scholarly journals Theoretical explanations of hybridization process of governance with evolutionary game, multiple optima, and path dependence

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 28-39
Author(s):  
Hideki Takei
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
International Governance ◽  
Hybrid Mode ◽  
Stable Mode ◽  
Transition Mode ◽  
Governance Mode ◽  
Hybrid Governance

While a hybrid governance mode has been considered as a transition mode, this consideration has been inappropriate in the current observations of hybrid modes that would be potentially a long-term stable mode. In addition, theoretical explanations of the traditional hybrid mode have lost explanatory powers since convergence ideas and assumptions have been rejected in the international corporate governance. This paper is a first challenge for theoretical explanations of the current emergences of new hybrid modes and hybridizations. While there are four phases of the hybridization, each phase would be discussed based upon evolutionary game theory, concept of multiple optima, and theory of path dependence that consider current drastic changes in international governance caused by mainly market globalizations, IT revolutions, and globalizations of shareholders.

An Analysis of Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components Using Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Simulation Calculation ◽  
The Government

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.

scholarly journals Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Genetic Interactions ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Hamilton’S Rule ◽  
Analytical Approaches ◽  
Hamilton's Rule

The evolution of social traits remains one of the most fascinating and feisty topics in evolutionary biology even after half a century of theoretical research. W. D. Hamilton shaped much of the field initially with his 1964 papers that laid out the foundation for understanding the effect of genetic relatedness on the evolution of social behavior. Early theoretical investigations revealed two critical assumptions required for Hamilton's rule to hold in dynamical models: weak selection and additive genetic interactions. However, only recently have analytical approaches from population genetics and evolutionary game theory developed sufficiently so that social evolution can be studied under the joint action of selection, mutation, and genetic drift. We review how these approaches suggest two timescales for evolution under weak mutation: (i) a short-term timescale where evolution occurs between a finite set of alleles, and (ii) a long-term timescale where a continuum of alleles are possible and populations evolve continuously from one monomorphic trait to another. We show how Hamilton's rule emerges from the short-term analysis under additivity and how non-additive genetic interactions can be accounted for more generally. This short-term approach reproduces, synthesizes, and generalizes many previous results including the one-third law from evolutionary game theory and risk dominance from economic game theory. Using the long-term approach, we illustrate how trait evolution can be described with a diffusion equation that is a stochastic analogue of the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics. Peaks in the stationary distribution of the diffusion capture classic notions of convergence stability from evolutionary game theory and generally depend on the additive genetic interactions inherent in Hamilton's rule. Surprisingly, the peaks of the long-term stationary distribution can predict the effects of simple kinds of non-additive interactions. Additionally, the peaks capture both weak and strong effects of social payoffs in a manner difficult to replicate with the short-term approach. Together, the results from the short and long-term approaches suggest both how Hamilton's insight may be robust in unexpected ways and how current analytical approaches can expand our understanding of social evolution far beyond Hamilton's original work.

scholarly journals The Impact of Penalty and Subsidy Mechanisms On The Decisions of Governments, Businesses, and Consumers During COVID-19 ——Tripartite Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuxun Zhou ◽  
Rahman Mohammad Mafizur ◽  
Khanam Rasheda ◽  
Brad R. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Virus Disease ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Initial Point ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Corona Virus ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Purpose – Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major participants in a society, the issue of this paper is how the penalty and subsidy mechanisms affect the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers during Corona Virus Disease 2019. The goal of this paper is to understand strategic selections from governments, enterprises, and consumers to maximize their respective utility during Corona Virus Disease 2019, and the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on the decisions of governments, businesses, and consumers.Design/Methodology/approach - This paper proposes a tripartite evolutionary game theory, involving governments, businesses, and consumers, to firstly analyze the evolutionary stable strategies and to secondly analyze the impact of penalty and subsidy mechanism on their strategy selection during Corona Virus Disease 2019. Thirdly, this paper uses numerical analysis to simulate the strategy formation process of governments, enterprises, and consumers in Japan and India based on their different penalty and subsidy mechanism.Findings – This paper suggests that there are four evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to the actual anti-epidemic situations of different countries in reality. We find that different subsidy and penalty mechanisms lead to different evolutionary stable strategies. If governments, enterprises, and consumers fighting the pandemic together, the government need to set a low subsidy mechanism and a high penalty mechanism.Originality/value - There are some limitations in the literature, such as long term strategies, rational hypothesis, and convergence path analysis in higher dimensional evolutionary game theory. This paper fills the gap and extends the theory of COVID-19 management theory. Firstly, this paper has important practical significance. This paper finds out the long-term equilibrium strategies of governments, businesses, and consumers under Corona Virus Disease 2019, which can provide an important theoretical and decision-making basis for pandemic prevention and control. Secondly, our paper extends the analytical paradigm of the tripartite evolutionary game theory. We extend the analysis of the dynamic process from the initial point to the convergence point and make a theoretical contribution to the development of high-dimensional evolutionary game theory.

