scholarly journals Managing Two-Echelon Remanufacturing Under Patent Protection

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 565-577
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Hui Wen
Keyword(s):  
Patent Protection ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
New Products ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Core Components ◽  
Second Period

Abstract We propose a two-echelon remanufacturing model in the context of two periods in which the factor of patent protection of the original manufacturer is considered. Through the analysis of the Stackelberg game among the supplier, the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer we obtain the equilibrium solutions of the unit patent licensing fee of the original manufacturer, the recycling effort degree of the remanufacturer, the wholesale price of new and remanufactured core components and the retail price of new and remanufactured products in the second period which are all dependent on the retail price of new products in the first period in cases with patent protection and without patent protection. In the numerical study we analyze the impacts of the remanufacturing rate of used products and the retail price of new products in the first period on the equilibrium results of the second period, and make a comparison between the case with patent protection and the case without patent protection.

Managing new and remanufactured products with remanufacturing degree under patent protection

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 707-731
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Xianjia Wang ◽  
Hui Wen
Keyword(s):  
Negative Correlation ◽  
New Products ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Second Period

Purpose This paper aims to propose a two-period model, including an original manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer, in which the products manufactured by the original manufacturer are patent-protected and the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products influences the purchasing decisions of consumers. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyzes the decisions of the original manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party remanufacturer of two periods, using Stackelberg game and obtains the equilibrium solutions of the three parties. Findings The study finds that consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. Originality/value (1) Consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. (2) The remanufacturing action efficiency of the third-party remanufacturer has a positive correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale and retail prices of new products in the second period.

Decision Models of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information with Demand Disruption

2010 ◽  
Vol 143-144 ◽  
pp. 773-781
Author(s):  
Xin Rong Jiang ◽  
Yong Chao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Production Quantity

This paper studied the influence of asymmetric information and demand disruption on the decision of the supply chain. We analyzed the supply chain decision models based on a Stackelberg game under normal circumstances and demand disruption situation. The conclusion indicates when the market demand is disrupted, the optimal wholesale price, the retail price, the supplier’s expected profit and the supply chain system’s expected profit change in the same direction as the demand disruption, while the optimal production quantity and the retailer’s profit both have certain robustness under disruption. Finally we gave a numerical example to illustrate our analysis.

scholarly journals Equilibrium decisions on pricing and innovation that impact reference price dynamics

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Shaokun Tao ◽  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Suresh P. Sethi ◽  
Xiuli He ◽  
Yu Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Steady State ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Interactive Effect ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Price Ratio ◽  
Reference Prices ◽  
Consumer Memory

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Previous studies have confirmed that reference prices play an essential role in consumer purchasing decisions, and some researchers have suggested that reference prices are positively influenced by innovation. Therefore, we construct an interactive effect of innovation and reference price to study their combined impact on supply chain decisions. We model a supply chain, where a manufacturer determines the innovation level and the wholesale price while the retailer controls the retail price, as a dynamic Stackelberg game. We show that the interactive effect causes the steady-state wholesale and retail prices to increase, thus motivating the manufacturer to increase innovation investment. We see that the retail price and the level of innovation increase in reference price effect whereas they decrease in consumer memory. The centralized firm has a higher steady-state innovation level and innovation/price ratio and lower steady-state retail price compared to the decentralized supply chain. Consumers also benefit from the interactive effect as well as from centralization. Finally, we use numerical analysis to demonstrate our results and offer some managerial implications.</p>

scholarly journals CSR Remanufacturing Supply Chains under WTP Differentiation

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2197
Author(s):  
Lili Dai ◽  
Tong Shu ◽  
Shou Chen ◽  
Shouyang Wang ◽  
Kin Keung Lai
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Corporate Social

With the shortage of global resources and the call for sustainable development, the remanufacturing supply chain and the corporate social responsibility of enterprises have attracted extensive attention from scholars. This paper studies a manufacturer-retailer corporate social responsibility (CSR) remanufacturing supply chain in which the manufacturer collects the used products grounded in the willingness to pay (WTP) differentiation. Different from previous literature, this paper first adds WTP differences to the CSR remanufacturing supply chain. Next, we analyze the manufacturer exhibiting CSR activity by Stackelberg game theory in both centralized and decentralized models with a consideration of prices, recycling, consumer surplus, and profits for the chain players in the two models with different CSR ratios. Through calculation and analyses of the models, we note that the chain members have the best status when the consumers’ WTP for new and remanufactured products is within a threshold. Subsequently, we compare the optimal price decisions and the expected profits in the decentralized and centralized systems, and we find that the retail price, wholesale price, and recycling rate decrease with a rising CSR under WTP differentiation. The centralized retail price is lower than the decentralized one. Conversely, the profit is higher when the increment of demand is higher. On top of that, in common cases, the pure and total profits of manufacturing are ascending while the retailer’s profit is descending. We also find that the consumer surplus is increasing in two cases. Finally, to motivate the players in the supply chain to engage in CSR activity, we consider the revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of WTP differences, this paper studies CSR remanufacturing, which has certain influences on the sustainable development of the economy.

scholarly journals Selection of Recycling Channels and Product Eco-Design with Take-Back Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 8961
Author(s):  
Shiqi Xu ◽  
Hui Liu ◽  
Guangye Xu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Take Back ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Selection Of

