MORAL CONSTRUCTION AS A TASK: SOURCES AND LIMITS

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Moral Perspective ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Construction ◽  
Basic Standards ◽  
Law Making

This essay first distinguishes different questions regarding moral objectivity and relativism and then sketches a broadly Kantian position on two of these questions. First, how, if at all, can we derive, justify, or support specific moral principles and judgments from more basic moral standards and values? Second, how, if at all, can the basic standards such as my broadly Kantian perspective, be defended? Regarding the first question, the broadly Kantian position is that from ideas in Kant's later formulations of the Categorical Imperative, especially human dignity and rational autonomous law-making, we can develop an appropriate moral perspective for identifying and supporting more specific principles. Both the deliberative perspective and the derivative principles can be viewed as “constructed,” but in different senses. In response to the second question, the essay examines two of Kant's strategies for defending his basic perspective and the important background of his arguments against previous moral theories.

scholarly journals Morals from rationality alone? Some doubts

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-273
Author(s):  
JP Messina ◽  
David Wiens
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Valid Argument ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Standard Conception ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Theoretic Argument ◽  
Game Theoretic

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.

scholarly journals 從儒家倫理學到“儒家生命倫理學”的距離

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Shuai WANG
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Confucian Ethics ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Moral Choices ◽  
Confucian Moral

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.生命倫理學由於強調平等和尊重的價值而使個體在道德困境中的抉擇顯得尤為重要，同時道德困境本身也要求個體具有一定的道德抉擇能力。就此而言，構建“儒家生命倫理”可能面臨兩個挑戰：從生命倫理學科性質而言，儒家面臨的是關於西方式“個體”概念缺失的問題；另外從個體抉擇方面而言，儒家似乎又面臨著缺乏道德抉擇能力的困境。前者是生命倫理學科的本質要求，後者則似乎是儒學內部的理論困境。二者似乎表明，儒家與生命倫理學科不能相容。面對當下中國令人憂慮的道德現狀，澄清上述問題就顯得必要。本文將通過分析儒家倫理思想來澄清上述兩個挑戰。由於儒家理解世界的方式不同於西方，我們就不能以西方流行的生命倫理學科標準來衡量儒家倫理學說。文章指出，儒家將一般人與儒者區別開來，也並不以要求君子的道德標準來要求一般人。儒家將承擔道義的責任更多的賦予了代表“天命”的儒者，以道在倫常日用之中的實用理性精神為本質特徵，開創了儒家理解道德和解決道德困境的獨特維度。然而，鑒於當代儒家的遭遇，構建“儒家生命倫理”依舊任重道遠。Contemporary bioethics and moral principles often emphasize values such as human dignity, equality, and individual autonomy, particularly in the case of moral dilemmas. Given that traditional Confucian ethics does not speak of these values, the effort to construct “Confucian bioethics” today may face challenges from two aspects: (1) the notion of individualism, and (2) individual autonomy that makes moral choices possible. The paper contends that there is an ethical incommensurability between traditional Confucian moral philosophy and contemporary bioethics. This leads to the argument that one cannot simply apply the moral principles of bioethics to assess and judge Confucian ethics. It also contends that the Confucian ethical viewpoint represents a kind of elitism that sets up moral standards for a minority, rather than for everyone in society. Therefore, Confucianism by default will not be able to answer many of the questions raised by bioethics, which has been highly influenced by a modern democratic system.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 673 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Folklorisation and the Emergent Moral Degeneration: A Functionalist Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Siziwe Mandubu
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
South African ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Behavioral Norms ◽  
South African Society ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Societal Norms ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
The Social ◽  
Functionalist Approach

Living in an egalitarian society has resulted in the corrosion of the moral base among certain sectors in the community. Some people misconstrue egalitarianism as an authorisation to act as they see fit. Young people, in particular, are gradually losing touch with reality in relation to acceptable behavioral norms in the South African society. Based on the functionalist theory of balancing the social equilibrium among people, the article delineates moral standards as the most fundamental and general principles of behaviour and reflects on how the society expects one to act in certain situations. The article, therefore, explores the primary concepts within functionalism and attempts to outline that the society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of stability and social cohesion. The article will use the folktale “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) to reflect on the expected societal norms. It demonstrates that folktales, which used to transfer values, morals and shape the conduct of people in the olden days are still appropriate in reshaping the outlook and perceptions of today’s generation. As such, the shrewd nature of folklore in the moral regeneration of the current generation of young people is exposed. While there are many folktales in this category, “uDyakalashe noMvolofu” (“The Jackal and the Wolf”) provides the theme relevant for the analysis of the topic to highlight that moral standards generate moral principles and moral judgments.

