Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court: Family law, political conciliation, and religious culture (1919-1930)

2015 ◽  
pp. 65-91
Author(s):  
Borrmann Ricardo Gaulia
2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-59
Author(s):  
Sławomir Piekarczyk

In the face of constitutional crisis in Poland, initiated in 2015 and ongoing to this day, it is essential for academics to describe legal events and rationales constituting the crisis using such measures so that issues associated with the crisis are descried in the most objective manner possible. This paper attempts to describe the rationale and activities of antagonistic parties to the dispute from the perspective of relevant issues, which one of the most prominent authors of the European idea of constitutional judiciary - Hans Kelsen pointed out in his paper “Essence and development of constitutional judiciary”, already in 1928. Deliberations covered in this article focus - from general issues - on the issues of systemic political motives as a threat to the guarantee of compliance of normative acts with the Constitution and issues relating to the authority competent to repeal unlawful acts. It also discusses specific problems concerning personal substrate of constitutional court, as well as the related issue of the presumption of constitutionality, and publishing of the court’s judgments. Comparison between topics undertaken by Kelsen with aspects of the constitutional crisis allows to draw a general conclusion that the actions of policy makers resembles a negative model of Kelsen’s idea of effective constitutional judiciary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Jorge Luís dos Santos LOURENÇON ◽  
Ana Maria Ortega ALONSO

No século XX, os pensadores Hans Kelsen e Carl Schmitt travaram um embate sobre a quem incumbiria a guarda da Constituição. Para aquele, a tarefa seria de um órgão técnico, qual seja, uma corte constitucional, capaz de uma análise de compatibilidade entre normas de hierarquia superior com as de hierarquia inferior. Para Schmitt, por outro lado, ao chefe de Estado caberia tal responsabilidade, por ser detentor da vontade política e, assim, mostrar-se afim aos anseios populares; sendo a Constituição uma decisão política, o representante do povo teria legitimidade para protegê-la, de acordo com a vontade pública. Discute-se, neste estudo, a qual teoria o Supremo Tribunal Federal se aproximou, quando do julgamento da Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade nº 4.439, em que se decidiu pela compatibilidade do ensino religioso de natureza confessional e matrícula facultativa, na rede pública de ensino, com a Constituição Federal de 1988, isto é, se a argumentação desenvolvida pela Corte Maior se reveste de caráter técnico, como pretendia Kelsen, ou se consideram os pensamentos do povo brasileiro, como defendido por Schmitt. Conclui-se que, pela análise de votos dos Ministros do Pretório Excelso, a argumentação técnica restou vencida por uma argumentação jurídica e de ordem política, em consonância com a vontade popular, distanciando a atuação do STF da guarda da Carta Política tal como pretendida por Hans Kelsen. A metodologia empregada é a revisão bibliográfica, sob o método dedutivo.   THE DIRECT UNCONSTITUTIONALITY ACTION 4.439 UNDER HANS KELSEN’S AND CARL SCHMITT’S CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES PERSPECTIVE   ABSTRACT In the 20th century, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt raised an issue about who was responsible for The Guardian of the Constitution.  For Kelsen, a technical body would be held responsible, wherever, a constitutional court, qualified to a compatibility analysis between superior hierarchy and inferior hierarchy. For Schmitt, on the other hand, the Head of State would bear such responsibility, for being the holder of the political will, and thus depicting popular aspirations; being the Constitution a political decision, the representative of the people would have the legitimacy to protect it, in accordance with the will of the people. In this study, it is discussed which theory the Supreme Court approached, in the judgment of Direct Unconstitutionality Action 4.439, in which, it was decided in favor of the compatibility of  the confessional natural theology nature and the elective enrollment in public school systems, with the Federal Constitution of 1988, that is, if the arguments developed by the Major Court holds a technical character, as Kelsen intended, or if they consider the thoughts of  Brazilian people, as defended by Schmitt. It is concluded that, by the analysis of the votes of the Ministers of Praetorium Excelso, the technical argument was defeated by a legal and political argument, in agreement with the popular will, intervening the performance of the STF from the custody of the Political Charter as intended by Hans Kelsen. The methodology used was the literature review, under the deductive method.   Keywords: Direct Unconstitutionality Action. Hans Kelsen. Carl Schmitt. Theory of Constitution. Secularism.