The influence of government policies on the selection of recycling channels has been widely discussed, but there are few studies from the perspective of product Eco-design. This paper examines the recycling channel options for a manufacturer applying Eco-design under government environmental regulation. We consider a system that includes a retailer, a manufacturer, and a government, and develop a three-stage Stackelberg game model. The government firstly decides whether to impose environmental regulations. Next, the manufacturer decides whether to recycle by himself or delegate the recycling task to the retailer, deciding both the wholesale price of the product and the collected price (recycled by the manufacturer) or the recycling compensation to the retailer (recycled by the retailer), and the retailer decides the retail price of new products and the collection price (recycled by the retailer). Our study finds that for the regulator, the optimal policy is not to implement environmental regulation because the manufacturer has implemented the product Eco-design. For the manufacturer, the choice of recycling channel depends on the recycling cost of the manufacturer and the retailer. When the manufacturer’s recycling cost is below a certain threshold, he will prefer to recycle the waste products by himself, and when the cost increases beyond this threshold, the manufacturer will transfer the recycling task to the retailer.

A Strategic Analysis of Mixed Channel Structure

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaowei Linda Zhu ◽  
Xingxing Zu ◽  
Lei Zhu ◽  
Huafan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Business Model ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Retail Store ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Online Store

In order to meet the needs of different customer segments, manufacturers use multiple distribution channels. This paper will examine two of the most common types of multi-channel structures. Under Structure 1, a supply chain includes a manufacturer, its online store and its own retail store, like GAP's business model. A profit maximization model is used to obtain optimal strategies in terms of optimal retail price and level of value-added services provided by manufacturer-owned retailer. Under Structure 2, a supply chain includes a manufacturer, its online store and an independent retail store, like Dell's business model. Stackelberg game is applied to obtain the optimal retail price, wholesale price, and level of value-added services provided by an independent retailer. Furthermore, comparisons between these two business structures are discussed and managerial guidelines are proposed. Finally, numerical examples are provided and real business examples are discussed to illustrate and justify the theoretical results.

Product design and pricing strategies in a closed-loop supply chain with patent protection

Kybernetes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Xiao ◽  
Zhi-Ying Wu ◽  
Song-Ling Zhang ◽  
Zhen-Song Chen ◽  
Kannan Govindan
Keyword(s):  
Product Design ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Unit Cost ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Second Period

PurposeThis paper aims to propose a two-period model in which an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) decides the remanufacturability level of products in product design and unit patent licensing fee at the first period, and a third-party remanufacturer (3PR) that has been licensed by the OEM enters the remanufacturing market to compete with the OEM at the second period.Design/methodology/approachThis paper analyzes the OEM's optimal decisions of remanufacturability level in the product design and unit patent licensing fee at the first period, as well as the OEM's and the 3PR's optimal decisions of selling prices at the second period, under two scenarios that the remanufacturing is constrained or unconstrained by the collected quantity available at the end of the first period, by making use of game theory.FindingsThe study finds that the OEM will choose high remanufacturability in product design only when the unit cost saving of remanufacturing or unit production cost of new products exceed certain thresholds.Originality/valueThe study is the first attempt to simultaneously integrate product design and patent licensing in remanufacturing. It provides useful insights for OEM managers who face competition from 3PRs and may use their product design strategies to deter 3PRs and may protect patent of products by levying patent licensing fees from 3PRs.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design: Risk Neutrality vs. Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Risk Neutral

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.

Supply Chain Decisions Considering Heterogeneous Consumer Greenness Preference and Reservation Utilities

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
YuHang Zhang ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Willingness To Pay ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
Reservation Utility

This article focuses on how the prices set by supply chains and the product greenness level changes when there exists a difference for consumers in both their greenness preference and their reservation utility for the common product with minimal greenness, based on a two-dimensional model which is built and the market is partitioned into four groups. In this study, the authors use the Stackelberg game model to analyze the decisions of a two-stage supply chain, providing environmentally friendly products affected by a consumer greenness preference which is represented by the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for product greenness. The authors found that manufacturers may lower the product greenness level with the decrease of the valuation of consumer's WTP for product greenness, but he may prefer keeping the same product greenness, he will even improve it, when there is a reduction in reservation utility for the traditional product. Moreover, this article shows that there is different impact for different combinations of both WTP for product greenness and product greenness level (different market segmentations) on price decisions of the manufacturer and retailer. In consideration of the asymmetric information about consumer's utility and willingness to pay between manufacturer and retailer, the authors introduce the bargaining power into the study, and then they conclude that during the different market segmentations, the wholesale price and retail price go down as a retailer strengthens his bargaining power, and increasing sales volume can improve profit to make up for a loss in retail price.

scholarly journals Is Patent Enforcement Efficient

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley ◽  
Robin C. Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Technology Transfer ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Social Interest ◽  
New Products ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
The Social ◽  
The World ◽  
Patent Enforcement ◽  
The Creation

Traditional justifications for patents are all based on direct or indirect contribution to the creation of new products. Patents serve the social interest if they provide not just invention, but innovation the world would not otherwise have. Non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) as well as product-producing companies can sometimes provide such innovation, either directly, through working the patent or transferring technology to others who do, or indirectly, when others copy the patented innovation. The available evidence suggests, however, that patent licensing demands and lawsuits from NPEs are normally not cases that involve any of these activities. Some scholars have argued that patents can be valuable even without technology transfer because the ability to exclude others from the market may drive commercialization that would not otherwise occur. We demonstrate that even if various commercialization theories can sometimes justify patent protection, they cannot justify most NPE lawsuits or licensing demands.

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