scholarly journals Education and the task of deconstructing the history of ontology

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 2082-2093
Author(s):  
Paulo Eduardo Lopes da Silva

Throughout the history of Ontology, the comprehension of Being has often deviated from its original path and taken different directions. What are the consequences of this detour when it comes to the current conception about the phenomenon we call Education? From the Fundamental Ontology of Martin Heidegger until the considerations of other contemporary thinkers, this article proposes an involvement and commitment regarding the task of deconstructing the history of Ontology in order to enable an approach that unveils the most original essence of Education as παιδεία. This is the challenge that concerns all those who somehow confront the questions related to everydayness and the possibility of Dasein to find its truth even in face of the dictatorship of the ‘they’ (das Man). Therefore, the aim of these reflections is to offer a new and introductory perspective that can open a horizon of projects in which we become transparent to ourselves in our resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).

Author(s):  
◽  
VALTERS ZARIŅŠ ◽  

Book review focuses on two books by Gunther Neumann, dedicated to the thought of Heidegger and Leibniz. If one of the books deals specifically with the understanding of freedom in both of the two philosophers, then the other one deals more with Heidegger’s three approaches to Leibniz’s thought: (1) Interpretation of Leibniz in the context of the making of fundamental ontology and in Being and Time, as well as the reading of Leibniz after Being and Time; (2) Interpretation of Leibniz during the transition to Ereignis thought; (3) Interpetation of Leibniz in the framework of Ereignis thought. Author’s scrupulous close reading approach allows to show the changes in Heidegger’s approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, as well as sketch out the placement of Leibniz’s great themes on the horizon of Heidegger’s history of the truth of being. Author also shows that from metaphysics there stems a certain view in the modern philosophical discussions oriented on neurosciences—a certain view on the human being and on the freedom of will. On this background Heidegger appears as a thinker who has looked beyond the alloy of metaphysics and sciences, in which the concept of freedom has been greatly restricted. Heidegger manages (thanks to the radical questioning of Being) to turn the view on the problem of freedom, which appears in G. Neumann’s books as the main problem of philosophy—through the contact of Leibniz’s thought and Heidegger’s.


Author(s):  
Bruno MOTANDI

How does the concept of being come to our mind? Where does the verb “to be” originate from the origins of speculative philosophy? Such questions raise problems about the conditions for the emergence of ontology in the history of the speculative sciences. It is historically known that the return to fundamental ontology as a science or primary philosophy in contemporary times, with Martin Heidegger, takes place under the banner of poetry. The objective of this article is to show that with Heidegger, it is certainly the being that is at the center of ontology, but this being is essentially linked to verbal and nominal poetry. From modernity, it is a question of understanding with Heidegger, that the essence of thought, beyond the representation given to it by the Moderns, is inscribed in the collecting donation of being. Hence the need to welcome the being in a thought that becomes poetry.


PhaenEx ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
NANDITA BISWAS MELLAMPHY

In 1971, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter introduced his study of Nietzsche as an investigation into the history of modern nihilism in which “contradiction” forms the central thread of the argument. For Müller-Lauter, the interpretive task is not to demonstrate the overall coherence or incoherence of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but to examine Nietzsche’s “philosophy of contradiction.” Against those such as Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith and Martin Heidegger, Müller-Lauter argued that contradiction is the foundation of Nietzsche’s thought, and not a problem to be corrected or cast aside for exegetical or political purposes. For Müller-Lauter, contradiction qua incompatibility (not just mere opposition) holds a key to Nietzsche’s affective vision of philosophy. Beginning with the relationship between will to power and eternal recurrence, in this paper I examine aspects of Müller-Lauter’s account of Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction specifically in relation to the counter-interpretations offered by two other German commentators of Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and Karl Löwith, in order to confirm Müller-Lauter’s suggestion that contradiction is indeed an operative engine of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed contradiction is a key Nietzschean theme and an important dynamic of becoming which enables the subject to be revealed as a “multiplicity” (BGE §12) and as a “fiction” (KSA 12:9[91]). Following Müller-Lauter’s assertion that for Nietzsche the problem of nihilism is fundamentally synonymous with the struggle of contradiction experienced by will to power, this paper interprets Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction in terms of subjective, bodily life (rather than in terms of logical incoherences or ontological inconsistencies). Against the backdrop of nihilism, the “self” (and its related place holder the “subject”), I will argue, becomes the psycho-physiological battlespace for the struggle and articulation of “contradiction” in Nietzsche’s thought.  


