Saddam Hussein's Chemical Weapons: on the Issue of United States Awareness in the 1980s

Author(s):  
A.V. Lepkov

The article examines the level of awareness of US officials regarding the Iraqi program for the production of chemical weapons as well as its use before 1988. Both in Russian and foreign historiography, the issue of Iraq's chemical weapons and the United States relationship with the government of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war is either considered superficially or becomes only an aspect of more general and extensive research topics. The period of 1980-1988 was marked by active USA-Iraqi cooperation in order to exert pressure on Iran. It is proved that during this period, Washington was fully aware of the development and use of chemical weapons by Iraq from the first incidents, even before the issue was brought to the level of the UN Security Council. It was not profitable for the United States to promote the dissemination of information discrediting an ally in the fight against Iran. World`s attention to the use of chemical weapons was drawn only after the end of the Iran-Iraq war.

Significance Russia on June 28 rejected as “lies” similar allegations by the United States, United Kingdom and France at the UN Security Council. The exchanges come against the backdrop of rising diplomatic tensions between Russia and France in CAR. Impacts Touadera’s ongoing offensive against rebel forces threatens to deliver a fatal blow to the peace deal he struck with them in 2019. Expanding Russian control over key mining sites could be a persistent source of frictions absent sophisticated local arrangements. Human rights concerns will deter some African leaders from engaging with Russia, but not all.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rashid I. Khalidi

This essay argues that what has been going on in Palestine for a century has been mischaracterized. Advancing a different perspective, it illuminates the history of the last hundred years as the Palestinians have experienced it. In doing so, it explores key historical documents, including the Balfour Declaration, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and UN Security Council Resolution 242, none of which included the Palestinians in key decisions impacting their lives and very survival. What amounts to a hundred years of war against the Palestinians, the essay contends, should be seen in comparative perspective as one of the last major colonial conflicts of the modern era, with the United States and Europe serving as the metropole, and their extension, Israel, operating as a semi-independent settler colony. An important feature of this long war has been the Palestinians' continuing resistance, against heavy odds, to colonial subjugation. Stigmatizing such resistance as “terrorism” has successfully occluded the real history of the past hundred years in Palestine.


1965 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-96

The Security Council held two meetings (1140th and 1141st) on August 5 and 7, 1964, to discuss a complaint of the United States government against the government of North Vietnam, which was expressed in a letter dated August 4, 1964, from the permanent representative of the United States addressed to the President of the Security Council. At the outset of the 1140th meeting on August 5, 1964, Mr. Morozov (Soviet Union) explained that he had requested the postponement of the meeting until August 6 to permit his delegation to receive necessary instructions from its government. With regard to this request, Mr. Stevenson (United States) pointed out that the UN Charter explicitly called for immediate reporting to the Council of measures taken by Members in the exercise of their right of self-defense. If the Council wished to adjourn after hearing the statement of the United States delegation, Mr. Stevenson had no objection. Mr. Hajek (Czechoslovakia) also opposed convening the meeting on August 5 on the grounds that Council members did not possess all the facts and views of the parties. To deliberate on the question on the basis of one version would not, he felt, serve the interests of the Council. Moreover, he did not feel that the circumstances constituted an emergency: The United States did not appear to be immediately threatened.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Richard Falk

This essay examines the consequences of the near-canonical status acquired over the years by UN Security Council Resolution 242. After tracing the evolution of the vision of peace seen to flow from 242, the essay explores the various ways in which the resolution has been read. In particular, the interpretation of Israel (backed by the United States) is examined, along with the balance of power factor. The essay concludes by suggesting that clinging to 242 as ““canonical”” inhibits clear-sighted thinking on new approaches that take cognizance of the greatly altered circumstances.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 335-349
Author(s):  
David Bosco

Less has changed in US diplomacy at the United Nations than many observers expected when the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In the UN Security Council, the United States has pursued a generally steady course that in many respects builds on the accomplishments of the Bush administration. Unexpectedly, the Security Council’s pace of work diminished considerably during the first few years of the new administration. The most significant change is the atmospherics of US diplomacy, not its substance: the Obama administration has participated in processes that the Bush administration shunned and has toned down US criticism of the United Nations’ perceived shortcomings.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-504