Co-herencia ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (16) ◽  
pp. 273-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Lagi

Este artículo examina las contribuciones de Hans Kelsen al establecimiento del primer Tribunal Constitucional en Austria, analizando las diferencias centrales entre el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional y el modelo de su maestro alemán, el jurista Georg Jellinek, al tiempo en el que se enfoca en el trasfondo históricopolítico especifico de Austria que ejerció un influjo en la configuración e incluso en el colapso del Tribunal Constitucional. De manera distinta a la mayoría de trabajos dedicados a esta cuestión, este artículo le presta particular atención a la dimensión histórico-política tras los esfuerzos de Kelsen para crear un sistema serio de defensa jurídica de la Constitución Austríaca. En este sentido, el modelo kelseniano de tribunal constitucional se analiza en referencia al problema de proteger a la joven democracia austríaca, que surgió de las cenizas del Imperio Habsburgo, en contra de sus numerosos oponentes. Este problema se ubica en el centro de los trabajos de Kelsen sobre la democracia publicados en la década de 1920.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 207-223
Author(s):  
Augusto Fernando Carrillo Salgado

Sara Lagi obtuvo el grado de doctora en Historia del Pensamiento Político Europeo por la Universidad de Perugia en el año 2005. Actualmente es catedrática de la Universidad de Turín; también ha sido docente en la Universidad de Florencia (2007-2009), Middlebury College, Smith College y Fashion Institute of Technology (2005-2014). A lo largo de su prolífica trayectoria docente, Sara Lagi ha publicado un gran número de artículos y libros, entre los que destacan: “Pensare la democracia: Hans Kelsen e Hermann Heller a confronto”; “Kelsen e la Corte costituzionale austriaca: un percorso storico-politico (1918-1920)”; “Hans Kelsen, un pensatore democrático tra Europa e America (1920-1955)”; Il Pensiero político di Hans Kelsen (1911-1920). Le origini di Essenza e valore della democracia; “Georg Jellinek storico del pensiero politico (1883-1905)”; “Adolf Fischer e Karl Renner: la questione nazionale austriaca (1869-1917)”; “The formation of a liberal thinker: Georg Jellinek and his early writings”; “Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court (1918-1929)”; “Karl Renner: Staat und Nation”; “Hans Kelsen: pensador político”; “Territorio y pueblo en Hans Kelsen”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-50
Author(s):  
Francisco Balaguer Callejon ◽  

Introduction. This work analyses the normative function of constitutional judgments, their cha- racteristics and their limits. Theoretical Basis. Methods. The theoretical bases start from the work of Hans Kelsen in relation to the condition of “negative legislator” of the constitutional court, which already implies a dero- gatory capacity on the legal order and, therefore, a normative function, completed with the differ- entiation of Vezio Crisafulli between “disposition and norm” that allows opening the constitution- al jurisdiction to a consideration as “positive legislator”. Likewise, theoretical contributions from other works by the author of the research are incorporated. The method that has been used to prepare the work is based on the analysis of the current legal reality of the constitutional jurisdic- tion taking into account the legal context in which it develops its functions. Results. It is concluded that the normative function of constitutional judgments is a structural fea- ture inherent to constitutional jurisdiction, which presents a series of specific characteristics. This normative function is characterized by being a complex reality, due to the diversity of procedures in which it occurs and the different legal material with which the constitutional jurisdiction works. It is also a complementary normative function, which lacks the plenitude of the legal production of law. Lastly, it is a fragmentary normative function, which operates on specific dispositions or provisions of the normative chains, without having the capacity to configure complete normative chains that correspond only to the legislator in the exercise of his legislative function. Discussion and Conclusion. Constitutional decisions clearly develop a normative function, as they incorporate more into the legal system than just the interpretation of the provisions of the law or the Constitution. These decisions derive from legal or constitutional provisions norms that complement the constitutional and legislative levels of the legal system. Thus, they contribute, albeit with the limitations noted in this paper, to the development of the legal system, resolve conflicts and establish norms that can help prevent new disputes. Thus, they perform the peace- keeping function that is inherent in any justice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Haniah Ilhami

AbstractIdentifying the contributions of Fatwa MUI No. 1 year 2012 in Indonesian Islamic Family Law, this research finds that the Fatwa has contributed in 2 (two) positions. First, the Fatwa contributes to the development of the substance of Islamic family law through its position as the  clarification and explanation of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 46/PUU-VIII/2010, as the confirmation of the prohibition of adultery, as the recommendation for the Government, and as the regulation that provides children’s protection. In the other side, the Fatwa contributes practically in Religious Courts through its contribution as the Judge's guidance, completes the absence of related regulations, and the source of material law.  IntisariDalam kajian terhadap Fatwa MUI No. 11 Tahun 2012, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa Fatwa MUI No.11 tahun 2012 telah memberikan kontribusi bagi hukum keluarga Islam di Indonesia dalam 2 (dua) bentuk. Pertama, fatwa berperan terhadap pengembangan substansi hukum keluarga Islam karena telah memberikan klarifikasi dan penjelasan atas Putusan MK Nomor 46/PUU-VIII/2010, mengatur larangan perbuatan zina, sebagai rekomendasi bagi Pemerintah dalam penyusunan peraturan perundang-undangan terkait zina, dan memberikan perlindungan hukum bagi anak hasil zina. Kedua, fatwa berkontribusi dalam tataran praktis di Pengadilan Agama sebagai pedoman Hakim, pengisi kekosongan hukum, dan sebagai sumber hukum materiil. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 39-114
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the German system of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, which has been borrowed by virtually all of the civil law countries in the world as being the one that is the most compatible with their legal system. The historical lessons drawn from Germany’s experience with the Third Reich made Germans acutely aware of the need for constitutional protection of rights growing out of the great historical wrongs of Nazism and of the Holocaust. Thus, the fundamental core explanation of the origins and growth of German judicial review is that it is a rights from wrongs phenomenon. That being said, the growth of German judicial review was made easier by the fact that the German Basic Law constituted the Constitutional Court to act as a federalism and separation of powers umpire. The German Constitutional Court has performed those umpiring function from 1949 down to the present day with great deftness and ability. Thanks to the great scholar, Hans Kelsen, the Germans borrowed a greatly modified system of U.S. judicial review, which was specially designed to work well in civil law countries. The German Model has, in turn, been borrowed by every oother country discussed in Volume II of my two part book series.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-521
Author(s):  
Rawin Leelapatana ◽  
Abdurrachman Satrio Pratomo

