scholarly journals Una académica comprometida con el estudio de la historia del pensamiento iuspolítico alemán y el trabajo de Hans Kelsen: una aproximación a la apasionante obra de Sara Lagi

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 207-223
Author(s):  
Augusto Fernando Carrillo Salgado

Sara Lagi obtuvo el grado de doctora en Historia del Pensamiento Político Europeo por la Universidad de Perugia en el año 2005. Actualmente es catedrática de la Universidad de Turín; también ha sido docente en la Universidad de Florencia (2007-2009), Middlebury College, Smith College y Fashion Institute of Technology (2005-2014). A lo largo de su prolífica trayectoria docente, Sara Lagi ha publicado un gran número de artículos y libros, entre los que destacan: “Pensare la democracia: Hans Kelsen e Hermann Heller a confronto”; “Kelsen e la Corte costituzionale austriaca: un percorso storico-politico (1918-1920)”; “Hans Kelsen, un pensatore democrático tra Europa e America (1920-1955)”; Il Pensiero político di Hans Kelsen (1911-1920). Le origini di Essenza e valore della democracia; “Georg Jellinek storico del pensiero politico (1883-1905)”; “Adolf Fischer e Karl Renner: la questione nazionale austriaca (1869-1917)”; “The formation of a liberal thinker: Georg Jellinek and his early writings”; “Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court (1918-1929)”; “Karl Renner: Staat und Nation”; “Hans Kelsen: pensador político”; “Territorio y pueblo en Hans Kelsen”.

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-59
Author(s):  
Sławomir Piekarczyk

In the face of constitutional crisis in Poland, initiated in 2015 and ongoing to this day, it is essential for academics to describe legal events and rationales constituting the crisis using such measures so that issues associated with the crisis are descried in the most objective manner possible. This paper attempts to describe the rationale and activities of antagonistic parties to the dispute from the perspective of relevant issues, which one of the most prominent authors of the European idea of constitutional judiciary - Hans Kelsen pointed out in his paper “Essence and development of constitutional judiciary”, already in 1928. Deliberations covered in this article focus - from general issues - on the issues of systemic political motives as a threat to the guarantee of compliance of normative acts with the Constitution and issues relating to the authority competent to repeal unlawful acts. It also discusses specific problems concerning personal substrate of constitutional court, as well as the related issue of the presumption of constitutionality, and publishing of the court’s judgments. Comparison between topics undertaken by Kelsen with aspects of the constitutional crisis allows to draw a general conclusion that the actions of policy makers resembles a negative model of Kelsen’s idea of effective constitutional judiciary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Jorge Luís dos Santos LOURENÇON ◽  
Ana Maria Ortega ALONSO

No século XX, os pensadores Hans Kelsen e Carl Schmitt travaram um embate sobre a quem incumbiria a guarda da Constituição. Para aquele, a tarefa seria de um órgão técnico, qual seja, uma corte constitucional, capaz de uma análise de compatibilidade entre normas de hierarquia superior com as de hierarquia inferior. Para Schmitt, por outro lado, ao chefe de Estado caberia tal responsabilidade, por ser detentor da vontade política e, assim, mostrar-se afim aos anseios populares; sendo a Constituição uma decisão política, o representante do povo teria legitimidade para protegê-la, de acordo com a vontade pública. Discute-se, neste estudo, a qual teoria o Supremo Tribunal Federal se aproximou, quando do julgamento da Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade nº 4.439, em que se decidiu pela compatibilidade do ensino religioso de natureza confessional e matrícula facultativa, na rede pública de ensino, com a Constituição Federal de 1988, isto é, se a argumentação desenvolvida pela Corte Maior se reveste de caráter técnico, como pretendia Kelsen, ou se consideram os pensamentos do povo brasileiro, como defendido por Schmitt. Conclui-se que, pela análise de votos dos Ministros do Pretório Excelso, a argumentação técnica restou vencida por uma argumentação jurídica e de ordem política, em consonância com a vontade popular, distanciando a atuação do STF da guarda da Carta Política tal como pretendida por Hans Kelsen. A metodologia empregada é a revisão bibliográfica, sob o método dedutivo.   THE DIRECT UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION 4.439 UNDER HANS KELSEN’S AND CARL SCHMITT’S CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES PERSPECTIVE   ABSTRACT In the 20th century, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt raised an issue about who was responsible for The Guardian of the Constitution.  For Kelsen, a technical body would be held responsible, wherever, a constitutional court, qualified to a compatibility analysis between superior hierarchy and inferior hierarchy. For Schmitt, on the other hand, the Head of State would bear such responsibility, for being the holder of the political will, and thus depicting popular aspirations; being the Constitution a political decision, the representative of the people would have the legitimacy to protect it, in accordance with the will of the people. In this study, it is discussed which theory the Supreme Court approached, in the judgment of Direct Unconstitutionality Action 4.439, in which, it was decided in favor of the compatibility of  the confessional natural theology nature and the elective enrollment in public school systems, with the Federal Constitution of 1988, that is, if the arguments developed by the Major Court holds a technical character, as Kelsen intended, or if they consider the thoughts of  Brazilian people, as defended by Schmitt. It is concluded that, by the analysis of the votes of the Ministers of Praetorium Excelso, the technical argument was defeated by a legal and political argument, in agreement with the popular will, intervening the performance of the STF from the custody of the Political Charter as intended by Hans Kelsen. The methodology used was the literature review, under the deductive method.   Keywords: Direct Unconstitutionality Action. Hans Kelsen. Carl Schmitt. Theory of Constitution. Secularism.


