scholarly journals Re-Thinking the World with Neutral Monism:Removing the Boundaries Between Mind, Matter, and Spacetime

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 551
Author(s):  
Michael Silberstein ◽  
William Stuckey

Herein we are not interested in merely using dynamical systems theory, graph theory, information theory, etc., to model the relationship between brain dynamics and networks, and various states and degrees of conscious processes. We are interested in the question of how phenomenal conscious experience and fundamental physics are most deeply related. Any attempt to mathematically and formally model conscious experience and its relationship to physics must begin with some metaphysical assumption in mind about the nature of conscious experience, the nature of matter and the nature of the relationship between them. These days the most prominent metaphysical fixed points are strong emergence or some variant of panpsychism. In this paper we will detail another distinct metaphysical starting point known as neutral monism. In particular, we will focus on a variant of the neutral monism of William James and Bertrand Russell. Rather than starting with physics as fundamental, as both strong emergence and panpsychism do in their own way, our goal is to suggest how one might derive fundamental physics from neutral monism. Thus, starting with two axioms grounded in our characterization of neutral monism, we will sketch out a derivation of and explanation for some key features of relativity and quantum mechanics that suggest a unity between those two theories that is generally unappreciated. Our mode of explanation throughout will be of the principle as opposed to constructive variety in something like Einstein’s sense of those terms. We will argue throughout that a bias towards property dualism and a bias toward reductive dynamical and constructive explanation lead to the hard problem and the explanatory gap in consciousness studies, and lead to serious unresolved problems in fundamental physics, such as the measurement problem and the mystery of entanglement in quantum mechanics and lack of progress in producing an empirically well-grounded theory of quantum gravity. We hope to show that given our take on neutral monism and all that follows from it, the aforementioned problems can be satisfactorily resolved leaving us with a far more intuitive and commonsense model of the relationship between conscious experience and physics.

2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-140
Author(s):  
Slobodan Perovic

Philosophers have substantially considered the key ideas of Neutral Monism, a philosophical view attempting to overcome the Mind/Body problem, as it was initially developed by Ernst Mach and Bertrand Russell. Yet similar ideas are also found in some key considerations of a few prominent physicists who developed quantum mechanics, although philosophers have neglected them. We will show that Niels Bohr?s principle of complementarity (of the particle and wave aspects of microphysical phenomena) is a gradually developed and experimentally motivated account very close to Russell?s and Mach?s key ideas on Neutral Monism.


2020 ◽  
Vol IV (4) ◽  
pp. 249-265
Author(s):  
Matvey Sysoev

This paper is an introduction to William James' philosophy of mind and is intended to prepare the reader for his work “How Two Minds Can Know One Thing”. The views of William James on three topics in the philosophy of mind are considered: panpsychism, neutral monism, and combination problem. There is a very deep connection between the modern analytical philosophy of mind and the philosophy of this author. A variety of neutral monism, to which James adhered, is analyzed, including the problem of neutrality of substance. Neutral monism in practice does not provide complete independence of a substance from mental and physical properties, and therefore neutral monism may tend to panpsychism if we are not talking about its idealistic varieties. The author concerns the relationship between panpsychism and neutral monism as two approaches to the combination problem. James's panpsychism is analyzed in terms of modern classification. Paper selectively considers individual episodes in James's philosophy in which he adhered to such panpsychism varieties as panexperientialism and panqualityism. The following is a question of the influence of James's combination problem on his philosophy as well as on modern analytical philosophy of mind. At different periods of time, James took, at first glance, mutually exclusive viewpoints on these issues. It is shown that the analysis of James's concept, taking into account the modern development of panpsychism, allows seeing an additional internal consistency in his systematic consideration of the phenomenon of consciousness.


