Language and the World. A Methodological Synthesis within the Writings of Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

1976 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 422
Author(s):  
Karsten Harries ◽  
George F. Sefler
Sincronía ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol XXV (79) ◽  
pp. 71-95
Author(s):  
Carlos Alberto Navarro Fuentes ◽  

The objective of the essay is to follow the tracks of silence philosophically, as multiplicity not reducible to unity; there are instances of silence, not silence, neither objectively nor subjectively considered; it is not an 'object' or a 'subjective experience'. Recognize the relevance of silence based on its apparent irrelevance, and, nevertheless, point out the importance that it can have in the attempt to lead to philosophical reflection and to philosophize in general what is essential in it: THINKING. The proposed path requires LISTENING to language, rather than taking for granted the immediate disposition and transparency with which the world appears to us. To do this, we will reflect on excerpts from works written by three thinkers who lived 'war' up close: Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929). This work proceeds peripathetically, alone, reflections emerge in the middle of a world that crumbles between the complexity and destruction that technique and modernity have brought. It is undertaken by welcoming resonances, sensations, representations, images, verses and musings, reflecting in the midst of daily daze. Is there a logical-grammatical silence or an ethicalmystical-liturgical silence? Is silence equivalent to an impossibility of saying or is it the result of an impossibility of saying itself, which does not say when what it most wants to say? Silence of existence or silence in the face of events that threaten to overwhelm us? Is silence silent or is being silent?


Author(s):  
Adem Olovčić

This paper focuses on language as a medium for a critique of the traditional metaphysical concepts, expressed in the philosophies of two contemporary philosophers, Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, where the language is treated as a framework for understanding the world in a multitude of its, for philosophy significant determinants. Although Heidegger, in his philosophy, was primarily concerned about the question of the being, he seeks that sense in thought, which took him away to language, as the only place where the given questions can be examined. Considering that the truth of the being cannot be expressed in everyday, linguistically and instrumentally conceived language, Heidegger will in his thought reach the language of poetry, as place were the understanding of the truth of being and its related concepts is possible. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, will focus in philosophical thought on the problems of language, which, in his philosophy, will culminate in the notion of a language game. With this term, Wittgenstein, first of all had in mind the interconnectedness of the use of language and the life practice. Still, he did not think of a language as an everyday – practical instrument of communication, but rather, as a place where linguistic definitions of language, everyday life practices and real life events meet.  In doing so, these thinkers, through their interpretations of linguistic issues, have reached a point in which is possible to understand their encounter.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 113-137
Author(s):  
Milos Sumonja

In this paper I will try to show that Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger defended conception of language as a universal medium in both phases of their work. Both philosophers believe that we are ?prisoners? of the language that we speak, so that we can not step outside of it and describe the semantic relationships of language and the world from metalinguistic point of view. For both thinkers the basic problem is of methodological nature: for, if we can not speak about the relationships between language and the world, then how can we say that we can not speak about the relationships between language and the world? I will argue: a) that the universalism of early Wittgenstein and late Heidegger is transcendentally motivated, and that they both deal with the problem of inexperessibility of semantics by invoking the language of poetry as a way to express a universalist point of view, and b) that the universalism of late Wittgenstein and early Heidegger is pragmatically motivated, and that the difference between two philosophers is that early Heidegger accepts, while late Wittgenstein rejects semantic paradox of universalism. For early Heidegger inexpressibility of semantics is evidence that there is something that eludes the ordinary language and that that something has to be grasped by use of special method, for late Wittgenstein it is the evidence that there is nothing that can not be expressed in ordinary language and that the problem of inexpressibility of semantics is a pseudo-problem.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 496-517
Author(s):  
Ned Hercock

This essay examines the objects in George Oppen's Discrete Series (1934). It considers their primary property to be their hardness – many of them have distinctively uniform and impenetrable surfaces. This hardness and uniformity is contrasted with 19th century organicism (Gerard Manley Hopkins and John Ruskin). Taking my cue from Kirsten Blythe Painter I show how in their work with hard objects these poems participate within a wider cultural and philosophical turn towards hardness in the early twentieth century (Marcel Duchamp, Adolf Loos, Ludwig Wittgenstein and others). I describe the thinking these poems do with regard to industrialization and to human experience of a resolutely object world – I argue that the presentation of these objects bears witness to the production history of the type of objects which in this era are becoming preponderant in parts of the world. Finally, I suggest that the objects’ impenetrability offers a kind of anti-aesthetic relief: perception without conception. If ‘philosophy recognizes the Concept in everything’ it is still possible, these poems show, to experience resistance to this imperious process of conceptualization. Within thinking objects (poems) these are objects which do not think.


Author(s):  
Carl Mitcham

Classic European philosophy of technology is the original effort to think critically rather than promotionally about the historically unique mutation that is anchored in the Industrial Revolution and has since progressively transformed the world and itself. Three representative contributions to this pivotal philosophical project can be found in texts by Alan Turing, Jacques Ellul, and Martin Heidegger. Despite having initiated analytic, sociological, and phenomenological approaches to philosophy of technology, respectively, all three are often treated today in a somewhat patronizing manner. The present chapter seeks to revisit and reconsider their contributions, arguing that, especially in the case of Ellul and Heidegger, what is commonly dismissed as their overgeneralizations about modern technology as a whole might reasonably be of continuing relevance to contemporary students in the philosophy of technology.