Co-herencia ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (16) ◽  
pp. 273-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Lagi

Este artículo examina las contribuciones de Hans Kelsen al establecimiento del primer Tribunal Constitucional en Austria, analizando las diferencias centrales entre el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional y el modelo de su maestro alemán, el jurista Georg Jellinek, al tiempo en el que se enfoca en el trasfondo históricopolítico especifico de Austria que ejerció un influjo en la configuración e incluso en el colapso del Tribunal Constitucional. De manera distinta a la mayoría de trabajos dedicados a esta cuestión, este artículo le presta particular atención a la dimensión histórico-política tras los esfuerzos de Kelsen para crear un sistema serio de defensa jurídica de la Constitución Austríaca. En este sentido, el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional se analiza en referencia al problema de proteger a la joven democracia austríaca, que surgió de las cenizas del Imperio Habsburgo, en contra de sus numerosos oponentes. Este problema se ubica en el centro de los trabajos de Kelsen sobre la democracia publicados en la década de 1920.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-50
Author(s):  
Francisco Balaguer Callejon ◽  

Introduction. This work analyses the normative function of constitutional judgments, their cha- racteristics and their limits. Theoretical Basis. Methods. The theoretical bases start from the work of Hans Kelsen in relation to the condition of “negative legislator” of the constitutional court, which already implies a dero- gatory capacity on the legal order and, therefore, a normative function, completed with the differ- entiation of Vezio Crisafulli between “disposition and norm” that allows opening the constitution- al jurisdiction to a consideration as “positive legislator”. Likewise, theoretical contributions from other works by the author of the research are incorporated. The method that has been used to prepare the work is based on the analysis of the current legal reality of the constitutional jurisdic- tion taking into account the legal context in which it develops its functions. Results. It is concluded that the normative function of constitutional judgments is a structural fea- ture inherent to constitutional jurisdiction, which presents a series of specific characteristics. This normative function is characterized by being a complex reality, due to the diversity of procedures in which it occurs and the different legal material with which the constitutional jurisdiction works. It is also a complementary normative function, which lacks the plenitude of the legal production of law. Lastly, it is a fragmentary normative function, which operates on specific dispositions or provisions of the normative chains, without having the capacity to configure complete normative chains that correspond only to the legislator in the exercise of his legislative function. Discussion and Conclusion. Constitutional decisions clearly develop a normative function, as they incorporate more into the legal system than just the interpretation of the provisions of the law or the Constitution. These decisions derive from legal or constitutional provisions norms that complement the constitutional and legislative levels of the legal system. Thus, they contribute, albeit with the limitations noted in this paper, to the development of the legal system, resolve conflicts and establish norms that can help prevent new disputes. Thus, they perform the peace- keeping function that is inherent in any justice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 39-114
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the German system of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, which has been borrowed by virtually all of the civil law countries in the world as being the one that is the most compatible with their legal system. The historical lessons drawn from Germany’s experience with the Third Reich made Germans acutely aware of the need for constitutional protection of rights growing out of the great historical wrongs of Nazism and of the Holocaust. Thus, the fundamental core explanation of the origins and growth of German judicial review is that it is a rights from wrongs phenomenon. That being said, the growth of German judicial review was made easier by the fact that the German Basic Law constituted the Constitutional Court to act as a federalism and separation of powers umpire. The German Constitutional Court has performed those umpiring function from 1949 down to the present day with great deftness and ability. Thanks to the great scholar, Hans Kelsen, the Germans borrowed a greatly modified system of U.S. judicial review, which was specially designed to work well in civil law countries. The German Model has, in turn, been borrowed by every oother country discussed in Volume II of my two part book series.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-521
Author(s):  
Rawin Leelapatana ◽  
Abdurrachman Satrio Pratomo

