scholarly journals DAZIBAO: SARANA PENGGALANGAN PENGAWAL MERAH PADA ERA REVOLUSI KEBUDAYAAN TIONGKOK (1966-1969)

Author(s):  
Tuty Nur Mutia Enoch Muas ◽  
Ervina Noviyanti

Dazibao literally translated as big character poster. Since China dynasty era dazibao has functioned as a medium to deliver messages to the public, therefore it is usually posted on an open wall. The use of dazibao as a propaganda medium for Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party has been widely discussed, but in the research process, specific data were found which show that revolutionary action and the number of Red Guards increased sharply in the short period of time after the dazibao of Nie Yuanzi from Beijing University and Mao Zedong were published. These findings aroused interest to dig deeper into dazibao’s strong elements as a Red Guards mobilizing medium during the Cultural Revolution which become the main analysis of this article. Historical approach which consist of heuristic, verification, interpretation, and historiography is used to reconstruct the strength of dazibao. The analysis focuses on the two dazibao mentioned above, along with Mao Zedong's influence and socio-political development at that time as inseparable factors. The result shows that writers background, main issue, form, and diction used are elements of the strength of Nie’s dazibao and supported by Mao’s dazibao caused dazibao to have a very significant function in raising the number of Red Guards during the Chinese Cultural Revolution 1966-1969.Dazibao secara harfiah dalam bahasa Indonesia berarti  poster dengan tulisan besar. Sejak era kedinastian Tiongkok telah dikenal dan digunakan sebagai sarana penyampai pesan kepada masyarakat, karena itu biasanya ditempel di dinding terbuka. Pemanfaatan dazibao sebagai sarana propaganda Mao Zedong dan Partai Komunis Tiongkok telah banyak dibahas, tapi dalam proses penelitian ditemukan data spesifik yang menunjukkan bahwa aksi revolusioner dan jumlah Pengawal Merah meningkat tajam dalam jangka waktu singkat setelah publikasi dazibao Nie Yuanzi dari Universitas Beijing dan dazibao Mao Zedong. Temuan tersebut membangkitkan ketertarikan untuk menggali lebih dalam tentang factor-faktor yang menjadi kekuatan dazibao sebagai sarana penggalangan Pengawal Merah pada Revolusi Kebudayaan tersebut. Hal itulah yang menjadi pokok bahasan artikel ini. Metode sejarah yang mencakup tahapan heuristik, verifikasi, interpretasi, dan historiografi digunakan untuk merekonstruksi kekuatan dazibao terutama yang tercermin dalam dazibao Nie dan Mao. Dalam pembahasan pengaruh Mao Zedong serta perkembangan sosial-politik saat itu menjadi bagian tak terpisahkan didalamnya.  Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa latar penulis, pokok bahasan, tampilan, dan pilihan kata/diksi merupakan faktor-faktor yang menjadi kekuatan dazibao Nie. Ditambah dengan dukungan dari dazibao yang dibuat Mao serta publikasi yang masif menyebabkan dazibao berfungsi sangat signifikan dalam penggalangan Pengawal Merah pada Revolusi Kebudayaan Tiongkok tahun 1966-1969.

Focaal ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 (58) ◽  
pp. 81-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Steinmüller

In the past, most farmhouses in central China had an ancestral shrine and a paper scroll with the Chinese letters for "heaven, earth, emperor, ancestors, and teachers" on the wall opposite the main entrance. The ancestral shrine and paper scroll were materializations of the central principles of popular Confucianism. This article deals with their past and present. It describes how in everyday action and in ritual this shrine marked a spatial and moral center. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the ancestral shrines and paper scrolls were destroyed, and replaced by a poster of Mao Zedong. Although the moral principles of popular Confucianism were dismissed by intellectuals and politicians, Mao Zedong was worshipped in ways reminiscent of popular Confucian ritual. The Mao poster and the paper scroll stand for a continuity of a spatial-moral practice of centering. What has changed however is the public evaluation of such a local practice, and this tension can produce a double embarrassment. Elements of popular Confucianism (which had been forcefully denied in the past) remain somewhat embarrassing for many people in countryside. At the same time urbanites sometimes inversely perceive the Maoist condemnation of popular Confucianism as an awkward survival of peasant narrow-mindedness—all the more so as Confucian traditions are now reinvented and revitalized as cultural heritage.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 346-366
Author(s):  
V. V. Bondareva

The article analyzes the first years of “the cultural revolution” in China (1966—1967), characterized by high revolutionary activity of students and school youth, organized into groups of “red guards”, who were distinguished in their actions by extreme cruelty and fanaticism. From this point of view, the destructive actions of the red guards, which were of a terrorist and mass nature, highlight the main direction of their revolutionary strike, which was inflicted on the party and state apparatus of China. Mao Zedong is presented as the initiator of a mass movement of red guards who used monstrous terrorist methods to fight his opposition and all, from their point of view, not enough politically conscious elements. The hongweibing movement, considered as an instrument of Mao Zedong’s struggle with the opposition, allows to reveal in the course of research the personal qualities of a leader who, in the name of establishing his own cult, was not afraid to deliberately plunge the entire country into mass and deeply disorderly turmoil. The detailed description of Mao Zedong’s personal attitude to what is happening, based on documentary sources, reveals the deeply dictatorial and anti-democratic nature of his power, which was asserted in the first years of “the cultural revolution” with the help of the red guards movement.


Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Reardon

Establishing a totalitarian state after 1949, Chinese Communist Party elites formulated religious regulations that ensured strong national security and guaranteed the Party’s hegemonic control of the state. The party state eliminated all foreign religious connections and established Party-controlled religious organizations to co-opt the five recognized official religious beliefs. By the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong prohibited all religious beliefs except in himself. As the post-totalitarianism of the 1980s evolved into consultative authoritarianism of the 1990s, Communist elites resurrected the Party-controlled religious organizations and implemented a new series of religious regulations in 1994 and 2005 that permitted the operation of officially recognized religions to strengthen moral standards and to supplement the state’s social welfare functions. Facing perceived challenges from foreign religions and fearing the growing popularity of religious belief, the party state adopted a third set of religious regulations in 2017 to strengthen Party hegemony.


2011 ◽  
Vol 206 ◽  
pp. 391-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yen-lin Chung

AbstractWhen the king went astray, the people suffered for it. Just as a wayward king needed loyal and capable courtiers to implement his wishes, so too did Mao Zedong in the People's Republic of China. The Anti-Rightist Campaign was one of Mao's controversial policies, and involved him delegating his trusted followers to implement his political initiatives. This article examines how the Central Secretariat, led by Deng Xiaoping, effectively implemented and strictly supervised the process, as well as the negative influences of the Central Secretariat on this witch-hunt-like campaign. It thus provides a case study of how the Central Secretariat operated and functioned as a powerful political apparatus in the political processes of the Chinese Communist Party during the pre-Cultural Revolution period.


1986 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 433-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Forster

In the five years between the disappearance of Lin Biao in 1971 and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 the Chinese political scene was highly volatile. Mass campaigns erupted regularly, disrupting and diverting efforts to normalize political, economic and social activities, which had originally been thrown into chaos during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. After the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in August 1973 the question of succession to the ageing Mao and ailing Premier Zhou Enlai became a matter of urgency to the political elite. At issue was the direction China would take in the post-Mao era, central to which was an assessment of the validity of Mao's thesis concerning the continuation of class struggle in socialist society, and his attempt to put into operation the conclusions he drew from this analysis.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 28-33
Author(s):  
Donia Zhang

This paper presents an analysis of the former Chinese Communist Party leader Chairman Mao Zedong's political career (reigned 1949-1976), with regards to his success and failures. Mao was one of the most prominent Communist theoreticians who governed a quarter of humankind for a quarter of a century. His political philosophy, particularly his Method of Leadership, focusing on the "masses" is discussed here. The analytical arguments are centered on three phases of his leadership: the rise, the apex, and the fall. In the first phase, the paper attributes his victory before 1949 to his profound understanding of Chinese peasants. In the second phase, it elaborates on his successful method of leadership in the early 1950s. And in the third and last phase, it criticizes his disastrous political movements, particularly the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. The study hopes to offer an objective and a balanced view of Chairman Mao, who had a complex personality and was a highly controversial figure in human history. The article also wishes to help readers gain a better understanding of China's top leader in recent history, and how China came to be what it is today.


1971 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Bedeski

Since the events of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Communist China, a crucial question has been whether the structures of the state can survive intact after the passing of Mao Tse-tung from the scene. The emergence of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a strategic political force and the reconstitution of the Chinese Communist Party in 1969 point to the possibility that China has entered into a new phase of political development insofar as institutional arrangements are concerned. Hints that the National People's Congress may be reconvened can also be taken as indications that major changes will have to be ratified. In short, something of a constitutional crisis or its equivalent has occurred on the Chinese mainland. The future direction of Peking policy may well be determined by the way in which this crisis is settled.


Author(s):  
Yuan-tsung Chen

From the time she was a girl, Yuan-tsung Chen had had a literary dream, and in 1950 she embarked on a literary career, a journey filled with thrilling and dangerous adventures. She went to Beijing and got a job in the Scenario Department of the Central Film Bureau, where she found herself in a front-row seat during China’s culture wars as Mao Zedong demanded that literature and art serve the Party, while writers wanted culture to be distinguishable from propaganda. Hence she became a secret listener. Purges ensued. She narrowly escaped the Anti-Rightist Purge of 1957 by marrying Jack Chen, who, because of his connections, had avoided political trouble so far. Mao’s “class war” continued. His Great Leap Forward caused the plunge in agricultural production and the greatest famine of the twentieth century. It led to Mao’s last and most violent purge, the Cultural Revolution. His hitmen, the Red Guards, viciously attacked Jack. Yuan-tsung went secretly to ask Zhou Enlai, the prime minister, for help. Zhou tried but failed to protect them. They were sent out of Beijing and consigned to a rural backwater village, cut off from all recourse to friends. But Yuan-tsung figured out a way to get in touch, right under the noses of the Red Guards, with Jack’s American brother-in-law and asked him to arrange a speaking tour for Jack. He did, and thus Jack was able to accept an invitation to lecture on Canadian and American campuses. After a tense wait, on the prime minister’s personal order Jack and Yuan-tsung got permits to leave the country.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-368
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wasserstrom

People routinely refer to the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong as two subjects that are “sensitive” to write and even talk about in today's People's Republic of China (PRC). This is true, but not all “sensitive” events and individuals are created equal—or handled the same way by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). When it comes to the June 4th Massacre, another “sensitive” event, and Liu Xiaobo, another “sensitive” figure, all public and even some relatively private forms of discussion are blocked. The goal is to make them both forgotten, as Louisa Lim argues in her important, aptly titled 2014 Oxford book, The People's Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited. The CCP's aim with the Cultural Revolution and Mao, by contrast, is not to blot out but control memory, not stop but steer the direction and constrain the scope of research, discussion, and commemoration. Last year, when the fiftieth anniversary of the first Red Guard rallies passed, there was, tellingly, muted discussion in all parts of the PRC other than Hong Kong but, equally tellingly, not a complete June 4th anniversary style blackout. Mainland bookstores stock novels dealing with the Cultural Revolution but not June 4th, and texts by and biographies of Mao but not Liu. And so on.


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