Long-term Hydropower Pricing in the Spot Market with Evolutionary Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 103 (sp1) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
Liling Lin ◽  
Chaorong Huang ◽  
Linfeng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Spot Market

Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bicchieri ◽  
Giacomo Sillari
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Extensive Form

Game theory aims to understand situations in which decision-makers interact strategically. Chess is an example, as are firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships, and so on. In such situations, the outcome depends on what the parties do jointly. Decision-makers may be people, organizations, animals, or even genes. In this chapter, the authors review fundamental notions of game theory and their application to philosophy of science. In particular, Section 1 looks at games of complete information through normal and extensive form representations, introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. Section 2 touches on epistemic foundations and correlated equilibrium, and Section 3 examines repeated games and their importance for the analysis of altruism and cooperation. Section 4 deals with evolutionary game theory.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategies in “Main Manufacturer–Supplier” Mode Considering Technology Docking and Price Concluding under Competition Condition

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (12) ◽  
pp. 1184
Author(s):  
Ming Zhang ◽  
Jianjun Zhu ◽  
Hehua Wang ◽  
Pei Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Complex Products ◽  
Competition Condition ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Mover

This paper analyses the strategies of the substitutable suppliers competing to collaborate with a main manufacturer in “main manufacturer–supplier” (M-S) mode. In the research and development (R&D) of complex products, only one supplier can be chosen for one kind of part as a long-term collaboration partner with the manufacturer. The competition between substitutable suppliers focuses on the technology docking and price-concluding strategies. In this paper, one original supplier as the first-mover and one new supplier as the second-mover chose between the two strategies sequentially to compete for the collaborative preference of the manufacturer. We also took the delay cost brought by strategy changing into the consideration of the risks, which the suppliers and the manufacturer should prepare to share. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can conclude that the initial costs have little impact on suppliers’ making decisions, while the initial prices are correlated with both suppliers’ decision making. Results also show that hesitation and fluctuation periods exist in suppliers’ decision making, which have a relationship with existing strategy conditions, initial prices, and the cost caused by modifying the part. These results provide practical and reasonable managerial implications for M-S collaboration.

scholarly journals Cooperation Mechanism in Blockchain by Evolutionary Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jinxin Zhang ◽  
Meng Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Normal Growth ◽  
Network Games ◽  
Long Term Stability ◽  
Cooperation Mechanism ◽  
Expected Benefits

In the blockchain network, to get rewards in the blockchain, blockchain participants pay for various forms of competition such as computing power, stakes, and other resources. Because of the need to pay a certain cost, individual participants cooperate to maintain the long-term stability of the blockchain jointly. In the course of such competition, the game between each other has appeared invisibly. To better understand the blockchain design of cooperation mechanisms, in this paper, we constructed a game framework between participants with different willingness, using evolutionary game theory, and complex network games. We analyzed how the behavior of participants potentially develops with cost and payoff. We consider the expected benefits of participants for the normal growth of the blockchain as the major factor. Considering the behavior of malicious betrayers, the blockchain needs to be maintained in the early stage. Numerical simulation supports our analysis.

Wholesale-retail pricing strategies under market risk and uncertain demand in supply chain using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1178-1201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashkan Hafezalkotob ◽  
Reza Mahmoudi ◽  
Elham Hajisami ◽  
Hui Ming Wee
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Purpose Nowadays, uncertainty in market demand poses considerable risk to the retailers that supply the market. On the other hand, the risk-averse behaviors of retailers toward risk may have evolved over time. Considering a supply chain including a manufacturer and a population of retailers, the authors intend to investigate how the population of retailers tends to evolve toward risk-averse behavior. Moreover, this study aims to evaluate the effects of wholesale-retail price of manufacturer on evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the retailers. Design/methodology/approach Due to market uncertainty, a supply chain with a population of risk-averse and risk-neutral retailers was investigated. The wholesale pricing strategy is determined by a manufacturer acting as a leader, while retailers who make order quantity decisions act as followers. An integrated Cournot duopoly equilibrium and evolutionary game theory (EGT) approach has been used to model this situation. Findings A numerical real-world case study using Iran Khodro Company is analyzed by applying the proposed EGT approach. The study provides managerial insights to the manufacturer as well as retailers in developing their strategies. Results showed that risk behavior of retailers significantly affects optimal wholesale/retail price, profits and ESS. In the long term, the retailers tend to have a risk-neutral behavior to gain more profit. In the short term, if a retailer choses risk-averse strategy, in the long term, it will change its strategy to obtain more profit and remain in the competitive market. Originality/value The contributions in this research are fourfold. First, ESS concept to investigate the risk-averse or risk-neutral attitudes of the retailers was used. Second, the uncertain risk behavior of the competing retailers was considered. Third, the effect of varying wholesale pricing was investigated. Fourth, the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices have been obtained by considering uncertainty demand and risk.

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