Author(s):  
Christopher Mole

Attention is a contentious topic, partly because the nature of attention itself is disputed, and partly because there are open questions about attention’s explanatory relations to several other philosophically puzzling phenomena. One of the phenomena to which attention seems somehow to be related is consciousness. Commonsense psychology suggests that if you pay attention to one sequence of events while ignoring another then you should expect the one sequence, but not the other, to figure prominently in your conscious experience. It therefore seems that there must be some connection between attention and consciousness. But there is controversy about how close this connection is, and controversy about whether the connection is essential, or is a contingent consequence of the way in which our brains happen to work. Some theorists, especially in the field of psychology, think that the connection between attention and consciousness is very close indeed, so that the two phenomena are really the same thing, or are the result of the same processes. Some think that attention is at least necessary for consciousness, so that only the things to which we pay attention can figure in our consciousness. Others think that consciousness is necessary for attention, so that paying attention to something requires one to be conscious of it. Yet others think that attention and consciousness exert an influence on one another, but that there are no necessary connections between them. Related to this controversy about the connection between attention and consciousness is an older controversy, concerning the connection between attention and free will. Writers such as William James suggest that the direction of attention is what produces the experience of freely willed agency. This suggestion has some intuitive force, since the clearest cases of freely willed action, and of deliberate, rationally-executed thought, are cases in which the one who acts is paying attention. The responses that we make when not paying attention are, in contrast, experienced as rather automatic. It might therefore be that an understanding of attention can help us to understand free will and the exercise of rationality, but it is unclear whether elucidating the relation of attention to free will would gives us any sort of explanation of free will. As before, it is unclear whether the relationship between these two phenomena is a necessary one. Two further philosophical puzzles to which attention has been thought to be related are about how words get their meanings and about how we can come to have warranted beliefs about the minds of others. In connection with the puzzle about word meanings, some philosophers have claimed that attention figures in the explanation of reference, and that it has a particularly central role in determining what is being referred to when we use demonstrative expressions like ‘this’ and ‘that’ and ‘there’. Others (notably Wittgenstein) deny that the attending/referring relation provides us with a route by which reference can be explained. In connection with the puzzle about the minds of others, there is an established view among developmental psychologists that an infant’s ability to respond to its mother’s attention provides the first step towards the development of an understanding of what the mother is thinking. Some philosophers have adopted this idea as possibly providing an explanation of how the mental states of others can be known. In each of these cases attention seems to be somehow related to a puzzling and philosophically important phenomenon, but in each case the nature and import of the relationship is unclear. It is particularly unclear to what extent articulating the role of attention in these phenomena can provide us with a philosophically satisfying explanation of them.


Author(s):  
Leemon B. McHenry

What kinds of things are events? Battles, explosions, accidents, crashes, rock concerts would be typical examples of events and these would be reinforced in the way we speak about the world. Events or actions function linguistically as verbs and adverbs. Philosophers following Aristotle have claimed that events are dependent on substances such as physical objects and persons. But with the advances of modern physics, some philosophers and physicists have argued that events are the basic entities of reality and what we perceive as physical bodies are just very long events spread out in space-time. In other words, everything turns out to be events. This view, no doubt, radically revises our ordinary common sense view of reality, but as our event theorists argue common sense is out of touch with advancing science. In The Event Universe: The Revisionary Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead, Leemon McHenry argues that Whitehead's metaphysics provides a more adequate basis for achieving a unification of physical theory than a traditional substance metaphysics. He investigates the influence of Maxwell's electromagnetic field, Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum mechanics on the development of the ontology of events and compares Whitehead’s theory to his contemporaries, C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell, as well as another key proponent of this theory, W. V. Quine. In this manner, McHenry defends the naturalized and speculative approach to metaphysics as opposed to analytical and linguistic methods that arose in the 20th century.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Maria M. Kuznetsova

The article examines the philosophy of Henri Bergson and William James as independent doctrines aimed at rational comprehension of spiritual reality. The doctrines imply the paramount importance of consciousness, the need for continuous spiritual development, the expansion of experience and perception. The study highlights the fundamental role of spiritual energy for individual and universal evolution, which likens these doctrines to the ancient Eastern teaching as well as to Platonism in Western philosophy. The term “spiritual energy” is used by Bergson and James all the way through their creative career, and therefore this concept should considered in the examination of their solution to the most important philosophical and scientific issues, such as the relationship of matter and spirit, consciousness and brain, cognition, free will, etc. The “radical empiricism” of William James and the “creative evolution” of Henry Bergson should be viewed as conceptions that based on peacemaking goals, because they are aimed at reconciling faith and facts, science and religion through the organic synthesis of sensory and spiritual levels of experience. Although there is a number of modern scientific discoveries that were foreseen by philosophical ideas of Bergson and James, both philosophers advocate for the artificial limitation of the sphere of experimental methods in science. They call not to limit ourselves to the usual intellectual schemes of reality comprehension, but attempt to touch the “living” reality, which presupposes an increase in the intensity of attention and will, but finally brings us closer to freedom.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Escotet Espinoza