Über Gewissen und Gewissheit

2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dina Emundts
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Status

AbstractThis paper suggests an understanding of the concept of “Gewissen” (conscience) according to which Gewissen is best understood as a receptivity to moral principles that corresponds to certain moral feelings. In the first part of the paper this suggestion is spelled out and alternatives to it are discussed. As is shown in the second part, this suggestion goes back to the thought of Immanuel Kant, but it can be developed even if one does not follow Kant in his understanding of the categorical imperative as an a priori principle. However, if one does not follow Kant with respect to the status of the categorical imperative, there are some interesting consequences for our understanding of conscience and especially for our understanding of its relation to knowledge and certainty. These consequences are discussed in the third part of this paper.

scholarly journals The contstructivistic defence of the objectivity of moral standards and natural law that does not require the debate on moral realism

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 653-663
Author(s):  
Slavenko Sljukic
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Moral Relativism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Social Fact ◽  
Moral Standards ◽  
Theories Of Justice

The main goal of Kenneth R. Westphal?s How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism is to defend the objectivity of moral standards and natural law and thus avoid the discussion about moral realism and its alternatives by interpreting Hume and Kant in a constructivistic sense. The reason behind the author?s disagreement with both: moral realism and non-realism (its alternative) is our inability to properly understand and answer one of the two parts in Socrates? question to Euthyphro: ?Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?? Moral realists cannot provide an answer to its second part, since it is not possible to prove that moral standards are not artificial; conversely, moral non-realists cannot provide an answer to its first part, since it is not possible to avoid the relatitvity of moral standards. The author tends to solve this problem by avoiding the confrontation between moral realism and non-realism and thus choosing the constuctivistic stance that, as he argues, can be found in both Hume?s and Kant?s theories. The main point of this stance is that moral standards are indeed artificial, yet not arbitrary. He proves this by pointing out that both Hume and Kant treat the moral standards as a social fact (that is, artificial), but also as objective. Westphal points out that Hume explicitly writes about moral standards as a social fact, while showing that, at the same time, his theory of justice, which precedes all of the moral standards, is established independently of his theory of moral sentiments (potentially leading to moral relativism). In this manner, he provides the objectivity of those standards. On the other hand, Kant?s theory is interpreted as advanced, yet similar to Hume?s in its structure. The crucial similarity is that both Hume and Kant interpret the moral standards as a social fact (that is, as an artificial) and, at the same time, as the objective ones. Kant, unlike Hume, provides this objectivity by using a specific moral criterion - a categorical imperative. Those assumptions will be used as the main premises of a distinctively inspiring interpretation of Hume?s and Kant?s theories of justice.

scholarly journals “OBJEKTFORMEL” – EVENTUAL ACTS OF DAMAGE TO HUMAN DIGNITY

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
First Time

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

Kant and Some Critics

2020 ◽  
pp. 188-213
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Universal Law

Kant argues that an understanding of the relation between morality and rational agency reveals the nature of moral rightness. Moral principles give us reasons for acting apart from our feeling or preferences. They give us reasons that apply to all rational agents alike. Principles that embody such reasons conform to a categorical imperative that states a universal law for all rational agents. Against critics who contend that this universal law is too general to tell us anything useful about right and wrong, Kant argues that it requires us to treat rational agents as ends in themselves, not to be sacrificed simply for the sake of other people’s goals. This attitude of mutual respect among rational agents is the basis for a moral and social order that realizes human freedom.

