Effects of Unitary vs. Nonunitary State Income Taxes on Interstate Resource Allocation: Some Analytical and Simulation Results

2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Williams ◽  
Charles W. Swenson ◽  
Terry L. Lease

This study examines the optimal location choice decisions of a two-state firm in response to changing state corporate income tax rates and tax structures. Because the firm can engineer its tax liability by manipulating between-state location of sales, property, and payroll, changes in relative state tax rates should result in the firm making such location changes. Results of a model firm simulation, examining various combinations of state tax rates and unitary vs. nonunitary tax structures, found that the firm would make interstate resource changes to minimize company-wide state income taxes. Important findings of the study are that tax rate changes in nonunitary states may cause little or no change in resources used in that state. Indeed, in one scenario, the resulting resource flows from a tax increase are favorable to the nonunitary state, making a tax increase a win-win situation for the state government (higher tax revenue and more economic activity). In contrast, changes in unitary state tax rates can result in significant resource changes in both the unitary state and in other states. The finding that tax rate cuts are ineffective in nonunitary states implies that these states may be more successful in attracting investment by changes affecting apportionment factors (tax credits for new capital, or new jobs) or by use of nontax incentives.

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Powell ◽  
Hui Shan

The link between taxes and occupational choices is central for understanding the welfare impacts of income taxes. Just as taxes distort the labor-leisure decision, they may also distort the wage-amenity decision. Yet, there have been few studies on the full response along this margin. When tax rates increase, workers favor jobs with lower wages and more amenities. We introduce a two-step methodology which uses compensating differentials to characterize the tax elasticity of occupational choice. We estimate a significant compensated elasticity of 0.03, implying that a 10 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate causes workers to change to a 0.3 percent higher wage job. (JEL H24, H31, J22, J24, J31)


2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 245-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan R. Smith ◽  
Philip Bailey ◽  
Harry Haney ◽  
Debra Salbador ◽  
John Greene

Abstract Federal and state income taxes are calculated for hypothetical forest landowners in two income brackets across 23 states in the Midwest and Northeast to illustrate the effects of differential state tax treatment. The income tax liability is calculated in a year in which the timber owners harvest $200,000 worth of timber. State income taxes ranged from highs of $13,427 for middle-income landowners and $18,527 for high-income landowners in Maine to no tax burden in New Hampshire and South Dakota. Calculated state and federal income taxes are based on 2004 tax regulations and rates. After-tax land expectation values calculated for a forest landowner in the Northern Lower Peninsula of Michigan illustrate the importance of tax planning on returns to a timber investment. The results support the need for adequate tax accounting.


2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-126
Author(s):  
Nathan R. Smith ◽  
Phillip Bailey ◽  
Harry Haney ◽  
Debra Salbador ◽  
John Greene

Abstract Federal and state income taxes are calculated for hypothetical forest landowners in two income brackets across 13 states in the West to illustrate the effects of differential state tax treatment. The income tax liability is calculated in a year in which the timber owners harvest $200,000 worth of timber. State income taxes range from highs of $19,693 for middle-income and $34,993 for high-income landowners in Oregon to no income tax in Alaska, Nevada, Washington and Wyoming. After-tax land expectation values for a forest landowner in Oregon are also calculated to illustrate the importance of tax planning on returns to a timber investment. The need for adequate tax accounting is supported by the results.


1999 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy R. Petroni ◽  
Douglas A. Shackelford

We hypothesize that, in their annual accounting reports, propertycasualty insurers allocate premiums from multistate policies to reduce total state taxes. To test this prediction, we exploit the industry's unique state tax disclosures. We examine firm-level data, collected from the publicly available, statutory reports filed with each state government. Reported premiums at the insurer-state level, scaled by incurred losses, are regressed on state tax measures. Consistent with tax-motivated income shifting, we find the premiumloss ratio is decreasing in state tax rates. The negative relation is greatest for insurers specializing in multistate lines of business.


1996 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
William C. Siegel ◽  
Harry L. Haney ◽  
Daniel M. Peters ◽  
Pete Bettinger ◽  
Debra S. Callihan

Abstract The structure and provisions of state income taxes are detailed for timber owners in 19 states of the Northeast and Midwest. Using 1994 federal and state income tax rules, the tax liability for a hypothetical married couple with timber sale income was calculated for two federal income tax rate brackets (medium and high income levels) for states in the Northeast and Midwest that impose an income tax. At the medium income level, the state portion of the total income tax liability ranged from 12.7% in Pennsylvania to 25.6% in Delaware. At the high income level, the state portion ranged from 11.1% in Pennsylvania to 24.9% in Minnesota. For both income levels, New Hampshire had the lowest state portion of the total tax liability when considering their business profits tax (12% for the medium and 7% for the high income level). The provision most significantly affecting state income tax liability was the tax rate schedule. Installment sales provide an alternative tax planning strategy for those timber owners who qualify as investors rather than a business and who are in the lowest federal tax bracket. Several states also impose taxes other than an income tax when timber is harvested. For example, Minnesota and New Hampshire both impose a minimum 10% yield tax on the timber's stumpage value. These levies significantly affect the total tax liability on harvest income. North. J. Appl. For. 13(1):8-15.


