The World Is Not Enough: A Political Dark Ecology

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 103-116

Timothy Morton’s dark ecology is positioned as an aesthetic and ethical study which is far removed from political theory. Although Morton touches upon actual political crises connected with global warming and on climate change skepticism and also deploys such fundamental concepts of political philosophy as territory, space, action and solidarity, he describes his approach as ontological rather than political. The author finds that dark ecology’s own foundations have been inherited from political theory. However, that does not make it inconsistent; on the contrary, under the right conditions it enables a different apprehension of both ecology and political philosophy. The author asks how politics would proceed in a world of uncertainty and proposes viewing Morton’s theory as a treatise on a political theory that addresses the problem of collective action. This is the main concept of any political philosophy out of which its description of the social order is constructed. Dark ecology denies any possibility of action by emphasizing uncertainty and the impossibility of predicting an action’s consequences, and this opens up new possibilities for conceptualizing action. It is precisely uncertainty that permits segregating action from the guilt that motivated Morton to divorce dark ecology from political philosophy. This is a narrative about the transformation of Morton the emancipator into a law-giver, about how political theory has evolved in parallel with the onset of the Anthropocene, about what will happen to the Leviathan in the age of global warming, and how to change the perception of the political from ontological categories to ethical ones.

Open Theology ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 228-235
Author(s):  
Silvana Rabinovici

Abstract This article analyses a certain philosophical (ethical and political) interpretation of “the sacred” as brought up by native world views of indigenous peoples in the American continent from a decolonial approach. Translation is used as resistance that resounds in the social-environmental struggles in our continent nowadays, particularly in Mexico. The appropriation of the term “sacred” by native peoples reveals the colonial political theory of the State. By challenging consumerism and ecological destruction, the translation of the indigenous concept of ‟sacred” into an ecological conception of intrinsic link between people and “nature” enables a dialogue between those cultures and the warning of modern science about global warming and the over-exploitation of the earth’s resources.


1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

Future historians of moral and political philosophy may well label our period the Age of Rights. In moral philosophy it is now widely assumed that the two most plausible types of normative theories are Utilitarianism and Kantian theories and that the contest between them must be decided in the end by seeing whether Utilitarianism can accommodate a prominent role for rights in morality. In political philosophy even the most bitter opponents in the perennial debate over conflicts between liberty and equality often share a common assumption: that the issue of liberty versus equality can only be resolved (or dissolved) by determining which is the correct theory of rights. Some contend that equal respect for persons requires enforcement of moral rights to goods and services required for the pursuit of one's own conception of the good, while others protest that an enforced system of ‘positive’ rights violates the right to liberty whose recognition is the essence of equal respect for persons. The dominant views in contemporary moral and political philosophy combine an almost unbounded enthusiasm for the concept of rights with seemingly incessant disagreement about what our rights are and which rights are most basic. Unfortunately, that which enjoys our greatest enthusiasm is often that about which we are least critical.My aim in this essay is to take a step backward in order to examine the assumption that frames the most important debates in contemporary moral and political philosophy – the assumption that the concept of a right has certain unique features which make rights so especially valuable as to be virtually indispensable elements of any acceptable social order.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 368-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertrand de Jouvenel

One of the major obstacles to the progress of political theory lies in the fact that people speak of rights without paying attention to the feasibility of their exercise. I propose to raise here some elementary problems relating to the right of speech. It is one of the basic tenets of our democratic political philosophy that all people (over a given age) have an equal right of speech. Making this right operational however gives rise to difficulties which have not been faced.I shall start out with a very simple problem, which moreover has the advantage of evoking familiar pictures: this is the chairman's problem. I find myself chairman of an assembly, and regard all participants as formally equal, which commits me to treating them equally. Feeling bound by this principle, I decide as follows: the duration of the meeting is m, the number of participants n: I shall give the floor to each participant for a time m/n; thus the equal right of speech will receive practical application. Assume that the meeting is to be crowned by a vote (the time of actual voting not figuring in m): before the participants cast their equal votes, they will have had equal opportunities to influence the voting, i.e., they shall have had, insofar as depends upon me, equal voices.Now if m the duration of the meeting (in speaking time) is three hours, and if n the number of participants is 12, my procedure is susceptible of being applied: it grants the floor to each participant for a quarter of an hour. This is not a long time but still it may be enough.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Alessandro Ferrara

InRousseau and Critical Theory, Alessandro Ferrara argues that among the modern philosophers who have shaped the world we inhabit, Rousseau is the one to whom we owe the idea that identity can be a source of normativity (moral and political) and that an identity’s potential for playing such a role rests on its capacity for being authentic. This normative idea of authenticity brings unity to Rousseau’s reflections on the negative effects of the social order, on the just political order, on education, and more generally, on ethics. It is also shown to contain important teachings for contemporary Critical Theory, contemporary views of self-constitution (Korsgaard, Frankfurt and Larmore), and contemporary political philosophy.


Adrian Desmond & James Moore, Darwin . London: Michael Joseph, 1991. Pp. 808, £20.00. ISBN 0-3403-3 In Britain, as in much of Europe, the early and mid-19th century was a period of great social, political and intellectual turbulence. The industrial revolution was transforming the countryside, crowding the cities and disrupting the social order at all levels. The right to govern, long assumed by the duo of church and aristocracy, was being challenged. In 1848 Europe erupted in a cluster of radicalist revolutions and, though in Britain the threat of Chartism came to nothing, radical political thinking was taking root and would culminate, as the century progressed, in the ascendancy of Liberalism and the birth of the labour movement. In philosophy and religion, freedom of thought and discussion was rampant: questions once taboo as heresy were openly discussed (in 1880 Northampton was to elect an avowed atheist as its M.P.); utopian, evangelist and spiritualist groups abounded; developments in Natural Philosophy (which we now call science) were followed with enthusiasm, not only by naturalists, but by non-scientific intellectuals and (more surprising to us today) by the press and its now widely based readership.


