Mechanisms for Party Control in the Government Bureaucracy in China

The purpose of this research is to see the open selection mechanism in the government of Bantul district. Because the success of bureaucratic reform is a part of human resources within the government bureaucracy. Therefore it is necessary to have human resource management to realize a state of civil apparatus with integrity, professionalism and competence. In this study, researchers used qualitative approach methods. Where in the technique is done in-depth interviews to get information and gather other supporting documents on this research. Human resource management could be done by structuring employees through an open selection mechanism. The Government of Bantul District has conducted an open selection in structuring employees who are in their government. Because the open selection is considered a solution in the screening of the state civil apparatus. Moreover, the Bantul Government in the open selection process uses several stages including administration selection, competency tests, interviews, and paper presentations. With the existence of several stages carried out in the open selection process by the Bantul Government, it is expected to capture and create a state civil apparatus who are professional and competent in running of bureaucracy in the government. So the existence of the state civil apparatus competent then will be influenced in its performance.

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Problematika Penerapan Sistem Omnibus Law Ke Dalam Sistem Hukum Nasional Indonesia Melalui Undang-Undang No.11 Tahun 2020 Tentang Cipta Lapangan Kerja

JOURNAL OF LEGAL RESEARCH ◽

10.15408/jlr.v2i1.19293 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2 (2) ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Ahmad Azharil

Keyword(s):

Environmental Sustainability ◽

Law System ◽

Economic Progress ◽

National Economic ◽

Legal Model ◽

Government Bureaucracy ◽

The Creation ◽

The Government ◽

Harsh Criticism ◽

Public Workers

AbstractThe obstruction of national economic growth due to the long bureaucratic process for business licensing is one of the reasons for the government to create an omnibus law concept in Indonesian Act concerning Job Creation No. 11 of 2020 (JC Act). In fact, the noble ideals outlined in the creation of the JC Act have received a lot of harsh criticism from among the public, workers, academics, and activists in the field of manpower and the environment. Some of the fundamental problems in the creation of the JC Act lie in the absence of public participation in the drafting and deliberation of the Indonesian Parilement, and one of them has the potential to damage environmental sustainability. The omnibus law of the JC Act is a legal model in countries adhering to the common law system that was born due to overcoming regulatory problems in the country caused by the number of regulatory barriers and problems in a field such as the economy. The omnibus law is the concept of simplifying the rules so that they can be implemented properly in order to create an effective, efficient, and stimulating government bureaucracy for national economic progress. Indonesia as a country based on a civil law system is not an obstacle to implementing the omnibus law concept as long as its development and application follows the provisions of the formation of statutory provisions. The concept of the omnibus law contained in the JC Act in the Indonesian national legal system has many substance problems in its articles, including the simplification of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) preparation process by not involving the community as the party whose function is to provide input and correction to the EIA initiator. This will have the potential to sustain the environment as an ecosystem that cannot be separated from people's lives.Keywords : Obstructed, Economy, Creation, Work, Environment

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Austria

10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0009 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 152-174

Author(s):

Marcelo Jenny ◽

Wolfgang C. Müller

Keyword(s):

Party Leader ◽

Policy Area ◽

Party Size ◽

Electoral Incentives ◽

Specific Policy ◽

Party Control ◽

Time Regime ◽

The Government ◽

Government Legislation ◽

New Instruments

In the Austrian parliament a strict time regime keeps the length of debates at bay. While the government sets most of the agenda, opposition parties can get some proposals debated, and new instruments provide room for debate of topics independent of government legislation and reports. Debates are under tight party control with regard to the speakers’ nomination and the speakers sticking to the party line. Individual MPs do have electoral incentives to seek speaking assignments, but for most this results in low-level satisficing rather than maximizing speaking assignments. Party-size is a crucial factor determining the floor presence: MPs belonging to a small party have better chances to speak. Within parties, individual talent of MPs as speakers and their occupation of key party functions such as parliamentary party leader, or party spokesperson in a specific policy area are crucial for nominations.