SERIEs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nezih Guner ◽  
Javier López-Segovia ◽  
Roberto Ramos

AbstractCan the Spanish government generate more tax revenue by making personal income taxes more progressive? To answer this question, we build a life-cycle economy with uninsurable labor productivity risk and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face progressive taxes on labor and capital incomes and proportional taxes that capture social security, corporate income, and consumption taxes. Our answer is yes, but not much. A reform that increases labor income taxes for individuals who earn more than the mean labor income and reduces taxes for those who earn less than the mean labor income generates a small additional revenue. The revenue from labor income taxes is maximized at an effective marginal tax rate of 51.6% (38.9%) for the richest 1% (5%) of individuals, versus 46.3% (34.7%) in the benchmark economy. The increase in revenue from labor income taxes is only 0.82%, while the total tax revenue declines by 1.55%. The higher progressivity is associated with lower aggregate labor supply and capital. As a result, the government collects higher taxes from a smaller economy. The total tax revenue is higher if marginal taxes are raised only for the top earners. The increase, however, must be substantial and cover a large segment of top earners. The rise in tax collection from a 3 percentage points increase on the top 1% is just 0.09%. A 10 percentage points increase on the top 10% of earners (those who earn more than €41,699) raises total tax revenue by 2.81%.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Travis Chow ◽  
Sterling Huang ◽  
Kenneth J. Klassen ◽  
Jeffrey Ng

This study examines the effects of jurisdictions’ corporate taxes and other policies on firms’ headquarters (HQ) location decisions. Using changes in state corporate income tax rates across time and states as the setting, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the HQ state corporate income tax rate increases the likelihood of firms relocating their HQ out of the state by 16.8%, and an equivalent decrease in the HQ state rate decreases the likelihood of HQ relocations by 9.1%. Exploiting the unique tax policy features within the state apportionment system lends strong support to the interpretation that taxation drives this effect. Our analyses also demonstrate that state income tax features affect the destination of the HQ move. We contribute to the literature on corporate decision making by showing how state income taxation affects a real corporate decision that has significant economic consequences for the company and the state. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 412
Author(s):  
Anindita D. Pinastika, Ferry Irawan

The pandemic of Covid-19 had attacked and contribute to the Indonesia’ economics negatively. State tax revenues could not be achieved given the restrictions on activities that were intensified to prevent the spread of virus. Incentives issued by the government are one of the factors causing the decline in state revenues, one of which is in the form of lowering corporate tax rates. The effective tax rate used in measuring corporate tax management is tested with related-parties transaction, profitability, leverage, and ownership structure variables. The effect of this variable is then compared in 2019 and 2020 to observe whether there is a difference before and during the pandemic. The research was conducted on health sector companiesas a sector that was positively affected by the pandemic. The results of the study show that leverage has an effect on the effective tax rate (ETR) in 2020 while ownership structure has an effect on the ETR in 2019. The effective tax rate of health sector companies, which allegedly decreased due to incentives from the government, has actually increased during the pandemic.


2019 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2019-055031
Author(s):  
Fatma Romeh M Ali ◽  
Ketra Rice ◽  
Xin Fang ◽  
Xin Xu

ObjectiveTo measure the association of raising the minimum legal age of tobacco sales to 21 years (T21) statewide with monthly sales of cigarette packs in California and Hawaii, the first two states to implement T21 statewide.MethodsState monthly cigarette tax revenues from state departments of taxation were analysed for 11 states from January 2014 through December 2018 (n=660). Monthly cigarette packs sold were constructed using cigarette tax revenue and cigarette tax rate in each state. A difference-in-differences regression method was used to estimate the association of statewide T21 policies with monthly cigarette packs sold in California and Hawaii, separately, compared to the western states that did not implement such policies. Both models were controlled for year–month fixed effects, cigarette tax rates, smoke-free air laws, Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation, minimum legal sales ages for e-cigarettes and state marijuana laws, in addition to state demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, race/ethnicity and population size).FindingsImplementation of T21 statewide was associated with a reduction of 9.41 (95% CI=–15.52 to –3.30) million monthly packs sold in California and 0.57 (95% CI=–0.83 to –0.30) million monthly packs sold in Hawaii, compared to regional states. These translate to a reduction of 13.1%–18.2%, respectively, in monthly packs sold relative to mean values before the implementation of T21.ConclusionsRaising the minimum legal age for tobacco sales to 21 years could reduce cigarette sales as part of a comprehensive tobacco control strategy that complements and builds on proven approaches to achieve this goal.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
David R. Agrawal

State borders create a discontinuous tax treatment of retail sales. In a Nash game, local tax rates will be higher on the low state tax side of a border. Local taxes will decrease from the nearest high-tax border and increase from the low-tax border. Using driving time from state borders and all local sales tax rates, local tax rates on the lowtax side of the border are 1.25 percentage points higher, reducing the differential in state tax rates by over three-quarters. A ten minute increase in driving time from the nearest high-tax state lowers a border town's local tax rate by 6 percent. (JEL H25, H71, H73, H77)


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