scholarly journals ROZWÓJ INSTYTUCJI TRUSTU W PRAWIE SZKOCKIM

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Aleksander Stępkowski

Development of the Law of Trusts in ScotlandSummaryThe earliest indisputable traces of trusts law in Scotland may be found in reports from the first half of the XVH‘h century. There are several examples of even earlier dispositions to which a fiduciary character might be ascribed, coming from the XV,h and XVTh centuries. Nevertheless, we are not able to state categorically that these represent examples of trusts, since there is nothing about priority of beneficiary's rights in respect to trust property, before trustee’s personal creditors, whereas it seems to be today differentiam specificam discerning trust from contractual relations.According to the aforementioned case law, the main subject of trust dispositions was land (immoveable property, called in Scotland “heritable”). The main issue giving rise to legal controversies was the question of the manner in which the existence of a trust in land was allowed to be proved. The rules of evidence adopted by the Court of Session differed substantially from those of Scottish land law which were usually applied when proving titles in land. According to Scottish institutional writers, it seems to be most probable that the reason for such a favourable standing of land being subject to trust was that the Court of Session proceeded on the ground of its’ nobile officium, extraordinary equitable jurisdiction performed by this court, most probably since the very early stages of it’s activity, on the basis of a statutory provision from 1540.During the XVIIth century the first statutory regulations concerning trusts appeared, but more substantial progress in this respect took place in the XIXth century. Most often, it was statutory implementation of earlier common law principles and, in relation to trustees’ competences, of standards relating to the professional drafting of trust deeds. XIXth century legislation was consolidated in 1921 as the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 which was subsequently amended in 1961 and, together with the British Trustee Investments Act 1961 (which is still in force in Scotland although will be repealed soon, as it was already done in England in 2001), is partial codification of Scottish trusts law. Nevertheless it should be emphasised that Scottish trust law is still principally based on case law.As regards the influence of English Equity on the development of the Scottish law of trusts, it seems to be negligible in the early stage of the latter’s development. A considerable influence of the Chancery Court’s cases upon Scots law in respect of trusts only began in the fourth decade of the XIXth century, with a book by Charles Forsyth ( The Principles and Practice o f the Law o f Trusts and Trustees in Scotland (1844)), who had used intensively English case law as an illustration, he claimed, of Scottish law principles. Since this publication, nevertheless, English case law, as exposed in English textbooks, though not necessarily in the Chancery Reports, became an important source of inspiration for Scottish lawyers writing books on this subject and, subsequently, it was also used in the Court of Session as an important source of authority. Notwithstanding the above, Scottish judges were always more critical and generally have applied English principles in a less willing manner than has been seen from Scottish advocates and solicitors. Generally speaking, the English influence, although considerable, has not changed the very construction of Scottish trusts law. A beneficiary’s claim in respect of trust property is still considered to be a personal right, as opposed to a sui generis right in real estate.Contemporary Scottish jurisprudence considers trust property as a trustee’s special patrimony, distinct from his general patrimony and, as such, not accessible by his personal creditors. In this way, the Scots have worked out a civil law approach to trust, which was long considered to be hardly possible. This is also a reason why Scottish trusts law, as well as the whole of Scottish law, attracts so much attention from lawyers from Continental Europe.

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Alisdair D J MacPherson

This article contains a doctrinal analysis of floating charges and trust property in Scots law. It uses the dual patrimony approach of trust law to interpret the floating charge's creation, attachment and enforcement, and thereby demonstrates that it is not possible under the current law to effectively charge property held by a company in trust. The application of the dual patrimony theory provides a broader foundation for explaining the current legal position and helps to integrate the floating charge into wider Scots law. The article also diagnoses issues that would need to be resolved if the law were to be successfully reformed to enable the charging of trust property. It shows that there are some ways in which the current law could facilitate such reform but that, in other respects, more substantial changes would be required.


