Pogrom in Gujarat

Author(s):  
Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi

In 2002, after an altercation between Muslim vendors and Hindu travelers at a railway station in the Indian state of Gujarat, fifty-nine Hindu pilgrims were burned to death. The ruling nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party blamed Gujarat's entire Muslim minority for the tragedy and incited fellow Hindus to exact revenge. The resulting violence left more than one thousand people dead—most of them Muslims—and tens of thousands more displaced from their homes. The author witnessed the bloodshed up close. This book provides a riveting ethnographic account of collective violence in which the doctrine of ahimsa—or nonviolence—and the closely associated practices of vegetarianism became implicated by legitimating what they formally disavow. The book looks at how newspapers, movies, and other media helped to fuel the pogrom. It shows how the vegetarian sensibilities of Hindus and the language of sacrifice were manipulated to provoke disgust against Muslims and mobilize the aspiring middle classes across caste and class differences in the name of Hindu nationalism. Drawing on his intimate knowledge of Gujarat's culture and politics and the close ties he shared with some of the pogrom's sympathizers, the book offers a strikingly original interpretation of the different ways in which Hindu proponents of ahimsa became complicit in the very violence they claimed to renounce.

2000 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractAfter half a century of experiment with secular politics, India has finally gone fundamentalist, preferring to be ruled by religious nationalists. This mind set among Indian voters is induced intriguing. The mandate for the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in the recent parliamentary elections is an indication that India's majority Hindus are uncomfortable with their minority Muslim counterparts. Simultaneously, the support of a section of Muslims for the BJP also questions the true nature of secularism in India. Is this behaviour an indication of erosion of faith in secular politics? In this article I explore the roots of majority-minority divide in India. I argue that the rise of Hindu nationalism is a direct response to the politically motivated pseudo-secular ideas of the Congress party that ruled 45 out of 50 years of independent India. Analysing three of the most controversial issues viz. Article 370, Uniform Civil Code and Ram temple, the article evaluates the minority loss and gain in case the BJP succeeds in implementing its policies over these. Finally, it looks into the position of Muslims in a Hindu nation.


Author(s):  
N. Rogozhina

The political development of Thailand in XXIth century is characterized by a deep split of the society into opponents and supporters of democratization. The latter are consolidated around the figure of Taksin Sinavatra, the former prime minister. He was overthrown by the military in 2006, but still enjoys the support of the popular majority he gained due to his economic policy aimed at improving the life conditions of the poor in periphery regions. The triumph of his parties in elections since 2001 caused the new power balance in politics traditionally viewed as a focal area of the political establishment – the representatives of the Bangkok upper and middle classes only. The marginalization of their position in the political system and the impossibility of coming to power through elections determined their integration into the anti-government movement, for the purpose of cancelling the representative democracy system that doesn’t meet the interests of the traditional political elite finding itself in a “minority” and unwilling to be under the reign of a “majority”. The deepening of the political crisis provoked the military into undertaking the coup d’état in May 2014 and establishing an authoritarian regime, which ensured the accrescency of power for the traditional elite. Nevertheless, as the author concludes, the future political development of Thailand seems unclear. The power of military in cooperation with their civilian followers is unlikely to reconcile the society, split by class differences and political aspirations. The contemporary political development of Thailand reflects the situation when the “populace” doesn’t want just to remain under control any longer, and the “upper strata” refuses to be under the rule of the electoral majority. The main question raised today is not of the Taksin's destiny, but of an alternative for the Thailand's future political development – restricted democracy directed by upper classes, or representative democracy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-896 ◽  
Author(s):  
ORNIT SHANI

The massacre of Muslims in Ahmedabad and throughout Gujarat in February 2002 demonstrated the challenge of Hindu nationalism to India's democracy and secularism. There is increasing evidence to suggest that government officials openly aided the killings of the Muslim minority by members of militant Hindu organisations. The Gujarat government's intervention did little to stop the carnage. The communalism that was witnessed in 2002 had its roots in the mid-1980s. Since then, militant Hindu nationalism and recurring communal violence arose in Ahmedabad and throughout Gujarat. This study aims to shed light on the rise and nature of communalism since the mid-1980s.


Significance The ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has retained a parliamentary majority and the BJP has extended its single-party majority. During campaigning, Modi emphasised nationalist themes, ranging from Hindu nationalism to national security, while deflecting criticism over problems such as the country’s jobless growth. Impacts The BJP’s pledge to spend 100 trillion rupees (1.4 trillion dollars) on infrastructure will likely prompt a widening of the fiscal deficit. Leading BJP figures such as party President Amit Shah and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath may aim to succeed Modi in 2024. Rahul Gandhi will highly likely relinquish leadership of the main opposition Congress party.


