The development of new technologies also has an impact on human rights. In the previous “epochs” of global information society, it was stated that that traditional rights can be exercised online. For instance, in 2012 (and again in 2014 and 2016), the UN Human Rights Council emphasized that ‘the same rights granted to people, so to speak, in an “offline” manner, must be protected online as well’. This, in its turn, implicitly brought to the reality that the new technetronic society did not create new rights. Though, we should take into consideration that in the digital world national legislative norms that guarantee the confidentiality of personal data often do not catch up with the technological development and, thus, can’t ensure confidentiality online. Therefore, the impact of digitalization on human rights within the frames of international and national laws should be broadly analysed and studied.
The article’s objective is to analyze the impact of new technologies on human rights in the context of the right to be forgotten and right to privacy. Because the development of new technologies is more closely linked to the security of personal data. With the formation of the right to be forgotten, it is the issue of ensuring the confidentiality of certain contents of personal data as a result of the influence of the time factor.
The authors conclude that, the right to be forgotten was previously defended more in the context of the right to privacy. However, they cannot be considered equal rights. The right to be forgotten stems from a person’s desire to develop and continue his or her life independently without being the object of criticism for any negative actions he or she has committed in the past. If the right to privacy contains generally confidential information, the right to be forgotten is understood as the deletion of known information at a certain time and the denial of access to third parties. Thus, the right to be forgotten is not included in the right to privacy, and can be considered an independent right. The point is that the norms of the international and national documents, which establish fundamental human rights and freedoms, do not regulate issues related to the right to be forgotten. The right to be forgotten should be limited to the deletion of information from the media and Internet information resources. This is not about the complete destruction of information available in state information systems.
Another conclusion of authors is that the media and Internet information resources sometimes spread false information. In this case, there will be no content of the right to be forgotten. Because the main thing is that the information that constitutes the content of the right to be forgotten must be legal, but after some time it has lost its significance. The scope of information included in the content of the right to be forgotten should not only be related to the conviction, but also to other special personal data (for example, the fact of divorce).
The media victimisation of the defendant through the violation of the presumption of innocence