UNSTRUCTURED Over half of Americans report looking up health-related questions on the internet, including questions regarding their own ailments. The internet, in its vastness of information, provides a platform for patients to understand how to seek help and understand their condition. In most cases, this search for knowledge serves as a starting point to gather evidence that leads to a doctor’s appointment. However, in some cases, the person looking for information ends up tangled in an information web that perpetuates anxiety and further searches, without leading to a doctor’s appointment. The Internet can provide helpful and useful information; however, it can also be a tool for self-misdiagnosis. Said person craves the instant gratification the Internet provides when ‘googling’ – something one does not receive when having to wait for a doctor’s appointment or test results. Nevertheless, the Internet gives that instant response we demand in those moments of desperation. Cyberchondria, a term that has entered the medical lexicon in the 21st century after the advent of the internet, refers to the unfounded escalation of people’s concerns about their symptomatology based on search results and literature online. ‘Cyberchondriacs’ experience mistrust of medical experts, compulsion, reassurance seeking, and excessiveness. Their excessive online research about health can also be associated with unnecessary medical expenses, which primarily arise from anxiety, increased psychological distress, and worry. This vicious cycle of searching information and trying to explain current ailments derives into a quest for associating symptoms to diseases and further experiencing the other symptoms of said disease. This psychiatric disorder, known as somatization, was first introduced to the DSM-III in the 1980s. Somatization is a psycho-biological disorder where physical symptoms occur without any palpable organic cause. It is a disorder that has been renamed, discounted, and misdiagnosed from the beginning of the DSMs. Somatization triggers span many mental, emotional, and cultural aspects of human life. Our environment and social experiences can lay the blueprint for disorders to develop over time; an idea that is widely accepted for underlying psychiatric disorders such as depression and anxiety. The research is going in the right direction by exploring brain regions but needs to be expanded on from a sociocultural perspective. In this work, we explore the relationship between somatization disorder and the condition known as cyberchondria. First, we provide a background on each of the disorders, including their history and psychological perspective. Second, we proceed to explain the relationship between the two disorders, followed by a discussion on how this relationship has been studied in the scientific literature. Thirdly, we explain the problem that the relationship between these two disorders creates in society. Lastly, we propose a set of intervention aids and helpful resource prototypes that aim at resolving the problem. The proposed solutions ranged from a site-specific clinic teaching about cyberchondria to a digital design-coded chrome extension available to the public.


Author(s):  
Nathan Wildman

The relationship between fundamentality and modality remains criminally underexplored. In particular, there are several significant questions about fundamentality’s modal strength that remain unanswered. For example, if something is fundamental is it necessarily so? That is, could something be fundamental in one possible world and derivative in another? And how would the acceptance of contingent fundamentality square with commitments to contingentism (or, for that matter, necessitism) about the existence of the fundamentalia? Chapter 14 makes some headway towards addressing these questions. It does so by exploring the contingent fundamentality thesis, according to which it is possible that something is possibly fundamental and possibly derivative. In this way, the chapter represents a starting point for examining broader issues about the relationship between fundamentality and modality.


Author(s):  
Michael Silberstein ◽  
W.M. Stuckey ◽  
Timothy McDevitt

The main thread of chapter 4 introduces some of the major mysteries and interpretational issues of quantum mechanics (QM). These mysteries and issues include: quantum superposition, quantum nonlocality, Bell’s inequality, entanglement, delayed choice, the measurement problem, and the lack of counterfactual definiteness. All these mysteries and interpretational issues of QM result from dynamical explanation in the mechanical universe and are dispatched using the authors’ adynamical explanation in the block universe, called Relational Blockworld (RBW). A possible link between RBW and quantum information theory is provided. The metaphysical underpinnings of RBW, such as contextual emergence, spatiotemporal ontological contextuality, and adynamical global constraints, are provided in Philosophy of Physics for Chapter 4. That is also where RBW is situated with respect to retrocausal accounts and it is shown that RBW is a realist, psi-epistemic account of QM. All the relevant formalism for this chapter is provided in Foundational Physics for Chapter 4.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1744 (3) ◽  
pp. 032176
Author(s):  
Man Zhang ◽  
Yunfei Wu ◽  
Hongyun Cui ◽  
Ju Cheng

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