2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-464
Author(s):  
Luka Brkic

This paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective. In contrast to most other literature, which fails to take into account geographical factors, it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements. Another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners. Accepting social integration might also be a condition for admitting those countries to the agreement. Changes of trade policy over time can therefore be explained by changes in the relative political influence of the sectors considered. The other important factors are, of course, a change in the degree of retaliation, leading to lower tariffs under higher retaliation, and a leveling of social standards. Redistribution across countries could also considerably change the optimal rate of tariff. The EU with its regional cohesion funds might be a good example of how those are used as a side-payment for diminishing the social divergence in the member countries. Countries with higher standards should only be willing to integrate when others raise their social standards as well. The negotiations about the social protocol in the EU indicate that this is in fact the case. More than 40 years of European integration have led to an habituation of thinking of the European Community as something ideologically neutral, which transcends normal political debate. European issues, it seems, do not fit the structure of the usual right-left ideological controversy. The only open fault-line in European politics is between advocates of "more" and those of "less" integration. The paper explores the potential cognitive and political gains of a change of perspective. It argues that the issue of more or less integration is often not interesting in itself but only to the degree that it influences the content of policies. It further shows that the policies at stake are normally such, that they can be usefully debated in the right-left framework. The decision about the site of policy control - national or European - is often only the guise in which a decision about the redrawing of the boundary between market and state, between the sphere of competitive allocation and the sphere of political coordination, materializes. This paper aimed at stressing the fundamental differences between conventional and contractarian constitutional orders. To achieve it, we have used the concept of common knowledge and have related it to its political philosophy background, especially with regard to communication and induction. The former generates a spontaneous social order - it is an evolutionist view that belongs to the Hume - Menger - Hayek tradition. The latter produces a contractarian vision shared by the Brennan-Buchanan-Tullock tradition. We consider here a basic distinction between institutions and conventions. An institution is considered as a formal, explicit rule, while a convention appears to be a tacit, implicit agreement. The former can be associated with contractarian constitutionalism, whereas the latter is related to evolutionism. In this context, institutions should not be understood as formalized conventions (such as law in Hayek). They are rather the expression of a voluntary and deliberate agreement, of a covenant. The application describes features relevant to the development of a European constitution and the corresponding unified legal system. It requires a clear vision of what a European "state" is meant to be or become. Then, once a constitutional setting is chosen, one must address the question of legal organization, in particular the nature of administrative law. Two different acceptation of law are thus associated with the two concepts of convention and contractarian institution. The former can be regarded as customary rule a kind of common knowledge that emerges from tradition and sympathy. By contrast, the latter is the place of explicitly created common knowledge. If it is to become more integrated, Europe will have to tackle this constitutional question, either in an evolutionary or in a contractarian way.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elijah Tukwariba Yin ◽  
Peter Atudiwe Atupare

This paper argues that it is not the prison rules and regulations that alter the behaviour of inmates but rather the ideological justification of their religious faith. The article draws upon the social constructionist theory of reality to underpin the discussion of the data. Data was gathered through in-depth interviews and the distribution of semi structured questionnaires. When analysed, the data revealed that although inmates had the right to practice the precepts of their religious faith as defined in law, in practice, these religious rights were not entirely observed. The partial recognition of these rights divulges that the principle of humane treatment underpinning the respect for rights in prison was ignored and reduced to mere formal respect for rules. Besides, the data disclosed that inmates rarely attributed the change in their personality to the impact of prison rules and regulations, but rather to the transformative power of their religion.


This consists of eight papers in political philosophy that were presented at the Sixth Annual Workshop for Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, at the University Pavia, Italy, in June 2018. In Part I: Rights and Wrongs, Kimberley Brownlee analyses how wrongs can create new rights. Zofia Stemplowska argues that it is possible to mitigate some past injustices done to those who are no longer alive. Japa Pallikkathayil develops an account of how our bodily rights constrain the right to free speech. In Part II: Immigration and Borders, Valeria Ottonelli defends the right to stay where one lives, on the basis of the right to control one’s body and one’s personal space. Nils Holtug argues that the equality required by justice has global scope and that open borders can be expected reduce global inequality. Johann Frick argues that special relationships among members of a group (e.g. one’s compatriots) cannot justify strong forms of partiality, unless the boundaries of this group can also be justified. In Part III: Other Matters, Christian List and Laura Valentini argue that the normative facts of political theory belong to a higher—more coarse-grained—level than those of moral theory and that, consequently, some questions that moral theories answer are indeterminate at the political level. Aart van Gils and Patrick Tomlin explore the issue whether weaker claims can be aggregated in order to collectively defeat stronger claims, and they focus on the limited aggregation view, according to which this is sometimes, but not always so.


Author(s):  
Martin H. Geyer

The years after the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty on 28 June and the adoption of the Weimar Constitution on 11 August 1919 were dominated by inflation, which culminated in hyperinflation in 1923 and resulted in a currency reform. The republic mastered severe political crises such as the Kapp putsch in 1920, upheavals, and hyperinflation. At the same time, political life remained almost permanently in post-revolutionary crisis mode, suffering from both internal and external uncertainties, including reparations, which played a major role. Between 1919 and 1923, the government changed eight times. In particular, the year 1923 was marked by economic, political, and social states of emergency. After the political revolution in November 1918, inflation proved to be a revolution of a different kind, which contemporaries saw as crisis of the social order, but also as the expression of destructive modernity.


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