Abstract Hans Kelsen was a pro-democracy Austrian jurist, who, owing to his Jewish ancestry, was forced to flee to the United States of America after Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. His well-known theory of centralised constitutional review has not only influenced the design of many constitutional courts in Western Europe. It has also expanded to other parts of the world, including Thailand and Indonesia. Having determined to break with their authoritarian pasts, these two Southeast Asian countries decided to establish a Constitutional Court (in 1997 in Thailand and in 2003 in Indonesia), to consolidate their democratic transition as well as to safeguard democracy from attack. This decision inevitably brought the liberal-democratic assumptions underlying Kelsen’s model into competition with entrenched national ideologies traditionally exploited by political power holders and the military to preserve their hegemony – Thai-ness in Thailand and Pancasila in Indonesia. In contrast to Kelsen’s original theory, both these ideologies advocate strong leadership, national harmony and social hierarchy. This paper explores the extent to which the ideological hegemony of Thai-ness and Pancasila affects the performance and jurisprudence of the Thai and Indonesian Constitutional Courts respectively. An alternative understanding of the implementation of the Kelsenian-style Constitutional Court in the absence of its facilitative conditions will ultimately be proposed.


Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea

This chapter succinctly introduces the reader to the composition, jurisdictional scope, and methods of judicial review in Italy. Using both direct and incidental methods of judicial review, the Italian system combines certain elements of centralized systems (like the Austrian paradigm of Hans Kelsen) with elements of diffuse systems of review like that of the United States. The chapter highlights the highly collegial structure and process of the Court. Overall, the cooperative and multilevel character of Italian constitutional adjudication emerges as its most distinctive contribution to our understanding of the range of the varieties of constitutional models and experiences in the world.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Subroto Subroto

<p><strong>ABSTRAK: </strong><em>Legeslasi kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi (disingkat MK) adalah sebagai berikut : (1) menguji undang-undang terhadap UUD NRI Th.1945; (2) memutus sengketa kewenangan lembaga Negara yang kewenangannya diberikan oleh UUD NRI Th.1945; (3) memutus pembubaran partai politik; dan (4) memutus perselisihan tentang hasil pemilihan umum. Dari legislasi MK tersebut, penulis tertarik untuk melihat sejauh mana legislasi MK dalam membuat suatu putusan berdasarkan teori hukum yang dikemukakan oleh Hans Kelsen, mengenai konstitusi. Pemikiran Kelsen, mendorong dibentuknya suatu lembaga yang diberi nama Verfassungsgerichtshoft atau MK (Constitutional Court) yang berdiri sendiri di luar Mahkamah Agung, sering disebut The Kelsenian Model. Adanya putusan MK No. 46/PUU-VIII/2010, merupakan suatu produk hukum yang dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. Dari putusan tersebut, akan dianalisis berkaitan dengan dasar hukum dan pertimbangan hukum yang digunakan MK dalam memutus perkara telah sesuai dengan teori hukum yang dikemukakan oleh Hans Kelsen dalam teori konstitusinya atau belum dan tentang legislasi MK dalam membuat putusan tersebut berdasarkan teori hukum Hans Kelsan.<strong></strong></em></p><p><strong>Kata kunci : <em>konstitusi, Hans Kelsen, </em></strong></p>


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Jeong-In Yun

Abstract A centralized constitutional review system, generally known as the Austrian Constitutional Court model established in 1920 by Hans Kelsen, has spread globally after World War II and is now the most active constitutional tribunal in Europe. Interestingly, although the Constitutional Court of Korea was classified as this Kelsenian model, besides a typical kind of constitutional review procedure, the Court runs an additional procedure for the constitutional review of legislation. The latter has some comparatively special and unusual requirements and procedure, but the statistics indicate it has been actively used. It takes the form of a constitutional complaint, but in practice, it is treated as the second type of constitutional review of legislation in Korean constitutional adjudication. Through this special procedure, individuals appear to participate in a tripartite conversation on constitutional interpretation along with the judicial branch and the Constitutional Court. Moreover, to some extent, this sui generis complaint is perceived to make up for the prohibition of constitutional complaint on judgments of ordinary courts (‘Urteilsbeschwerde’) in Korea. In Austria, the individual complaint on constitutional review of statutes was introduced by a constitutional amendment in 2013, whereby the individual parties of the pending cases are entitled to file a constitutional review with the Constitutional Court as of 1 January 2015. In terms of enabling the individual party to request to the Constitutional Court for constitutional review of legislation, the Austrian new complaint is similar to the Korean one, but their requirements and procedures are different. From the perspective of enhanced individual access to the Constitutional Court, however, both complaints may be viewed as an evolution of the Kelsenian model to meet the demands of the times. In this regard, the Korean practice for over three decades may provide useful insights into the implementation of a new practice and further improvement in Austria. This article will examine the Korean ‘Constitutional Review Complaint’ and compare it with the Austrian ‘Gesetzesbeschwerde (Parteiantrag auf Normenkontrolle)’ to explore mutual references that will help improve both institutions. Then, I will assess what this kind of evolutionary invention of the constitutional review implies to the centennial of the Austrian model.


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