At the request of the United States, the Council met on April 26 to resume consideration of the Suez question. The Council had before it an Egyptian declaration on the Suez Canal and the arrangements for its operation, dated April 24, in which the government of Egypt announced that the Canal was again open for normal traffic. The declaration on arrangements for its operation comprised the following ten points: 1) The terms and the spirit of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 were reaffirmed, the Egyptian government declaring its intention to respect, observe and implement them; 2) While reaffirming its determination to respect the terms and spirit of the 1888 Convention and to abide by the Charter and the principles and purposes of the UN, the government of Egypt was confident that the other signatories of the said Convention and all others concerned would be guided by the same resolve; 3) The government of Egypt was more particularly determined a) to afford and maintain free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations within the limits of and in accordance with the provisions of the 1888 Convention; b) that tolls should continue to be levied in accordance with the last agreement, concluded on April 28, 1956, between Egypt and the Suez Canal Maritime Company, and that any increase in the current rate of tolls within any twelve months, if it took place, should be limited to 1 percent, any increase beyond that level to be the result of negotiations, and, failing agreement, to be settled by arbitration according to the procedure set forth in paragraph 7(b) of the declaration; and c) that the Canal would be maintained and developed in accordance with the progressive requirements of modern navigation and that such maintenance and development should include the eighth and ninth programs of the Suez Canal Maritime Company, with such improvements to them as were considered necessary


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 419-448
Author(s):  
Cláudio Júnior Damin

O artigo aborda a relação existente entre guerra e opinião pública nos Estados Unidos. O artigo foca na análise do caso da Guerra do Iraque iniciada em março de 2003 durante os mandatos de George W. Bush. Esse conflito insere-se no contexto dos ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001, sendo parte constitutiva da chamada “guerra global contra o terrorismo”. A primeira hipótese de trabalho é a de que inicialmente e reproduzindo padrões históricos anteriores, a guerra foi amplamente aprovada pela população norte-americana, processo que se prolongou por alguns meses e influenciou decisivamente para a reeleição do presidente republicano em 2004. Como segunda hipótese assevera-se que, passado algum tempo, o humor da opinião pública sofreu uma inflexão, diminuindo a aprovação popular à guerra e tendo como importante desdobramento a derrota dos republicanos na eleição de 2008, com o conflito ainda em curso. Espera-se mostrar, portanto, como a Guerra do Iraque pode ser dividida em duas fases distintas, sendo a primeira de bônus para o governo de George W. Bush e seus correligionários republicanos e a outra de ônus a partir do crescimento do número de baixas militares norte-americanas e da crise de credibilidade do governo no que concerne às perspectivas de vitória definitiva no conflito.Abstract: The article discusses the relationship between war and public opinion in the United States. The article focuses on the analysis of the case of the Iraq War that began in March 2003 during the administration of George W. Bush. This conflict is within the context of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, being a constituent part of the "Global War on Terrorism." The first hypothesis is that initially and reproducing previous historical standards, the war was widely approved by the American population, a process that was prolonged for a few months and influenced decisively to the re-election of Republican president in 2004. As a second hypothesis asserts that, after some time, the mood of public opinion has undergone a shift, reducing the public approval of the war and with the important effect the defeat of the Republicans in the 2008 election. It is expected, therefore, to show how the Iraq War can be divided into two distinct phases, with the first bonus for the George W. Bush and his fellow Republicans and other liens being from the growing number of U.S. military casualties and the crisis of credibility of the government with regard to the prospects of ultimate victory in the conflict.


Significance The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China are the body’s five permanent members. India wants to join that group. Impacts India-China border tensions could surge in early 2021, worsening bilateral relations. Delhi will deepen security ties with Washington and its other partners in the ‘Quad’ grouping, Tokyo and Canberra. India will push for more stringent selection of UN peacekeepers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-281
Author(s):  
Stefano Recchia

Abstract Research suggests that military interveners often seek endorsements from regional international organizations (IOs), in addition to approval from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to reassure international and domestic audiences. Toward that end, interveners should seek the endorsement of continent-wide regional IOs with the broadest and most diverse membership, which are most likely to be independent. In practice, however, interveners often seek endorsements from subregional IOs with narrow membership and aggregate preferences similar to their own. This should weaken the reassurance/legitimation effect significantly. I argue that such narrower regional endorsements are sought not so much to reassure skeptical audiences, as to pressure reluctant UNSC members to approve the intervention by putting those members’ relations with regional partners at stake. To illustrate this argument and probe its plausibility, I reconstruct France's successful efforts to obtain UNSC approval for its interventions in Côte d'Ivoire (2002–2003) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003) at a time when the United States was hesitant to support France because of the two countries’ falling-out over the Iraq War. For evidence I rely on original interviews with senior French and US officials.


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