Author(s):  
Fransisca Handayani ◽  
Alvin Hadiwono

"Dwelling" basically means living in a place. However, Dwelling itself has a broader meaning when we understand how humans decided to inhabit. In the book The Nature of Order, Christopher Alexander says "Dwelling is Living-Structure" which means to live is a life participating in a living-structure. This quote directly describes a relationship between nature and humans in the process of living. Seeing the conditions that exist in the world today, there are many aspects that can affect the way humans will live in the future. One of the problems that humans have to face is climate change which causes sea level rise. Realizing that humans must face these events and know that in reality, humans cannot be separated from their natural surroundings, "The Dynamic of Adaptive Shelter" was designed with the aim of wanting to unite aspects of habitation (especially nature and humans) as well as provide solutions for buildings that are adaptive to sea level rise. Located in Kamal Muara, North Jakarta, this project begins by studying the selected site, community activities, the shape of the buildings around the site, as well as the natural characteristics around the site, as a method that refers to a quote from Martin Heidegger's book about "the thing It-self". Referring to the results of the selected site, this project is complemented with programs that are suitable for the activities of the residents of the area and have been developed with systems which can adapt to the issue of sea level rise. Keywords:  Adaptive-Dynamic; Coastal; Dwelling; Fishermen ; Sea Level Rise Abstrak“Dwelling” atau Berhuni pada dasarnya memiliki arti hidup pada suatu tempat. Namun Dwelling sendiri memiliki arti yang lebih luas saat kita memahami awal mula manusia memutuskan untuk berhuni. Dalam buku The Nature of Order Christohper Alexander mengatakan “Dwelling is Living- Structure” yang berarti berhuni adalah hidup berpartisipasi dalam Struktur-kehidupan (Living- structure). Kutipan tersebut secara langsung menggambarkan sebuah keterkaitan antara alam dan manusia dalam menuju proses berhuni. Melihat kondisi yang ada didunia saat ini banyak aspek yang dapat mempengaruhi cara manusia berhuni dimasa depan. Salah satu permasalahan yang harus dihadapi manusia adalah perubahan iklim yang menyebabkan kenaikan permukaan air laut. Menyadari bahwa manusia harus menghadapi peristiwa tersebut dan mengetahuni bahwa pada dasarnya dalam proses berhuni manusia tidak terlepas dari alam sekitarnya, “Wadah Adaptif- Dinamis” dirancang dengan tujuan ingin mempersatukan aspek-aspek berhuni (khususnya alam dan manusia) dan juga memberikan solusi akan bangunan yang adaptif akan kenaikan permukaan air laut. Berlokasi di Kamal Muara, Jakarta Utara proyek ini diawali dengan mempelajari site terpilih, aktivitas masyarakat, bentuk bangunan sekitar tapak, dan juga karakteristik alam sekitar tapak, sebagaimana metode yang mengacu pada kutipan buku Martin Heidegger tentang “the thing It-self”. Mengacu pada hasil analisis tapak terpilih, proyek ini dilengkapi dengan program-program yang sesuai dengan aktifitas penduduk daerahnya dan telah dikembangkan dengan sistem-sistem yang mana dapat beradaptasi dengan kondisi alam sekitar dan menjawa isu akan kenaikan permukaan air laut.


2019 ◽  
pp. 100-103
Author(s):  
Gro Lauvland

Our understanding of the world is manifested in what we make and produce. Through the last 250 years there has been a change in the understanding of man´s place in the world. Our way of building is characterized by market economy and controlled production processes — as if we can control everything through our consciousness. Both the given nature and what is transferred to us through history, are regarded as resources made for us. Today our understanding of the world makes the cities more and more similar. This understanding of nature and culture challenges our human conditions. As human beings, we are embedded in the place, according to both Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In line with their understanding the Norwegian architect and theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz argued, for instance in Stedskunst (1995), that it is the qualities of the place we identify with, and which makes it possible for us to feel at home.


Author(s):  
Gregory N. Siplivii ◽  

This article is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenology “Nothingness” by Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. Through research of existential phe­nomenology, the article also touches on the topic of “mood” as philosophical in­tentionality. Various kinds of “moods”, such as faintness (Verstimmung), ennui (Langeweile), burden (Geworden), inquisitiveness (Neugier), care (Sorge) and conscience (Gewissen), by Martin Heidegger’s and nausea (la nausée), anxiety (l’anxiété), dizziness (le vertige) by Jean-Paul Sartre, is considered in the context of what they may matter in an ontological sense. The phenomenologically under­stood “mood” as a general intentionality towards something is connected with the way in which the existing is able to ask about its own self. In addition, the ar­ticle forms the concept of the original ontological and phenomenological “in­completeness” of any existential experience. It is this incompleteness, this “al­ways-still-not” that provides an existential opportunity to realize oneself not only thrown into the world, but also different from the general flow of being. This “elusive emptiness” is interpreted in the article in accordance with the psychoan­alytic category of “real” (Jacques Lacan).


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