Democratic Federalism

Author(s):  
Robert P. Inman ◽  
Daniel L. Rubinfeld

This chapter addresses the two weaknesses of Democratic Federalism. First, how can we guarantee all minorities are represented in the legislature? Second, how can we control the national legislature's inclination to usurp all important dimensions of public policy? The chapter evaluates the contributions of three new national institutions: first, an upper chamber called the Senate, elected not from local districts but from geographically larger provinces or states; second, a nationally elected president with agenda and veto powers over legislative decisions; and third, an independent national court to interpret the ground rules for federal governance and, in particular, what constitutes meaningful local assignment and full representation of all citizens. In addition to these three constitutionally created institutions, it also considers the ability of national political parties, if they were to arise, to foster minority representation and to control an overreaching national legislature. Each of these four safeguards contributes positively to the performance of Democratic Federalism, but only if a majority of all citizens understands and support the ongoing contribution of these institutions to the goals of economic efficiency, democratic participation, and protection of rights.

Author(s):  
Robert P. Inman ◽  
Daniel L. Rubinfeld

This chapter details the likely economic, democratic, and rights performance of a decentralized national legislature with representatives elected from geographically specified local districts. The national legislature is assigned responsibility for national public goods and services and national regulations. Decisions in the legislature are made by simple majority rule. Independent local governments continue to be responsible for important local services, perhaps provided concurrently with the national government. On the dimensions of democratic participation and the protection of rights and liberties, Democratic Federalism is likely to do well, provided all citizens are represented in the legislature. It is on the dimension of economic efficiency that legislature-only Democratic Federalism is most likely to fall short.


2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-294

John D. Wilson of Michigan State University reviews “Democratic Federalism: The Economics, Politics, and Law of Federal Governance” by Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Analyzes the contemporary arguments for the democratic federal state, investigating how best to design the institutions of federal governance to achieve economic efficiency, democratic participation, and the protection of individual rights and liberties.”


Author(s):  
Robert P. Inman ◽  
Daniel L. Rubinfeld

This chapter examines, both theoretically and empirically, the causal connections from multiple local and provincial governments and their local assignment of revenues and services to the three goals of economic efficiency, political participation, and the protection of rights and liberties. Economic Federalism does not require the direct representation of provincial or local governments within the central government. Rather, the central government is managed by a single leader, a president, elected nationally. The president makes and implements all national policies. The chapter then reviews the theory and evidence as to the performance of competitive lower-tier governments and finds that allowing citizens variety and choice provides significant economic benefits in efficiency and growth. Matters are less clear for how Economic Federalism might perform against the goals of democratic participation and the protection of rights and liberties.


Author(s):  
Camilo Argibay ◽  
Rafaël Cos ◽  
Anne-Cécile Douillet

This chapter examines the role played by political parties and think tanks in the development of policy analysis in France. It shows how party-based policy analysis is interwoven with inter and intra-party competition related to the objective of seeking office. Indeed, even though policy seeking activities do not look central in the functioning of French political parties, developments in party rationales, like those in the profile of governing parties’ elites, are favourable to intensifying interest in policy issues. Political parties’ professionalization nonetheless appears to have a marked effect on their internal production of public policy expertise: party membership is marginalised while the electoral issues and internal competition have a structuring impact. Lastly, analysis of public policy expertise production shows that it is mainly done in the vicinity of party organisations, due to the significant recourse to experts outside of parties and the role of think tanks.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Sabl

Liberal democracy is often viewed by its supporters as a system of government that responds to the informed and rational preferences of the public organized as voters. And liberal democracy is often viewed by its critics as a system that fails to respond to the informed and rational preferences of its citizens. In this book Larry Bartels and Chris Achen draw on decades of research to argue that a “realistic” conception of democracy cannot be centered on the idea of a “rational voter,” and that the ills of contemporary democracies, and especially democracy in the U.S., must be sought in the dynamics that link voters, political parties and public policy in ways that reproduce inequality. “We believe,” write the authors, “that abandoning the folk theory of democracy is a prerequisite to both greater intellectual clarity and real political change. Too many democratic reformers have squandered their energy on misguided or quixotic ideas.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-144
Author(s):  
Mphonyane Rakhare ◽  
Tania Coetzee

The article acknowledges that Lesotho governance has been characterised by unstable democracy since its attainment of independence in 1966, which makes civil society and other democratic institutions unable to pursue their roles as expected. The proposed solution to overcome predicaments that Lesotho faces was to have active and vibrant democratic institutions such as civil societies, ombudsman, political parties, independent media, independent electoral commissions and the legislative, executive and judiciary. The article aims to bridge the gap by examining published literature and documentary review, which clearly elucidate how good governance can be achieved in a democratic country with the help of active democratic institutions. The article highlights the importance of active and vibrant civil society in governance and public policy. The article concludes by justifying that in deed the government of Lesotho should accept and allow participation of civil society so as to be able to realise its contribution and the important role played by it. Also, civil society in Lesotho must distance themselves from suspicions that they are political parties in disguise.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey M. Stonecash

Party battles for control of government are seen as efforts to reshape public policy. In prior decades, the impact of parties was limited by divided control of branches of government. The impact of party control was also limited because neither party had a distinctive constituency with clear and different policy goals. Over time, realignment has produced parties with very different electoral bases. Republicans now are more unified and willing to cut government while Democrats are more supportive of government programs. This chapter reviews our expectations of the impact of parties, the changes that have made party control mean more, and how these changes affect policy areas like economic policy, welfare, and health care.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Bevan ◽  
Zachary Greene

Political parties matter for government outcomes. Despite this general finding for political science research, recent work on public policy and agenda-setting has found just the opposite; parties generally do not matter when it comes to explaining government attention. While the common explanation for this finding is that issue attention is different than the location of policy, this explanation has never truly been tested. Through the use of data on nearly 65 years of UK Acts of Parliament, this paper presents a detailed investigation of the effect parties have on issue attention in UK Acts of Parliament. It demonstrates that elections alone do not explain changes in the distribution of policies across issues. Instead, the parties’ organizations, responses to economic conditions, and size of the parliamentary delegation influence the stability of issue attention following a party transition.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document