Armageddon and the Gulag, 1939–1945

Author(s):  
Steven A. Barnes

This chapter focuses on the Gulag during the Armageddon of the Great Patriotic War. It shows how the institutions, practices, and identities of the Gulag shifted in accord with the demands of total war. The war was an era of mass release on an unprecedented scale side by side with the highest mortality rates in the history of the Gulag system. After four years of brutal, exhausting warfare and a disastrous initial stage, the Soviet Union emerged from its Armageddon victorious. The early postwar period offered no indication that the Gulag would cease to be a mass social phenomenon within fifteen years. Rather, the Gulag remained a pillar in the reestablishment of the Soviet system, following the Red Army into liberated territories, so that every liberated district received its own corrective labor colony. By 1944, the camp and colony population began to grow again.

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 44-66
Author(s):  
Maryna Berezutska

AbstractBandura art is a unique phenomenon of Ukrainian culture, inextricably linked with the history of the Ukrainian people. The study is dedicated to one of the most tragic periods in the history of bandura art, that of the 1920s–1940s, during which the Bolsheviks were creating, expanding and strengthening the Soviet Union. Art in a multinational state at this time was supposed to be national by form and socialist by content in accordance with the concept of Bolshevik cultural policy; it also had to serve Soviet propaganda. Bandura art has always been national by its content, and professional by its form, so conflict was inevitable. The Bolsheviks embodied their cultural policy through administrative and power methods: they created numerous bandurist ensembles and imposed a repertoire that glorified the Communist Party and the Soviet system. As a result, the development of bandura art stagnated significantly, although it did not die completely. At the same time, in the post-war years this policy provoked the emigration of many professional bandurists to the USA and Canada, thus promoting the active spread of bandura art in the Ukrainian Diaspora.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Anne E. Hasselmann

In the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet museum curators began to establish a museal depiction of the war. This article analyzes these early beginnings of Soviet war commemoration and the curtailing of its surprising heterogeneity in late Stalinism. Historical research has largely ignored the impact of Soviet museum workers (muzeishchiki) on the evolution of Russian war memory. Archival material from the Red Army Museum, now renamed the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, in Moscow and the Belarus Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk documents the unfolding of locally specific war exhibitions which stand in stark contrast to the later homogenized official Soviet war narrative. Yet war memory was not created unilaterally by the curators. Visitors also participated in its making, as the museum guestbooks demonstrate. As “sites of commemoration and learning,” early Soviet war exhibitions reveal the agency of the muzeishchiki and the involvement of the visitors in the “small events” of memory creation.


2014 ◽  
pp. 132-142
Author(s):  
T. Kuznetsova

The article is devoted to the creative work of the Soviet economist-agrarian Vladimir Grigorievich Wenger, doctor of economic sciences, the employee of Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He was not only a contemporary, but also an active participant of all the most important events of this time, having the ability to analyze and critically comprehend. Along with deep agrarian studies of collective farmers, agricultural production and rural development in the Soviet Union; that have lost their relevance at the present time, Wenger’s works contribute to the understanding of the Soviet system as a social phenomenon.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-44
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Borisov

It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Wendy Z. Goldman ◽  
Donald Filtzer

On June 22, 1941, the Nazis launched Operation Barbarossa with the mightiest military force ever concentrated in a single theater of war. They occupied large swathes of Soviet territory; surrounded Leningrad in the longest siege in modern history; and reached the outskirts of Moscow. Soviet leaders adopted a policy of total war in which every resource, including labor, was mobilized for war production. The civilian toll was great. The Soviet Union lost more people, in absolute numbers and as a percentage of its population, than any other combatant nation: an estimated 26 million to 27 million people. Almost every Soviet family was affected in some terrible way. This book is the first archivally based history of the home front to explore the relationship of state and society from invasion to liberation. Focusing on the cities and industrial towns, it shows how ordinary citizens, mobilized for “total war,” became central to the Allied victory.


Author(s):  
Len Scott

This chapter focuses on some of the principal developments in world politics from 1900 to 1999: the development of total war, the advent of nuclear weapons, the onset of cold war, and the end of European imperialism. It shows how the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union became the key dynamic in world affairs, replacing the dominance of—and conflict among—European states in the first half of the twentieth century. It also examines the ways that the cold war promoted or prevented global conflict, how decolonization became entangled with East–West conflicts, and how dangerous the nuclear confrontation between East and West was. Finally, the chapter considers the role of nuclear weapons in specific phases of the cold war, notably in détente, and then with the deterioration of Soviet–American relations in the 1980s.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (86) ◽  
Author(s):  
Serhii Papeta ◽  