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Bringing the Low-Carbon Agenda to China: A Study in Transnational Policy Diffusion

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs ◽

10.1177/186810261304200108 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 42 (1) ◽

pp. 199-215 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Andreas Hofem ◽

Sebastian Heilmann

Keyword(s):

Opinion Leaders ◽

Policy Agenda ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Low Carbon Economy ◽

Research Institutes ◽

Transnational Actors ◽

Government Bureaucracy ◽

The Government ◽

Level Analysis ◽

Carbon Economy

This study traces the transnational interactions that contributed to introducing the low-carbon economy agenda into Chinese policymaking. A microprocessual two-level analysis (outside-in as well as inside-access) is employed to analyse transnational and domestic exchanges. The study provides evidence that low-carbon agenda-setting – introduced by transnational actors, backed by foreign funding, promoted by policy entrepreneurs from domestic research institutes, propelled by top-level attention, but only gradually and cautiously adopted by the government bureaucracy – can be considered a case of effective transnational diffusion based on converging perceptions of novel policy challenges and options. Opinion leaders and policy-brokers from the government-linked scientific community functioned as effective access points to the Chinese government's policy agenda.

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Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123408000550 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 39 (3) ◽

pp. 587-607 ◽

Cited By ~ 14

Author(s):

Manabu Saeki

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Veto Players ◽

Divided Government ◽

Substantial Impact ◽

Government Effectiveness ◽

Change Policy ◽

Party Control ◽

The Government ◽

Legislative Productivity

David Mayhew’s Divided We Govern significantly challenged the conventional wisdom of the adversarial effect of divided government on government effectiveness in the United States. While the post-Mayhewian literature has been centred on legislative productivity as a measure of gridlock, gridlock is here defined as an ‘inability to change policy’. In this study, the preferences of the legislators, such as the filibuster, override and House median veto players are plotted in Euclidean space. The analysis focuses on the influence of the area of the winset, which is an intersection overlapped by the veto players’ indifference curves. There is a substantial impact of the area of the winset on the change in policy output point, which is measured by the ADA scores and by Poole’s Mean Winning Coordinate. Yet divided government has marginal or no effect on policy swing. The conclusion is that the preferences of veto players, but not party control of the government, have a substantial impact on gridlock in the United States.

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Party will reassert control over business in China

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db229267 ◽

2018 ◽

Keyword(s):

Communist Party ◽

Chinese Communist Party ◽

Direct Control ◽

Business Decisions ◽

Content Type ◽

Foreign Companies ◽

Party Control ◽

Business In China ◽

The Government ◽

Enterprise Reforms

Subject Communist Party control over private businesses. Significance The Chinese Communist Party sees itself as a 'vanguard party'. That is, it governs by leading other social groups, including the government and private enterprise. Reforms over the years have withdrawn the government from direct control of many industries, but the Party is reasserting control behind the scenes. Impacts In the business sector, control by the state is being replaced with control by the Party; enterprise is not an independent sector. Large private sector firms such as China's ICT giants are subject to the influence and occasional control of Party groups. Party infrastructure in foreign companies is growing, and the Party may take a closer look at business decisions.

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The ‘bureaucratized’ project system: An organizational study of Chinese central governmental earmarked projects

Chinese Journal of Sociology ◽

10.1177/2057150x17719852 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 409-449

Author(s):

Puyuan Shi

Keyword(s):

