Tobacco 21 policies in California and Hawaii and sales of cigarette packs: a difference-in-differences analysis

2019 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2019-055031
Author(s):  
Fatma Romeh M Ali ◽  
Ketra Rice ◽  
Xin Fang ◽  
Xin Xu

ObjectiveTo measure the association of raising the minimum legal age of tobacco sales to 21 years (T21) statewide with monthly sales of cigarette packs in California and Hawaii, the first two states to implement T21 statewide.MethodsState monthly cigarette tax revenues from state departments of taxation were analysed for 11 states from January 2014 through December 2018 (n=660). Monthly cigarette packs sold were constructed using cigarette tax revenue and cigarette tax rate in each state. A difference-in-differences regression method was used to estimate the association of statewide T21 policies with monthly cigarette packs sold in California and Hawaii, separately, compared to the western states that did not implement such policies. Both models were controlled for year–month fixed effects, cigarette tax rates, smoke-free air laws, Medicaid coverage of smoking cessation, minimum legal sales ages for e-cigarettes and state marijuana laws, in addition to state demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, race/ethnicity and population size).FindingsImplementation of T21 statewide was associated with a reduction of 9.41 (95% CI=–15.52 to –3.30) million monthly packs sold in California and 0.57 (95% CI=–0.83 to –0.30) million monthly packs sold in Hawaii, compared to regional states. These translate to a reduction of 13.1%–18.2%, respectively, in monthly packs sold relative to mean values before the implementation of T21.ConclusionsRaising the minimum legal age for tobacco sales to 21 years could reduce cigarette sales as part of a comprehensive tobacco control strategy that complements and builds on proven approaches to achieve this goal.

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Wang ◽  
David Merriman ◽  
Frank Chaloupka

We analyze data about cigarette tax compliance from the first US-based national scale littered cigarette packs collection. We code each pack based on whether an appropriate tax had been paid at the location where it was found. Noncompliance across our 132 sample communities ranges from 0 percent to 100 percent with an appropriately weighted mean of 21 percent. We provide evidence that noncompliance is due to both cross-border shopping and cigarette trafficking. Ordinary least squares and binomial logit regressions demonstrate that the financial incentive for noncompliance is the most important explanatory variable and has a statistically and quantitatively significant impact on noncompliance. We find mixed evidence about the extent to which tax avoidance varies with distance to lower-tax borders. Our simulations show that, even after accounting for increased noncompliance, virtually all areas in our study would experience increases in tax revenue if they increased cigarette tax rates.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Soule Sow ◽  
Mesay Gebresilasse

To remedy their low fiscal capacity problem, many developing countries adopted value-added taxation because they believe it will raise tax revenue and improve the production efficiency of firms. In this paper, we study the impact of the adoption of the value-added tax (VAT) on firms by analyzing the introduction of VAT in Ethiopia in 2003 using panel data of manufacturing firms (1996-2009). By law, a firm is required to register for VAT if it is big (its revenue is higher than 500,000 Birr); otherwise, the firm is small and faces a much lower turnover tax rate. Using a difference in differences strategy with big firms as a treatment and small firms as control, and excluding firms that might potentially bunch around the threshold, we find taxes paid, reported revenue, taxes paid out of revenue, value-added, and raw materials use increase for big firms. However, the share of inputs in revenue fell suggesting VAT increased revenue efficiency by not production efficiency.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-167
Author(s):  
Arfah Habib Saragih

This research was intended to provide empirical evidences that the exemption of banks from Minister of Finance Decree Number 169/PMK.010/2015 did not raise any significant problem on banks tax avoidance which was measured by effective tax rates. Quantitative method was used in this study by conducting regression-fixed effects method on unbalanced panel data. This study found that thin capitalization in banks did not impact effective tax rates significantly. Present research also found that the banks size and profitability were other determinants of the level of tax avoidance in the banks sample. Bank size and profitability had a significant and negative effect on effective tax rate.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wanfu Li ◽  
Jeffrey A. Pittman ◽  
Zi-Tian Wang

ABSTRACT Using data obtained from a local tax office in China, we examine the determinants of corporate tax audits and the consequences of those audits. We find that the tax authority is more likely to select a firm for an audit when the firm has a lower effective tax rate, a higher book-tax difference, and more income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Applying a difference-in-differences research design, we find that after firms have been audited, they significantly increase their effective tax rates, reduce their book-tax differences, and reduce their income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Our study provides important insights on the determinants of the tax authority's decision on whether to initiate an audit and the impact of tax audits on both tax reporting and financial reporting. JEL Classifications: H26; L51; M41.


2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael G. Williams ◽  
Charles W. Swenson ◽  
Terry L. Lease

This study examines the optimal location choice decisions of a two-state firm in response to changing state corporate income tax rates and tax structures. Because the firm can engineer its tax liability by manipulating between-state location of sales, property, and payroll, changes in relative state tax rates should result in the firm making such location changes. Results of a model firm simulation, examining various combinations of state tax rates and unitary vs. nonunitary tax structures, found that the firm would make interstate resource changes to minimize company-wide state income taxes. Important findings of the study are that tax rate changes in nonunitary states may cause little or no change in resources used in that state. Indeed, in one scenario, the resulting resource flows from a tax increase are favorable to the nonunitary state, making a tax increase a win-win situation for the state government (higher tax revenue and more economic activity). In contrast, changes in unitary state tax rates can result in significant resource changes in both the unitary state and in other states. The finding that tax rate cuts are ineffective in nonunitary states implies that these states may be more successful in attracting investment by changes affecting apportionment factors (tax credits for new capital, or new jobs) or by use of nontax incentives.