Abstract Hans Kelsen was a pro-democracy Austrian jurist, who, owing to his Jewish ancestry, was forced to flee to the United States of America after Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. His well-known theory of centralised constitutional review has not only influenced the design of many constitutional courts in Western Europe. It has also expanded to other parts of the world, including Thailand and Indonesia. Having determined to break with their authoritarian pasts, these two Southeast Asian countries decided to establish a Constitutional Court (in 1997 in Thailand and in 2003 in Indonesia), to consolidate their democratic transition as well as to safeguard democracy from attack. This decision inevitably brought the liberal-democratic assumptions underlying Kelsen’s model into competition with entrenched national ideologies traditionally exploited by political power holders and the military to preserve their hegemony – Thai-ness in Thailand and Pancasila in Indonesia. In contrast to Kelsen’s original theory, both these ideologies advocate strong leadership, national harmony and social hierarchy. This paper explores the extent to which the ideological hegemony of Thai-ness and Pancasila affects the performance and jurisprudence of the Thai and Indonesian Constitutional Courts respectively. An alternative understanding of the implementation of the Kelsenian-style Constitutional Court in the absence of its facilitative conditions will ultimately be proposed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 13
Author(s):  
Danu Aris Setiyanto

Interfaith marriage, in fact, is a contentious issue in the family law. The arrangement of interfaith marriage in Indonesia is experiencing a change since before and after the establishment of the constitutional Law of R.I. No. 1 of 1974 regarding Marriage. Although there are changes in the regulations but some parties consider that arrangement of interfaith marriage is not firm, it is unclear / smuggling law in it. Regulation of interfaith marriage in Indonesia is considered to have reduced the freedom to choose a mate and find the happiness with a partner of different religions. This is considered by the applicant that Article 2, paragraph 1 does not comply with the principle of freedom of human rights. This paper focuses on studying the problems of the interfaith marriages after a Constitutional Court decision No. 68 / PUU-XII / 2014 in the perspective of human rights. Constitutional Court rejected entirely about judicial interfaith marriage, as it is considered unreasonable under the law and marriage in Indonesia is based on religion. Constitutional Court's decision contains the values of human rights with a particular meaning and is limited by the limited freedom of religion in Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.[Perkawinan beda agama secara fakta merupakan persoalan yang menjadi perdebatan dalam hukum keluarga. Pengaturan perkawinan beda agama di Indonesia mengalami perubahan sejak sebelum dan setelah adanya UU R.I. Nomor 1 tahun 1974 tentang Perkawinan. Walaupun ada perubahan secara regulasi tetapi beberapa pihak menganggap bahwa pengaturan perkawinan beda agama tidak tegas, ada ketidakjelasan/penyelundupan hukum di dalamnya. Regulasi perkawinan beda agama di Indonesia dianggap telah mengurangi kebebasan untuk memilih jodoh dan menemukan kebahagiaan bersama pasangannya yang berbeda agama. Hal inilah yang dianggap oleh para pemohon bahwa Pasal 2 ayat 1 tidak sesuai dengan prinsip kebebasan dalam HAM. Tulisan ini difokuskan untuk mengkaji permasalahan perkawinan beda agama pasca putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 68/ PUU-XII/2014 dalam perspektif HAM. Mahkamah Konstitusi menolak seluruhnya tentang uji materiil perkawinan beda agama, karena dinilai tidak beralasan menurut hukum dan perkawinan di Indonesia yang berdasarkan agama. Putusan MK mengandung nilai-nilai HAM yang bermakna partikular dengan kebebasan terbatas dan dibatasi oleh agama dalam Pancasila dan UUD 1945]


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