psychological warfare with consistent action.


Author(s):  
Mathieu Segers

‘Post-Maastricht reality’ soon became again an uneasy European reality for Dutch policymakers. As the uneasiness with ‘Small Europe’ had done in the late 1950s, it silenced Dutch political debate on European integration. And, once more, it triggered an erratic course during the 1990s and 2000s in which European integration fundamentally changed, both in terms of deepening (mainly through the eurozone) and widening (the accession of the former Warsaw Pact members). Once again, the Dutch felt lost in Europe. Crucially, Dutch government representatives often proved unable to fathom the European and transatlantic political realities that were shaping the Netherlands’ position in European integration and by implication the fate of Dutch initiatives and plans.


2019 ◽  
pp. 169-178
Author(s):  
Sara Lorenzini

This concluding chapter argues that, during the Cold War, countries in the Global South had played the superpowers off each other, achieving almost unchecked aid during decolonization—but this approach no longer worked. Economists and social scientists attacked the Cold War, claiming that the aid distributed then, while abundant, had been distorted by politics, with negative consequences for national economies. Cold War aid, they said, fostered inefficient distribution, thwarted institutional development in newly independent countries, propped up failed states, and nourished civil wars with weapons and ideology. The book reveals development's many expectations other than humanitarian motives: political loyalty, broader markets, and personal or group legitimacy. It also recounts a plural history, seeing the global history of development as made up of projects with worldwide aspirations but clearly framed for national purposes and within regional dimensions. The image of development as a single design, the concretization of a hegemonic view, a global faith, a center around which global polity is organized, is a simplified representation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin A. French

This article considers the imbrication of war-time logics with the ideational and institutional development of public health surveillance.  It suggests that, as the Cold-War–era gave way to the ‘age of globalization’, public health discourse became less concerned with ideological enemies, and more concerned with ontological enemies. The discourse of emerging infectious disease exemplifies this preoccupation and illustrates how public health surveillance, dominated by war-time logics, is both globalized and predisposed to marginalized local orders of concern. However, at the same time that militarized configurations of public health surveillance set certain tendencies in motion, local orders of concern deconstruct, contest, resist, and negotiate these tendencies. Hence, this article concludes with a call for further empirical attention by Surveillance Studies scholars to the multiplicity of local sites that enact public health surveillance.


Politics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-294
Author(s):  
Miia Huttunen

In 1959, UNESCO published a catalogue of Eastern films suitable for Western audiences, titled ‘Orient. A Survey of Films Produced in Countries of Arab and Asian Culture’. The aim of the catalogue was to familiarise Western audiences with Eastern cultures through cinema. The catalogue lists seven general characteristics of Eastern cinema to distinguish it from its Western counterpart and to provide ready-made interpretations of the essential characteristics of the Eastern world. Of the 139 feature films listed in the catalogue, five were directed by Kurosawa Akira – the biggest number of films by a single director. This article provides an analysis of the five Kurosawa films within the frame provided by the characterisations in the catalogue in the political framework of World War II and its aftermath. Reading the cultural differences listed in the catalogue as a means of constructing the East in Western eyes, the article suggests UNESCO’s world was defined neither in terms of the contemporaneous geopolitical polarisation of the Cold War nor the ongoing decolonisation process. Instead, the catalogue served the purpose of proposing a cultural intervention in geopolitics, providing a reimagining of political realities constructed on a cultural basis and given a concrete form through cinema.


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