Beyond Animal Rights

2019 ◽  
pp. 22-44
Author(s):  
Celia E. Deane-Drummond
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Animal Rights ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Animal Experimentation ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Social Agenda ◽  
Moral World ◽  
Animal Use

This chapter sets out the philosophical context for current debates in animal ethics, including abolitionist versions of animal rights that are against all forms of animal use, including animal experimentation and agriculture. The author argues that while a more muted version of animal rights is more convincing, rights language has proved inadequate to the modest task of shifting to more humane treatments of other animals. There are also theoretical problems associated with the use of rights language that itself is premised on a particular approach to social justice. Utilitarian advocates following Peter Singer do not fare much better in that his liberationist agenda is ethically ambiguous by his association of speciesism with racist and even sexist views. This approach could just as easily diminish women and those of colour, or deny human dignity, all of which have a strong political and social agenda, rather than elevating concern for other animals. Even anti-speciesism still relies on a comparative approach that begins by widening the moral world of humans to sentient others, even while, ironically perhaps, denying the special significance of the human species. Christine Korsgaard has made the most convincing case so far for rehabilitating Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative so that it is extended to other animals. Rather more promising is the largely theoretical approach of Peter Scott’s argument for postnatural right and Cynthia Willett’s interspecies ethics to begin to map out the multispecies frameworks.

scholarly journals Die Christelike huwelik – ’n sosiale konstruk of ’n verbondsgegewe?

2015 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakobus M. Vorster
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Spiritual Gifts ◽  
Imago Dei ◽  
Social Construct ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Postmodern Ethics ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Husband And Wife

In die huweliksetiek van die postmoderne era pleit verskeie christelike teoloë vir ’n eietydse inkleding van die huwelikskonsep. As beginpunt word die standpunt oorweeg dat daar nie sprake van ’n sogenaamde ‘bybelse huwelik’ kan wees nie omdat die huwelik as instelling ’n sosiale konstruk is wat kultureel en tradisioneel bepaal word. So kan alternatiewe saamblyverhoudings deur christene in die huidige postmoderne era as geldig aanvaar word. Na die bespreking van sommige van die outeurs wat hierdie mening huldig se standpunte, pleit hierdie artikel vir die siening dat die huwelik verbondsgegewe en ’n instelling van God is. As sodanig is dit ’n instelling waar man, vrou en God verbind word in ’n interdimensionele spirituele verhouding wat uitstyg bo die patriargalisme en androsentrisme wat tradisioneelaan ’n christelike huwelik toegeskryf is. Deur te let op die skeppingsaard van die huwelik (imago dei en verbond) en die christologiese en pneumatologiese perspektief op hierdie instelling, word betoog dat dit nie maar net ’n sosiale konstruk is nie, maar dat dit ’n goddelike instelling is wat deur hoër beginsels, ontgin uit bybelse openbaring, ingerig behoort te word. As kerke die gedagte van die huwelik as ’n verbondsgegewe bedien, kan hulle bydra tot die vestiging van huwelike wat deur menswaardigheid, liefde, getrouheid en die ontwikkeling van die geestesgawes van man sowel as vrou gekenmerk word.The Christian marriage – a social construct or a covenantal relation. In the postmodern ethics of marriage several christian theologians plead for a contemporary definition of the concept of marriage. They choose as a point of departure that the concept biblical marriage cannot be accepted as valid, because marriage is a social construct determined only by tradition and culture. Alternative forms of cohabitation should also be accepted by christians as valid in the contemporary postmodern environment. Following a discussion of the works of some of these authors who hold this opinion, this article attempts to make a case for the view that marriage should regarded as an institution of God and a covenantal reality, where husband, wife and God are bonded in an interdimensional relationship that overarches the patriarchalism and androcentrism that is usually ascribed to a christian marriage. By paying attention to the creational character of marriage (imago dei and covenant) and the christological and pneumatological perspectives on this institution, the article argues that marriage cannot be seen merely as a social construct, but that it is a divine institution that should be constructed according to the higher moral principles derived from the unfolding biblical revelation. If churches minister the idea of marriage as a covenantal relation, they can contribute to the establishment of christian marriages qualified by human dignity, love, faithfulness and the development of the spiritual gifts of both husband and wife.

scholarly journals The concept of dignity and duties of virtue in Kant

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Milene Consenso Tonetto
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Principle

It can be argued that the "Formula of the End in Itself " of the Categorical Imperative has been widely accepted and analyzed by commentators of Kant. Allen Wood, for instance, mentions that the idea of human dignity, which underlies the "Formula of the End in Itself ", is the Kantian principle that perhaps has the greatest resonance in the moral conscience of our culture and also the most universal appeal because it seems to support human rights (WOOD, 1998).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document