Author(s):  
Tyler Lohse

This essay comments on the nature of the language of the law and legal interpretation by exam- ining their effects on their recipients. Two forms of philosophy of law are examined, legal positiv- ism and teleological interpretive theory, which are then applied to their specific manifestations in literature and case law, both relating to antebellum slave law. In these cases, the slave sustains civil death under the law, permissible by means of these legal interpretive strategies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


Author(s):  
Masami Okino

This chapter discusses the law on third party beneficiaries in Japan; mostly characterized by adherence to the German model that still bears an imprint on Japanese contract law. Thus, there is neither a doctrine of consideration nor any other justification for a general doctrine of privity, and contracts for the benefit of third parties are generally enforceable as a matter of course. Whether an enforceable right on the part of a third party is created is simply a matter of interpretation of the contract which is always made on a case-by-case analysis but there are a number of typical scenarios where the courts normally find the existence (or non-existence) of a contract for the benefit of a third party. In the recent debate on reform of Japanese contract law, wide-ranging suggestions were made for revision of the provisions on contracts for the benefit of third parties in the Japanese Civil Code. However, it turned out that reform in this area was confined to a very limited codification of established case law.


Author(s):  
Aruna Nair

This chapter examines the law governing the availability of claims to traceable proceeds. It argues that the language used in the case law—which uses the terminology of property rights and of fiduciary relationships—cannot fully explain the law, since such claims are often available in the absence of fiduciary duties and are not available to holders of many types of property right. It argues that such claims instead presuppose a relationship of ‘control of assets’: where the defendant has a legal power to deal with some asset, correlating to a vulnerability to a loss of rights in that asset on the part of the claimant, and coupled with a duty not to exercise the power. It argues that relationships that have this formal structure also share normative characteristics that justify the subordination of defendant autonomy that has been shown to be at the heart of the tracing concept.


Author(s):  
Hillary A. Sale

This chapter uses corporate law as a case study to evaluate the content of the fiduciary duty of good faith. Tracing its development from Van Gorkom through to the present, the chapter shows how good faith, though part of the duty of loyalty, has become a gap filler, policing the space between generally exculpated breaches of care and the more obvious breaches of loyalty. This chapter also surveys good faith case law to show the most common “red flags” for which corporate officers and directors should be monitoring. An analysis of two of the most recent good faith cases—City of Birmingham and In re Wells Fargo—show how the theory of publicness can be used to predict future good faith developments. Finally, the chapter ends by showing that the duty of good faith’s expansion into trust law parallels its corporate development by emphasizing its gap-filler function.


2021 ◽  
pp. 138826272110049
Author(s):  
Victoria E. Hooton

The role of proportionality and individual assessments in EU residency and welfare access cases has changed significantly over the course of the last decade. This article demonstrates how a search for certainty and efficiency in this area of EU law has created greater uncertainty, more legal hurdles for citizens, and less consistency in decision-making at the national level. UK case law illustrates the difficulty faced by national authorities when interpreting and applying the rules relating to welfare access and proportionality. Ultimately, the law lacks the consistency and transparency that recent CJEU case law seeks to obtain, raising the question of whether the shift from the Court's previous, more flexible, case-by-case approach was desirable after all.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-488
Author(s):  
Thomas M.J. Möllers

AbstractThe Europeanisation of domestic law calls for a classical methodology to ‘update’ the established traditions of the law. The relationship between European directives and national law is difficult, since directives do apply, but European legal texts need to be implemented into national law. Whilst directives are not binding on private individuals, there is no direct third-party effect, but only an ‘indirect effect’. This effect is influenced by the stipulations of the ECJ, but is ultimately determined in accordance with methodical principles of national law. The ECJ uses a broad term of interpretation of the law. In contrast, in German and Austrian legal methodology the wording of a provision defines the dividing line between interpretation and further development of the law. The article reveals how legal scholars and the case-law have gradually shown in recent decades a greater willingness to shift from a narrow, traditional boundary of permissible development of the law to a modern line of case-law regarding the boundary of directive-compliant, permissible development of the law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN BUIJSEN

Abstract:The Dutch Euthanasia Act seems to be set in stone. Since it took effect in 2002, it has not seen any significant amendments. Recent developments, however, indicate that a major component of the act—the review procedure—is due for revision. The review practice of the regional euthanasia review committees—responsible for applying and interpreting the law—now also extends to instances of euthanasia and assisted suicide for special categories of patients: psychiatric patients, patients with early-stage dementia, and patients whose suffering is derived from a combination of medical and existential causes. In this article, it is argued that a reconsideration of the review practice for these new cases is necessary primarily because review committees lack the legitimacy needed for the development of policies with such a large impact on society.


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