scholarly journals Redressing the Harms of Government (In)Action: A Section 7 Versus Section 15 Charter Showdown

2013 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Koshan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Winning Strategy ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Community Services ◽  
Government Action ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Scant Attention ◽  
The Government

When considering the recent Charter claims of vulnerable individuals seeking to redress the harms of government action or inaction, there are two related trends in the appellate case law on sections 7 and 15 that merit attention.1 First, the Supreme Court has undertaken new approaches to equality rights under section 15(1) and 15(2) of the Charter, with a marked lack of success of claims in spite of (or perhaps because of) these approaches. The cases of Kapp,2 Withler,3 and Cunningham4 will be discussed in Part II as illustrations of this trend, along with cases where section 15 was given scant attention, such as Hutterian Brethren,5 AC v Manitoba,6 and Fraser.7 Second, there has been relative success of Charter claims under section 7 where there is strong evidence of harm to life, liberty or security of the person in circumstances where the government action was arbitrary, grossly disproportionate, or overbroad. In Part III, the cases of PHS Community Services,8 Adams,9 and Bedford10 will be shown to reflect this trend.11 These cases present an opportunity to discuss whether section 7 holds advantages over section 15 as a tool for disadvantaged persons challenging the harms of government (in)action, which will be addressed in Part IV. I conclude that while framing government harms as violations of life, liberty or security of the person may be a winning strategy for some Charter claimants, not all such harms can be presented in those terms, and the particular harms captured by section 15 must be given their due.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

¿Gracia vs. Justicia? El control contencioso-administrativo del indulto a partir de la Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 20 de noviembre de 2013

2014 ◽  
pp. 2935-2984
Author(s):  
Miren Jasone URKOLA IRIARTE
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Action ◽  
The Third ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Administrative Jurisdiction

LABURPENA: Auzitegi Gorenari indultu partzialaren gaian Gobernuak garatutako jardunaren izaera juridikoa zehazteko aukera eman dio bere Hirugarren Salaren Osokoak 2013ko azaroaren 20an adostutako Epaiak. Izaera juridiko hori oinarritzat harturik, administrazio-auzien jurisdikzioak gara dezakeen kontrola aztertuko du ondoren: bereziki, elementu arautuen teknikaren bidez gauza dezakeena [LJren 2(a) art.]. Eremu honetan, Indultu Legeari buruz Auzitegi berak egin izan duen interpretazioa iragazi, eta joera berria ezarriko du, gai berean jarraian argitaratutako epaietan berretsia dirudiena. RESUMEN: La Sentencia del Pleno de la Sala Tercera del Tribunal Supremo de 20 de noviembre de 2013 ofrece al Tribunal Supremo la oportunidad de precisar la naturaleza jurídica de la actuación del Gobierno en materia de indulto, para analizar posteriormente la extensión del control practicable en sede contencioso-administrativa, de modo especial, a través de la técnica de los elementos reglados [art. 2(a) LJ], un ámbito en el que tamiza la lectura de la Ley de Indulto que venía realizando el propio órgano judicial. Marca, así, una nueva tendencia que parece confirmada en sentencias posteriores. ABSTRACT: The judgment by the Third Section plenary of the of the Supreme Court from November 20th of 2013 gives the Supreme Court the chance to establish the legal nature of the Government action regarding the pardon, in order to analyze subsequently the extension of the control to be carried out by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, specially by means of the technic of the regulated elements [art. 2(a) LJ], a field where it weights up the reading of the Act of Pardon that used to do the same judicial body. It marks therefore a new tendency that seems to be confirmed in later judgments.

scholarly journals Expansion of the Objects of State Administrative Disputes after the Enactment of Law Number 30 of 2014 Concerning Government Administration and Supreme Court Regulation Number 2 of 2019 Concerning Guidelines for the Resolution and Authority to Adjudicate Unlawful Conducts by Government Agencies or Officials (Onrechtmatige Overheidsdaad / OOD)

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 383
Author(s):  
Sonyendah Retnaningsih ◽  
Disriani Latifah Soroinda Nasution ◽  
Heryna Oktaviani ◽  
Muhammad Rizqi Alfarizi Ramadhan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
The State ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Government Action ◽  
Government Administration ◽  
State Administration ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government

