Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 443-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Gold

The concept of “soft law” in international law has been familiar for some years, although its precise meaning is still debated. A distinguished international lawyer, Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, delivered a series of lectures on International Economic “Soft Law” at the Hague Academy of International Law in 1979. The concept as applied to economic affairs is of particular interest in relation to the subject matter of this article.

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jozef Valuch ◽  
Tomáš Gábriš ◽  
Ondrej Hamuľák

Abstract The aim of this paper is to evaluate and differentiate between the phenomena of cyberwarfare and information warfare, as manifestations of what we perceive as postmodern warfare. We describe and analyse the current examples of the use the postmodern warfare and the reactions of states and international bodies to these phenomena. The subject matter of this paper is the relationship between new types of postmodern conflicts and the law of armed conflicts (law of war). Based on ICJ case law, it is clear that under current legal rules of international law of war, cyber attacks as well as information attacks (often performed in the cyberspace as well) can only be perceived as “war” if executed in addition to classical kinetic warfare, which is often not the case. In most cases perceived “only” as a non-linear warfare (postmodern conflict), this practice nevertheless must be condemned as conduct contrary to the principles of international law and (possibly) a crime under national laws, unless this type of conduct will be recognized by the international community as a “war” proper, in its new, postmodern sense.


Author(s):  
R. W. Ianni

To the impressive list of Italian periodicals on international law led by the prestigious Rivista di Diritto Internazionale there has now been added The Italian Yearbook of International Law, published exclusively in English. Italian scholars have made a very significant contribution to doctrinal developments in international law; however, some of their work has gone unnoticed because Italian is not among the languages in widespread use in international law circles. In addition, Italian scholarship has suffered somewhat from what some consider to be an overly theoretical or abstract approach to the subject matter. While it is always a noteworthy occasion to welcome a new member into the family of international law yearbooks, the advent of the Italian yearbook is particularly noteworthy, contributing as it does to the accessibility of a broad range of material and learned comment. It is appropriate, therefore, that the first issues of The Italian Yearbook of International Law receive extended comment in the pages of this Yearbook.


1942 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 614-620
Author(s):  
William Marion Gibson

In explaining the nature of international law, each of the two major schools of thought draws upon legal philosophy and practice for evidence in support of its interpretation. It is not the purpose of this note to offer any conclusions or proofs as to the validity of the reasoning of one or the other of the two schools. It would require more than the subject-matter here considered to prove the “Monist” position, or to detract from that of the “Dualist.” However, inasmuch as state practice is one of the guides to the resolution of the debate on the nature of international law, it is hoped that an explanation of the attitude of the Colombian Supreme Court concerning the relationship of pacta to the national constitution and legislation of that state may merit mention.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-489
Author(s):  
Haris Jamil

Abstract The arbitral award in The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India) brings to the fore the issue of assigning a name to a case. To contextualise India’s contention regarding the name, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, in this article, I outline the law and practice regarding assigning names to cases by different international judicial bodies (ICJ, ITLOS, WTO and PCA). Examining India’s objection to the name, I argue that the name of the case does not capture the subject matter of the dispute accurately and emanates from the mainstream view of international law. The name prioritises an Italian flagged vessel, owned by a company engaged in international commerce and navigating under the protection of the Italian navy, over a fishing vessel owned by private individuals. The name reinforces a state-centric view of international law in which the victims of the incident do not picture.


Author(s):  
Kupelyants Hayk

This chapter explores South Caucasian perspectives on the Hague Principles. The rules of private international law in all three South Caucasian countries—Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—are primarily contained in statutes: the Chapter of Private International Law in Armenia (1998) and separate statutes on Private International Law in Azerbaijan (2000) and Georgia (1998). Article 1253(1) of the Armenian Civil Code and Article 1(2) of the Azerbaijani Act provides that the courts may apply international customs in the area of private international law. In so far as the Hague Principles amount to or eventually crystallize into customary international law, the courts may give effect to the Hague Principles in that manner. Before that happens, there is nothing in the legal systems of either of the three jurisdictions preventing the courts from citing for explanatory and persuasive reasons soft law instruments, such as the Hague Principles. That said, stylistically the judgments of the South Caucasian jurisdictions are often drafted in a very concise and skeletal manner. Soft law instruments and commentary might influence the reasoning of the judges, but they would rarely refer to them in the text of the judgment.


Author(s):  
Gebremeskel Fekadu Petros

This chapter reflects on Ethiopian perspectives on the Hague Principles. Ethiopia does not have a codified law regulating matters of private international law, nor is there detailed case law from which one could derive key principles of the subject. While the shortage of private international law in Ethiopia is evident, the problem is most severe in the area of applicable law. In relation to party autonomy in choice of law, the Federal Supreme Court’s Cassation Division has handed down some interesting decisions, and these indeed have the force of law in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the approach of the Ethiopian courts in respect of party autonomy is not very developed and clear, including in the field of international commercial contracts. While it would be prudent for Ethiopian courts to refer to the Hague Principles as persuasive authority, this requires awareness of the existence of the Hague Principles. In the long term, the Hague Principles will surely find their way into Ethiopian law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 507-525
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

Abstract One of the most fascinating developments in the domain of international law in the last few decades is the astonishing proliferation of non-binding legal instruments or soft law, namely, norms or directives explicitly avoiding the imposition of legal obligations on the relevant parties. From a philosophical perspective, this is rather puzzling: how can we explain the idea of a non-binding directive or a non-binding contract? In this article I aim to provide an account of the rationale of soft law from the perspective of the practical reasons in play. First, I analyse the idea of authoritative advice, suggesting that when authorities advise their putative subjects, they purport to give the subject presumptive reasons for action. I explain what presumptive reasons are. Secondly, I suggest the possibility that something very similar is at work in cases of non-binding agreements, coupled with special accountability relations that such agreements invariably constitute.


Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C

This chapter discusses the ‘subject-matter scope’ of Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. ‘Subject-matter scope’ refers to the scope covered by a measure as regards its subject matter, that is to say the branches and areas of the law to which it applies. For the three legal instruments under consideration, the relevant provisions are contained in Article 1 of Brussels 2012 and Lugano, and Articles 1 and 2 of Hague. A review of case law shows that the distinction between a civil matter and public matter is far from straightforward. There is a significant grey area in which the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimately go either way.


Author(s):  
Torremans Paul

This chapter examines the distinction between movables and immovables under English private international law. The first task of the court in a private international law case when required to rule on the question of a proprietary or possessory nature is to decide whether the item of property in dispute is movable or immovable. The legal system that will be applicable to the case depends on this preliminary decision. This chapter first considers the classification of the subject matter of ownership into movables and immovables by the law of the situs before looking at some examples relating to mortgages, trusts for sale, and annuities. It also discusses the relevance of the distinction between realty and personalty and concludes by explaining the distinction between tangible and intangible movables.


Author(s):  
C. H. Alexandrowicz

This chapter focuses on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1974. The Charter consists of a preamble and four chapters, the most important of which are Chapter I relating to the fundamentals of international economic relations, and Chapter II on the detailed economic rights and duties of States. Chapter I contains general principles such as the sovereignty and equality of states and other principles, the adoption of which presented few difficulties to members of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). On the other hand, the provisions of Chapter II, particularly article 2, were the subject of hard bargaining in which the negotiating states had to face some of the most controversial problems of international law in the economic field.


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