scholarly journals Behavioral influences on strategic interactions outcomes in game theory models

Author(s):  
Marija Kuzmanovic

Traditional decision-making models assume the full rationality of all actors. Nevertheless, the practice has shown that the behavior and choices of actors are influenced by many factors such as motives, beliefs, opinions, personal and social preferences, as well as cognitive biases. Moreover, it has already been proven that people have limitations in their ability to collect relevant information and respond to them, i.e. they are bounded rational. All this has contributed to the development of behavioral models in many disciplines including game theory. This paper provides a detailed review of the literature regarding behavioral models of strategic decision making. Bounded rationality and other cognitive biases in the strategic interactions are illustrated through the findings of numerous experimental studies.

Author(s):  
Jose Rascão ◽  

This article investigates the main concepts and activities of information,while it is in the strategic decision-making system, treated by literature. Since information has become the source of value of the global economy for organizations, information plays a key role in contributingto the development oforganizations' performance by selecting business-relevant information. The relationship between strategic information management and business activities contributes to the strategic decision-making processfor a more effective and efficient decision-making process. Understanding the importance of information as a strategic resource in the management of organizations is becoming more important for strategists, than the formulation ofstrategic models,of industrial society. In the 21st century no Manager will be able to define and implement the strategy successfully, without a basic understanding of information for strategic decision making.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chae M. Jaynes ◽  
Thomas A. Loughran

Objectives: We examined the relationship between social preference game behavior and offender status and tested whether this relationship was attributed to genuine prosocial preferences or confounded by individual differences in future orientation, sensation seeking, and risk-taking. Methods: Offender and nonoffender samples played the dictator and ultimatum games. Ordered and generalized ordered logistic regression models were used to test the hypothesis that when compared to nonoffenders, offenders would demonstrate increased self-interest, while also considering competing theoretical mechanisms. Results: Offenders appeared to be more self-interested as indicated by smaller offers in the dictator game. This relationship, however, was attributed to differences in future orientation between the two groups rather than differences in social preferences. Net of demographic controls and competing theoretical mechanisms, however, offenders made smaller offers in the ultimatum game. We argue this finding revealed differences in strategic decision-making between the two groups. Conclusions: Results suggested that offenders were not distinguishable from nonoffenders by individual differences in social preferences. While nonoffenders made larger offers in both games, this finding was attributed to differences in temporal orientation and risk-taking rather than differences in prosocial preferences. This supported the rational choice assumption of self-interest and highlighted differences in strategic decision-making between offenders and nonoffenders.


Author(s):  
Antonio Juan Briones Penalver

This chapter investigates the main concepts and activities of information in strategic decision-making systems. Since information became the global economy value source for organizations, information assumes a key role in contributing to the development of the performance of organizations through the selection of relevant information for businesses. The relationship of the strategic management of information with business activities contributes to the process of strategic decision making for more effective and efficient decisions. The understanding of the importance of information as a strategic resource in the management of organizations is becoming more important to strategists than the formulation of strategy models of industrial society. In the twenty-first century, no manager will be able to set and implement the strategy successfully without a basic understanding of information for strategic decision making.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (8) ◽  
pp. 335-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
AP Marco

How the controversial study of strategic decision-making plays out in our profession.


Author(s):  
Heiko Rauhut

Game theory analyzes strategic decision making of multiple interdependent actors and has become influential in economics, political science, and sociology. It provides novel insights in criminology because it is a universal language for the unification of the social and behavioral sciences and allows deriving new hypotheses from fundamental assumptions about decision making. This chapter first reviews foundations and assumptions of game theory, basic concepts, and definitions. This includes applications of game theory to offender decision making in different strategic interaction settings: simultaneous and sequential games and signaling games. Next, the chapter illustrates the benefits (and problems) of game theoretical models for the analysis of crime and punishment by providing an in-depth discussion of the “inspection game.” The formal analytics are described, point predictions are derived, and hypotheses are tested by laboratory experiments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of theoretical and practical implications of results from the inspection game.


Author(s):  
Han Smit ◽  
Thras Moraitis

This chapter develops a framework for assessing the value generated by both the option-like and competitive characteristics of an acquisition strategy. The conceptual approach is based on real options and principles from game theory. It illustrates the approach with an example of how real options and games thinking were used in strategic decision making at a major pharmaceutical company. The method treats an acquisition strategy as a package of corporate real options actively managed by the firm in a context of competitive responses or changing market conditions. This framework can help management answer several questions that are important for a successful acquisition strategy: How valuable are the growth opportunities created by the acquisition? How can we best sequence the acquisition options in the strategy? When is it appropriate to grow organically, and when are strategic acquisitions the preferred route? How is the industry likely to respond, and how will that affect the value of our acquisitions and future targets? The subsequent sections present a series of frameworks to address these questions.


Author(s):  
Roy Lindelauf

AbstractCommonly used game and decision theoretic models fail to explain the empirics of deterrence. This has unjustly led many theorists to criticize the (rationality and other) assumptions underpinning of such models. No serious game theorist will contend that his theoretic model will possibly take account of all the peculiarities involved in decision making and therefore be an accurate model of such situations. Games are an aid to thinking about some of the aspects of the broader situation. Game theory models prescribe what a decision maker ought to do in a given situation, not what a decision maker actually does. To maintain nuclear strategic stability, it is of paramount importance to understand the dynamical interplay between all players involved in decision making processes with regard to nuclear strategy. History has shown some progress in understanding nuclear deterrence by the use of initial game- and decision theoretic models to alleviate the burden of human cognitive biases. Since it is highly likely that (semi-)autonomous systems will in some way participate in the future nuclear strategic landscape, combined with the fact that the nuclear deterrent decision-cycle will also be based on algorithmic analysis, rational deterrence theory is and should be an integral element of strategic thinking about nuclear deterrence. That, or it might as well be game over.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 11-19
Author(s):  
K S DhanyaShankar

 Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. Game theoretic concepts apply whenever the actions of several agents are interdependent. These agents may be individuals, groups, firms, or any combination of these. The concepts of game theory provide a language to formulate structure, analyse, and understand strategic scenarios. Supermarkets are one such industry which is characterized by narrow profit margin and cut throat competition which had necessitated the need for the formulation and implementation of strategic decision. This interplay of decision making is similar to that of a game. This game of strategy can be used to test the real world theoretical implications of game theory. Thus from this context there arises the need of a study to test the game theory against the experimental evidences of real world economy and the analysis of the implications of game theory in experimental economics.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Avo Schönbohm ◽  
Tingyue Viktoria Zhang

PurposeThis research seized the COVID-19 pandemic-induced economic recession as a strategic response background to answer whether serious games (SGs) can be effectively applied to facilitate the strategic decision-making process.Design/methodology/approachThis paper develops a conceptual model and hypotheses based on the strategic formulation and SGs literature. Virtual-gamified workshops treat four companies in a quasi-experimental framework applying an action research design approach. The data were analysed triangularly from the observations, the focus group interviews and the surveys.FindingsA SG facilitates conveying conceptual recession management knowledge and structures the decision-making process. It incentivises creativity and motivation. Meanwhile, it is a tool to mitigate human errors due to cognitive biases. More importantly, it offers a new means to improve strategic decision-making adapted to different cases. The variety of game elements expands possibilities for different needs.Originality/valueThis paper creatively bridges the gap between strategic decision facilitation and serious gaming in a crisis. It contributes a conceptual model and provides practical insights into SGs mechanics for companies.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document