A study of the work of an unknown to the general public painter middle XX century Serhii Doroshenko is currently at the initial stage. Thanks to the publication of the catalog and the holding of a personal exhibition, the process of putting part of his picturesque heritage into scientific circulation began. Today the life and professional path of the artist, as well as several dozen surviving works of the master are known and partially researched. The fact that the artist had to live under a fictitious name for most of his life makes it difficult to identify individual facts and documents. However, undoubted picturesque talent, a subtle sense of the landscape genre, put Serhii Doroshenko next to the best representatives of the landscape of his time. The return of the artist's name to the history of Ukrainian art will open another page for scholars and connoisseurs of painting. Roman Solovey was born in the village Pavlivka, Cherkasy region in 1915. During the Holodomor, Roman was arrested by the NKVD, but it is unknown how he resigned, and in 1936 he appeared as Serhii Doroshenko. According to the dates on the student card, from 1936 to 1939 he studied at the Kharkiv Art School. However, according to other documents from 1937, the young artist leads an active creative life on the opposite side of the Soviet Union in Buryat-Mongolia. He exhibits his works at the republican exhibition, works as an artist in the club. In 1939, Doroshenko, as a student of the Kharkiv Art School, was transferred to the 3rd year of the Faculty of Fine Arts of the Ukrainian Art Institute. From 1945 Doroshenko was again a student of Kyiv Art Institute and, finally, in 1948 he received a diploma of a painter. From that time until his death he worked in the Kyiv Regional Cooperative Society of Artists. In 1949 Doroshenko made his debut at the 10th Ukrainian Art Exhibition. Since then, his favorite genre - marina - has been determined. He became a regular participant in Ukrainian and Soviet Union exhibitions, where his works are exhibited along with the best examples of landscape painting of that time. In 1950, Doroshenko became a candidate for membership in the Union of artists of Ukraine, and in the registration card indicates a non-existent place in nature of his birth. He was also a member of the board of the Ukrainian branch of the USSR art fund. His life ended on May 27, 1957 due to severe heart disease.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 156
Author(s):  
Jan-Erik Lane

Most of the history of the Baltic States in the 20th century is completely dominated by their relation to the Eastern giant, the Soviet Union. What the Soviet Union represented was not only an authoritarian, and at times, totalitarian rulership but also a constant fear of the unpredictable. Two French military historians, connected with the journal Guerre et Histoire, have recently managed to go through newly opened archives in Russia to unveil the unpredictable career of the most distinguished commander of the Red Army, Gregory Zhukov. Their book entirely confirms the impression among Baltic people that the Soviet Union was fundamentally instable in the sense that anything could happen: state arbitrariness. [...]


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Alexander J. Kent

<p><strong>Abstract.</strong> As part of its secret Cold War mapping programme, the Soviet Union produced detailed plans of over 2,000 towns and cities within foreign territories around the globe. Some of these maps were made available for the first time in 1993 at the 16th International Cartographic Conference in Cologne, Germany, via a Latvian map dealer who discovered them at an abandoned depot outside Riga as the Red Army withdrew. However, Soviet city plans have only recently become the topic of cartographic research, which has provided some insights into aspects of their production, accuracy and purpose, that continue to have relevance for mapping diverse urban environments today.</p><p>This paper focuses on the city plan of Tokyo, which comprises four sheets and was produced by the General Staff of the Soviet Union in 1966. Street names are transcribed to allow phonetic pronunciation and the plan identifies almost 400 important objects (from factories to hospitals), which are described in a numbered list. Although the street-level detail of the plan is produced according to a standard specification and symbology, it adopts an uncommon scale of 1&amp;thinsp;:&amp;thinsp;20,000 (with contours at 5-metre intervals) and incorporates an unusual and transitory cartographic style in the history of the series.</p><p>In addition to highlighting the main features of the plan and exploring some possible sources, this paper interprets the wider context of the Soviet military plans of Japanese towns and cities (over 90 are known to have been mapped during the Cold War). Aside from their historical significance, it suggests how understanding the city plans can reveal how problems of the design and portrayal of detailed topographic information may be overcome through their unfamiliar, yet comprehensive, cartographic language.</p>


Author(s):  
Michael Cox

In many important ways the history of modern international relations (IR) begins at the point when the international order collapses in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, the withering of communism in Central and Eastern Europe followed by the break–up of the USSR two years later, posed what many in the field saw then (and continue to regard now) as a series of problems to which the hitherto dominant paradigm in IR—realism—had no ready or easy answers. This article neither seeks to defend nor criticize realism. Rather it shifts the debate about the end of the cold war—and why most experts failed to anticipate it—away from the field of IR to the more specific study undertaken in the West of the Soviet system. It goes on to argue that the source of so much academic embarrassment may be better explained not through a rehearsal of realism's supposed flaws as an international theory, but rather through a detailed examination of the different ways that different writers understood, or more precisely failed to understand, the operation of the Soviet system itself. The conclusion reached is that few analysts could have predicted what happened between 1989 and 1991. In fact, as the article seeks to show, their often complicated and diverse theories about the USSR as the living alternative to market capitalism led most of them (with one or two notable exceptions) to the conclusion that whatever problems faced the Soviet Union as a power in the 1980s, the system as such was likely to endure.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document