Author(s):  
Julio Quesada

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?


2021 ◽  
Vol - (3) ◽  
pp. 138-148
Author(s):  
Vlada Anuchina

The aim of the paper is to justify the view of Martin Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a recon- ceptualization and modification of Edmund Husserl’s concept of experience (Erfahrung). The subject of analysis is Heidegger's concept “Dasein”, which is one of the most problematic concepts of the entire Heidegger's legacy due to ambiguity of its meaning and the resulting variability of possible interpretations. Specific attention is paid to examining the ontological reading of Heidegger's philosophy as opposed to both existentialist and anthropological ones; the author also textually argues for its legitimacy. Author textually proves that Dasein indeed is a modification of Husserl`s concept of experience. Moreover, she claims that not only the concept of Dasein but fundamental ontology itself may be seen to some extent as an original modification of Husserl’s phenomenology. For not only one of the key phenomenological concepts gets modified, but also its method of exploration and some crucial topics (e. g. the temporality of consciousness) get modified and incorporated in Heidegger’s fundamental ontology project.


Author(s):  
Udo Reinhold Jeck

Abstract It is a great loss to philosophy that Heraclitus’s writing was lost in antiquity, for the surviving fragments rarely contain more than one sentence. Often, they are succinct but concise statements that contain little text. So, when one succeeds in augmenting important fragments with a few words or illuminating their context, there is progress in Heraclitus research. Sometimes, however, this requires recourse to lineages outside the Greek-Latin tradition. An example of this is provided by fragment 123, which has played an important role since its discovery in the Orationes of Themistius: in the 20th century, Martin Heidegger used it several times for his idiosyncratic interpretation of Heraclitus and the philosophy of the Pre-Socratics. However, he did not consider that an Armenian variant of this fragment had become available at the beginning of the 19th century. This Armenian variant derives from a treatise of Philo of Alexandria which has only been transmitted in Armenian and offers more text than the Greek version. As Diels-Kranz did not include this Armenian source in their edition of The Fragments of the Pre-Socratics, this Armenian variant fell into oblivion and was not known to Heidegger either. Now this article, after introductory remarks on the transmission of Heraclitus’s sayings in Themistius and Philo’s Heraclitea, focuses on the history of the Armenian version of fragment 123 and its primary interpretations. It concludes with a reconstruction of the remarks which Ferdinand Lassalle dedicated to this fragment in both its Greek and Armenian versions in 1858.


Author(s):  
Kurt Flasch

Abstract In his later thought, Martin Heidegger disclaimed the possibility of a philosophical history of philosophy. In his view, the history of philosophy tends to remain bound to a specißc philosophical orientation and offer merely a philosophical position, not philosophy itself, presenting at best nothing more than an assemblage of doctrinal positions. In contrast, Heidegger developed in his early Freiburg lectures of 1919-1923 an historical-phenomenological program of philosophical history directed against the historical school of Dilthey, whose objekthi-storisch perspective he meant to replace with his own vollzugshistorisch method. For Heidegger, there is no perfected subject at the basis of historical investigation, but rather it is the temporality of the observer which makes possible historical knowledge in the ßrst place. Heidegger's later abandonment of this notion is a significant reason for the lack of a philosophical approach to writing the history of philosophy after 1945 in Germany.


2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Hurych

Abstract Authenticity is usually understood as something similar to truth, or as a kind of ability of one “to be oneself”. However, for the philosophical approach, authenticity presents a more complex and complicated term. This conception has been followed in existentialism and fundamental ontology, where it has been examined and analyzed in depth (especially by Martin Heidegger). This paper deals with the search for some potentiality of the authentic modus of being through the practice of some forms of sport tourism. We selected and described four model types of sport tourism activities. Then, we designed and selected some factors of authenticity. The evaluation of authenticity within the selected activities according to the factors was applied in a two-round process of evaluation. The results of the process are explained and discussed. In conclusion, authenticity is presented as a concept that is not strongly influenced by outer settings, but is rather strongly connected with personal attunement and individual (or group) perception of the outer world.


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