2002 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Gould

A recent trend in the historiography of north India has involved analyses of ‘Hindu nationalist’ motifs and ideologies within both mainstream nationalist discourses and subaltern politics. A dense corpus of work has attempted to provide historical explanations for the rise of Hindutva in the subcontinent, and a great deal of debate has surrounded the implications of this development for the fate of secularism in India. Some of this research has examined the wider implications of Hindutva for the Indian state, democracy and civil society and in the process has highlighted, to some degree, the relationship between Hindu nationalism and ‘mainstream’ Indian nationalism. Necessarily, this has involved discussion of the ways in which the Congress, as the predominant vehicle of ‘secular nationalism’ in India, has attempted to contest or accommodate the forces of Hindu nationalist revival and Hindutva. By far the most interesting and illuminating aspect of this research has been the suggestion that Hindu nationalism, operating as an ideology, has manifested itself not only in the institutions of the right-wing Sangh Parivar but has been accommodated, often paradoxically, within political parties and civil institutions hitherto associated with the forces of secularism. An investigation of this phenomenon opens up new possibilities for research into the nature of Hindu nationalism itself, and presents new questions about the ambivalent place of religious politics in institutions such as the Indian National Congress.


Subject India's nationwide clean-up campaign. Significance Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s flagship ‘Swachh Bharat Abhiyan’ (‘Clean India Mission’) is now in its fifth and final year. While the programme aims to eliminate the country’s culture of open defecation, many Dalits (historically regarded as ‘untouchable’) working as manual scavengers continue to make up for an infrastructure deficit in urban sewerage. Modi will be seeking a second term in the general election, likely in April or May next year, but his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) faces a tough challenge from rivals including the main opposition Congress party. Impacts The BJP’s election campaign will likely have a strong emphasis on Hindu nationalism. Mayawati, Bahujan Samaj Party chief and a Dalit, will be a key figure in talks about forming a broad anti-BJP alliance for the election. Water shortages could prompt pre-poll protests in several cities across India.


Subject Modi's likely approach to the 2019 elections. Significance India’s general election is likely to occur in April or May 2019. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) swept to power in May 2014 on promises to transform India’s society and economy. In seeking to preserve his position, Modi has begun to emphasise protectionism and national interest. Impacts India will raise tariff barriers on Chinese goods and may do so on US ones, pushing back on what it regards as unfair trade policies. Low-level political violence between different religious and caste communities is likely in the lead-up to the election. The poll is likely to see contention over the credibility of electronic voting machines.


Significance Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced earlier in the month that the reforms would be revoked. The laws sparked a major protest movement among farmers, who maintained that the legislation favoured corporate players over them. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) probably feared that the agitation would hurt it in some of the state elections due early next year. Impacts Modi’s government may in the medium term try to revive aspects of the repealed legislation in a piecemeal way. The BJP will step up appeals to Hindu nationalism in the upcoming state polls, hoping to shore up support from its base. Any crackdown by security forces on ongoing farmer protests would work against Modi’s party in the elections.


2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
PRIYA CHACKO

AbstractThe embrace of markets and globalization by radical political parties is often taken as reflecting and facilitating the moderation of their ideologies. This article considers the case of Hindu nationalism, orHindutva, in India. It is argued that, rather than resulting in the moderation of Hindu nationalism, mainstream economic ideas are adopted and adapted by its proponents to further theHindutvaproject. Hence, until the 1990s, the Hindu nationalist political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its earlier incarnation, the Jana Sangh, and the grass-roots organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), adopted and adapted mainstream ideas by emphasizing the state as the protector of (Hindu) society against markets and as a tool of societal transformation for its Hindu nationalist support base. Since the 1990s, Indian bureaucratic and political elites, including in the BJP, have adopted a view of the market as the main driver of societal transformations. Under the leadership of Narendra Modi, in particular, the BJP has sought to consolidate a broader support base and stimulate economic growth and job creation by bolstering the corporate sector and recreating the middle and ‘neo-middle’ classes as ‘virtuous market citizens’ who view themselves as entrepreneurs and consumers but whose behaviour is regulated by the framework of Hindu nationalism. These policies, however, remain contested within the Hindu nationalist movement and in Indian society generally. The BJP's discourse against ‘anti-nationals’ and the use of legal sanctions against dissent is an attempt to curb these challenges.


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