2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Eaton

This paper uses a series of two-year panels of tax return data to estimate the effects of two sources of tax rate changes on the participation in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). This paper uses a panel logit approach to control for individual specific fixed effects, which may also influence IRA participation behavior. This paper examines participation during the years of open eligibility for IRAs, as well as examining the impact of the 1986 tax reform on participation. A key finding of this paper is that taxpayers' IRA participation decisions are more sensitive to changes in tax rates due to changes in taxable income than to direct changes in the tax tables.


Author(s):  
Yeti Apriliawati ◽  
Rahma Nazila Muhammad

<em><span lang="IN">The effect of changes in tax rates on income taxpayer compliance is addressed in this research. The analysis used the quantitative comparative approach and the population is the tax offices (KPP) within the scope of the Kantor Wilayah Direktorat Jenderal Pajak (Kanwil DJP) Jabar 1. The data collected using purposive sampling are secondary in the form of tax revenue reports and taxpayer compliance, which is 18 months each, before and after the regulation implemented. Descriptive statistics, normality test as well as Wilcoxon signed rank test are used to the data analysis techniques used. The renewal is the reduction to 0.5 percent of the final income tax rate that is the purpose of Law No. 23 of 2018 enactment. The finding reveals that the changes in tax rates have a significant effect on taxpayer compliance. This outcome is expected to be a consideration in future policymaking related to the tax rate.</span></em>


2021 ◽  
pp. 311-316
Author(s):  
Edward Fuller

In December 1974, the economist Art Laffer had dinner at a Washington D.C. restaurant with Jude Wanniski, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. The tax rate was so high in the United States, Laffer argued, that reducing the tax rate would increase government tax revenue. As legend has it, he drew the Laffer Curve on a napkin to illustrate how reducing the tax rate would raise tax revenue. The Laffer Curve has been a mainstay of Supply-Side Economics ever since.The Laffer Curve relates government tax revenue to the tax rate. Figure 1 is the Laffer Curve (Laffer, 2004). The x-axis shows tax revenue and the y-axis shows the tax rate. The Laffer Curve plots the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenue. As figure 1 shows, tax revenue is maximized, or optimal at RO, when the tax rate is TO. [Fig 1: LAFFER CURVE] Further, the Laffer Curve illustrates that tax revenue decreases as the tax rate rises above the optimal tax rate. For example, imagine the tax rate is suboptimal at TS. At this tax rate, government revenue is suboptimal at RS. Even though the tax rate TS is higher than TO, tax revenue RS is actually lower than RO. In this case, government can increase tax revenue by reducing the tax rate. Generally, government can increase tax revenue by lowering the tax rate whenever the economy is located on the downward sloping part of the Laffer Curve. In short, the Laffer Curve suggests that extremely high taxes are counterproductive even from the government’s own perspective.Murray N. Rothbard stressed that Laffer’s analysis contains a hidden value judgement: maximizing government tax revenue is desirable. Rothbard writes,“Laffer assumes that what all of us want is to maximize tax revenue to the government. If—a big if—we are really at the upper half of the Laffer curve, we should then all want to set tax rates at that “optimum” point. But why? Why should it be the objective of every one of us to maximize government revenue? To push to the maximum, in short, the share of private product that gets siphoned off to the activities of government? I should think we would be more interested in minimizing government revenue by pushing tax rates far, far below whatever the Laffer Optimum might happen to be” (Rothbard, 1984: 17-18; Block, 2010).Economists who use the Laffer Curve conduct their analysis with a fixed curve. However, in a progressing economy, the Laffer Curve is constantly expanding. Put differently, the Laffer Curve is always shifting to the right in a progressing economy. Advocates of the Laffer Curve fail to realize that the position of the curve is far more important than the economy’s place on a given curve.The position of the Laffer Curve depends on the stock of accumulated capital. As economists underscore again and again, capital accumulation is the only way to raise overall living standards. Ludwig von Mises writes,“there is but one method available to improve the conditions of the whole population, viz., to accelerate the accumulation of capital as against the increase in population. The only method of rendering all people more prosperous is to raise the productivity of human labor, i.e., productivity per man hour, and this can be done only by placing into the hands of the worker more and better tools and machines.” (1951: 282)Significantly, capital accumulation and hence overall living standards depend on the tax rate. As economists have known for centuries, high taxes impair capital accumulation:“If the funds which the successful businessmen would have ploughed back into productive employments are [taxed and] used by the state for current expenditure or given to people who con-sume them, the further accumulation of capital is slowed down or entirely stopped. Then there is no longer any question of economic improvement, technological progress, and a trend toward higher average standards of living” (Mises, 1955: 51).


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 36-71
Author(s):  
Pierre Bachas ◽  
Mauricio Soto

How should developing countries tax corporate income? We study this question in Costa Rica, where firms face higher average tax rates on profits when revenues marginally increase. We combine discontinuity and bunching designs to estimate the elasticity of taxable profit and separate it into revenue and cost elasticities. We find that firms faced with a higher tax rate slightly reduce revenues but considerably increase costs, thus producing a large elasticity of taxable profit of 3–5. In this context, the revenue-maximizing rate for a corporate tax on profit is below 25 percent, and we show that a tax policy that broadens the base while lowering the rate can almost double the tax revenue collected from these firms. (JEL D22, H25, H26, H32, K34, L25, O23)


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Devereux ◽  
Li Liu ◽  
Simon Loretz

We estimate the elasticity of corporate taxable income with respect to the statutory corporation tax rate using the population of UK corporation tax returns. We analyze bunching in the distribution of taxable income at kinks in the marginal rate schedule. We decompose this elasticity into an elasticity of total income with respect to the corporation tax rate, and an elasticity of the share of income taken as profit with respect to the difference between the personal and corporate tax rates. This implies a marginal deadweight cost at the £10,000 kink of around 29 percent of tax revenue. (JEL G32, H24, H25, L25)


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