Historically, State Administrative Court (PTUN) has existed since 1986, with the enactment of Law Number 5 of 1986 concerning State Administrative Court which currently has been amended by Law Number 9 of 2004 concerning Amendment to Law Number 5 of 1986 concerning State Administrative Court and amended again by Law Number 51 of 2009 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 5 of 1986 concerning State Administrative Court. The role of the Administrative Court according to the explanation of the law, the PTUN functions as a control or supervisory agency thus legal actions from government officials do not deviate, in addition to protecting the rights of citizens from the actions of officials who abuse their authority or act arbitrarily. Currently, the object of dispute and can be sued at the State Administrative Court is only a State Administration decision reduced by the exceptions stipulated in Article 2 and Article 49 of the PTUN Law. The provisions of Article 3 of the Administrative Court Law No. 5 of 1986 on negative fictitious could potentially no longer be enforced since the enactment of Article 53 of the AP Law which stipulates positive fictitious. Since the promulgation of Law Number 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration (hereinafter referred to as AP Law) on 17 October 2014, there has been a change in the legal criteria from the government written stipulation (beschikkingen) which was initially restrictive and can be sued to the PTUN, yet it has recently become extensive (which was originally mere beschkking, currently it almost covers all variations of besluiten). With the enactment of the AP Law, there will be an expansion of absolute competence and objects of state administration disputes, as stipulated in Article 87 of the AP Law which includes: first, Government Administration Decrees, as stipulated in Article 1 point 7 of the AP Law; second, Government Administration Actions Based on Article 1 point 8 of the AP Law. Furthermore, with the enactment of the Supreme Court Regulation Number 2 of 2019 concerning Guidelines for Government Action Dispute Resolution and the Authority to Adjudicate Unlawful Conducts by Government Agencies and/or Officials (onrechtmatige overheidsdaad / OOD), the judicial power shall transfer from the General Court to the State Administrative Court. This crucial matter continues to be the groundwork and reason for conducting the current research entitled the expansion of the state administration dispute object after the enactment of Law Number 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration and the supreme court regulation (Perma) Number 2 of 2019 concerning Guidelines for Government Action Dispute Resolution and Authority to Adjudicate Unlawful Conducts by the Government Agencies and/or Officials (onrechtmatige overheidsdaad / OOD). Conducted through normative juridical research method, this research-based paper examined the interviews through judges at PTUN Jakarta and Bandung and the main data source within this qualitative analysis serves as the secondary data or literature data.

The Practice and Case Law of Israel in Matters Related to International Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 803-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem M. Giladi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
District Court ◽  
Sovereign Immunity ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Suit ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Government

The case of the Canadian ambassador's residence has been the subject of several court decisions at various instances in Israel. These decisions (as well as others relating to the doctrine of sovereign immunity) have been reviewed in former issues of this section. On June 3, 1997, the Supreme Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, gave its judgment in this case and delineated the application of the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity in Israeli law. In a different case decided on the last day of 1996, the Tel-Aviv District Court was required to rule on the applicability of this doctrine to a civil suit brought against the government of the United States of America. This District Court decision now needs to be examined in light of the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in theEdelsoncase.

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

Summary of Results

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Trademark Law ◽  
Intellectual Property Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
Networked Economy

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...

The UK courts and EU law post-Brexit

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.

scholarly journals The Constitution as a Code of Honor

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Faith Commitment ◽  
The Government

This article argues that the Senate’s refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court should be deemed unconstitutional. The Senate’s stonewalling disrespected the institutional needs of the judiciary, violated the constitutional norm of forbearance in the exercise of power, and assumed a Senate role in the appointments process that was never intended. Although no court would ever enjoin a recalcitrant President to make a nomination or an obstructionist Senate to meet with, deliberate over, or vote on a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court or anything else, the President’s and the Senators’ oaths to “support the Constitution” should be understood as entailing a good faith commitment to enabling the government to function.

scholarly journals Life After Bilski

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Real World ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
District Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Abstract Ideas ◽  
New Applications

In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court declined calls to categoricallyexclude business methods - or any technology - from the patent law. It alsorejected as the sole test of subject matter eligibility the FederalCircuit’s deeply-flawed "machine or transformation" test, under which noprocess is patentable unless it is tied to a particular machine ortransforms an article to another state or thing. Subsequent developmentsthreaten to undo that holding, however. Relying on the Court’s descriptionof the Federal Circuit test as a "useful and important clue', the U.S.Patent and Trademark Office, patent litigants, and district courts have allcontinued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake ofBilski: no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting pointthat threatens to effectively become mandatory. In this Article, we suggesta new way to understand the exclusion of abstract ideas from patentablesubject matter. No class of invention is inherently too abstract forpatenting. Rather, the rule against patenting abstract ideas is an effortto prevent inventors from claiming their ideas too broadly. By requiringthat patent claims be limited to a specific set of practical applicationsof an idea, the abstract ideas doctrine both makes the scope of theresulting patent clearer and leaves room for subsequent inventors toimprove upon - and patent new applications of - the same basic principle.Recasting the abstract ideas doctrine as an overclaiming test eliminatesthe constraints of the artificial machine-or-transformation test, as wellas the pointless effort to fit inventions into permissible or impermissiblecategories. It also helps understand some otherwise-inexplicabledistinctions in the case law. Testing for overclaiming allows courts tofocus on what really matters: whether the scope of the patentee's claimsare commensurate with the invention’s practical, real-world contribution.This inquiry, we suggest, is the touchstone of the abstract ideas analysis,and the way out of the post-Bilski confusion.

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