Local Governments ◽

Institutional Design ◽

Chinese Government ◽

Structural Constraints ◽

System A ◽

Project Integration ◽

Government Bureaucracy ◽

The Government ◽

Organizational Study

In recent years, a proliferation of central governmental projects has been taking place within the Chinese government bureaucracy. In order for us to understand this phenomenon, we need to examine both the bureaucracy and the project system. This article proposes three key features of the project system, which tends to be temporary, goal-oriented, and flexible, as well as innovative in institutional design. A comparison of these features with the basic elements of bureaucracy shows that underneath the superficial fusion of the two systems there is unavoidable tension. Given the fact that the Chinese bureaucracy lacks structural constraints and public participation in its decision-making process, projects seldom meet the target of an appropriate supply–demand equation. Tensions are particularly manifested in two areas: (1) projects are inter-departmental and temporary in nature while bureaucracy is always rigid and insular; and (2) projects are goal-oriented and flexible while bureaucracy is rule-oriented and hierarchical. In most cases, central governmental projects have to operate within the government bureaucracy, and thus we call the system a ‘bureaucratized project system.’ In our case study, we find that the bureaucracy resists the project integration reform because its power is being threatened even though it is apparently beneficial for project operations. We are not optimistic about the future of the project integration reform as the task has now been laid upon the already over-loaded and wrongly-motivated local governments while the state bureaucracy remains all powerful.

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Big Business and the Kapp Putsch

Central European History ◽

10.1017/s0008938900000340 ◽

1971 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 99-130 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Gerald D. Feldman

Keyword(s):

Political Parties ◽

Trade Unions ◽

The Political ◽

Military Officers ◽

Short Term ◽

Big Business ◽

Government Bureaucracy ◽

The Subject ◽

The Government ◽

General Strike

The Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch, hastily begun on March 13, 1920, and ingloriusly ended with the resignation of Dr. Wolfgang Kapp on March 17, has already been the subject of significant study. The details of the putsch itself, the character of the conspirators, and their motives, the positions taken by the political parties and leaders, and the reasons for its failure are fairly Well known. It is generally agreed that the circle of conspirators had too narrow a social base and was too divided in its purposes to be successful. In essence, it was a revolt of unemployed reactionary East Elbian officials like Kapp himself and his “Minister of the Interior,” Traugott von Jagow, disgruntled conservative military officers, the most important of whom was Freiherr von Lüttwitz, and military adventurers like Colonel Max Bauer, Major Pabst, and Captain Ehrhardt. Where Kapp sought far-reaching constitutional and political changes, Lüttwitz strove for more short-term goals, i.e., reconstruction of the cabinet to give it an “expert” character, new elections, and a larger army. The Kapp regime was doomed because of the refusal of the government bureaucracy to serve it and because of the general strike called by the trade unions on March 14.

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Jesuit Scientia and Natural Studies in Late Imperial China, 1600-18001

Journal of Early Modern History ◽

10.1163/157006502x00130 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 6 (3) ◽

pp. 209-232

Author(s):

Benjamin A. Elman

Keyword(s):

Large Scale ◽

Cultural Control ◽

Early Modern Europe ◽

Late Imperial China ◽

Late Imperial ◽

Imperial Court ◽

Government Bureaucracy ◽

Tea Production ◽

Imperial China ◽

The Government

AbstractArguably, by 1600 Europe was ahead of China in producing basic machines such as clocks, screws, levers, and pulleys that would be applied increasingly to the mechanization of agricultural and industrial production. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, Europeans still sought the technological secrets for silk production, textile weaving, porcelain making, and large scale tea production from the Chinese. Chinese literati in turn, before 1800, borrowed new algebraic notations (of Hindu-Arabic origins), Tychonic cosmology, Euclidean geometry, spherical trigonometry, and arithmetic and trigonometric logarithms from Europe. Until 1990, Chinese elites and their Manchu rulers interpreted the transition in early modern Europe—from new forms of scientific knowledge to new modes of industrial power—on their own terms. Each side made a virtue out of the mutually contested accommodation project, and each converted the other's forms of natural studies into acceptable local conventions of knowledge. The Ming and Qing imperial court induced Jesuit calendrical, military, and land mensuration experts to work as imperial minions in the government bureaucracy to augment each dynasty's own project of political and cultural control. Consequently, it would be a historiographical mistake to underestimate Chinese efforts to master on their own terms the Western learning of the Jesuits in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.

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