scholarly journals Intentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology

Phainomenon ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-42
Author(s):  
Ángel Xolocotzi Yáñez

Abstract lntentional ontology. Heidegger and the transformation of Husserlian phenomenology. The article will look inside in what Heidegger said in his first course in Marburgo about the issue of intentionality as the basis for a “fundamental ontological investigation.” Through the first Heidegger’s lessons, especially Freiburg, aspects of the Husserl’s idea of intentionality who suffered a hermeneutic appropriation by Heidegger, will be deployed. The text will focus on the relationship between Husserl’s intentionality and categorial intuition in order to interpret them through the light of hermeneutic and understanding intuition that Heidegger speaks in his 1919’s Kriegsnotsemester.

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-630
Author(s):  
Zeljko Radinkovic

The text deals with a certain phase of the Heideggerian way of thinking, which had precedes the emergence of ?Being and Time? (1927). Heidegger?s reception, criticism, and transformation of some of the central concepts of Husserlian phenomenology (intentionality, a priori, categorial intuition) is the focus of the reflections. This article shows how this radical transformation of Husserlian phenomenology goes beyond the formal coincidence of the phenomenological principle ?to the things themselves? and points to the essential connection of the question of being and its phenomenological demetalization.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-142
Author(s):  
Julien Farges

This article intends to clarify some of the problems raised by the opposition between the husserlian phenomenology and the neo-Kantian philosophy of the Heidelberg school on the basis of Husserl’s 1927 lessons about Nature and Spirit, where an accurate critique of Heinrich Rickert’s epistemology is developped. It is noteworthy that Husserl claims in this context that his phenomenology is more faithful to the Kantian philosophy than Rickert’s philosophy itself. The reconstruction of Husserl’s argumentation shows that the idea of a transcendental deduction of objectivity is the key to understand the disagreement between the two philosophers. It is then possible to suggest that what is at stake in this opposition concerns not only the definition of a transcendental logic, that is the question of the relationship between the being of the world and the knowledge of it, but also the problem of the relationship between rationality and intuition.


Author(s):  
Michael Madary

The main argument of the book is as follows: (1) The descriptive premise: The phenomenology of vision is best described as an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. (2) The empirical premise: There are strong empirical reasons to model vision using the general form of anticipation and fulfillment. (AF) Conclusion: Visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment. The book consists of three parts and an appendix. The first part of the book makes the case for premise (1) based on descriptive claims about the nature of first-person experience. The initial support for (1) in Chapter 2 is based on the fact that visual experience has the general features of being perspectival, temporal, and indeterminate. Chapter 3 includes an argument for (1) based on the possibility of surprise when appearances do not change as we expect, and Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the content of visual anticipations. The second part of the book focuses on empirical support. Chapter 5 covers a range of evidence from perceptual psychology that motivates premise (2). Chapter 6 turns to evidence from neuroscience, including recent work in predictive coding. The seventh chapter shows how evidence for the two-visual systems hypothesis can be re-interpreted in support of (2). The third part of the book turns to general methodological questions (Chapter 8) and the relationship between visual perception and social cognition (Chapter 9). The appendix addresses the ways in which Husserlian phenomenology relates to the main theme of the book.


1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-98
Author(s):  
Anna Varga-Jani

Well known is the fact that Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and phenomenological Philosophy I, published in 1913, made a strong disappointment in the phenomenological circle around Husserl, and started a reinterpretation of the husserlian phenomenology. The problem of the constitution was a real dilemma for the studentship of Munich — Göttingen. More of Husserl’s students from his Göttingen years reflected in the 1930th on the transcendental idealism, which they originated from the Ideas and found fulfilled in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations and Formal and transzendental Logic. The remarkable similarity between these papers is the questioning on being incorporated in the problematic of the method in the husserlian phenomenology. But this parallelism in the problem reveals the origin of the religious phenomenon in the husserlian phenomenology as well. Adolf Reinach’s religious terms as gratitude (Dankbarkeit), charity (Barmherzigkeit), etc. in his religious Notes, Heidegger’s notion of being as finiteness in Being and Time, Edith Stein’s concept about the finite and eternal being in Finite and Eternal Being are originating in the problem of constitution in the transcendental phenomenology on the one hand, but these phenomenon point at the constitution theologically. In my paper I would like to show the relationship between the critique on the husserlian transcendental idealism and the roots of the experience of religious life by the phenomenological problem of being especially at Edith Stein.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 299-309
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Armogida

AbstractThis paper, through a realist reading of Husserlian phenomenology, aims to explain how the consciousness-sense has access to reality and, in general, to objectivity. There is a ‘strife’ between the essence of a thing and the specific concreteness in which it always becomes manifest, such that the identical object is indicated by changeable predicates, but at the same time always distinguishes itself from them. Language can express the evidence of the thing - which makes the determinable aspects of the thing exist and which is inexpressible through definitions - only “for conjectures”, showing the difference between its own expression and the thing. And it can do this by analogy, the only device that exhibits the antinomic relationship between the object and its determinations, and, in the meantime, makes possible not so much their composition, but rather their transformation. Analogy, in fact, operating through a logic of contradiction, grasps, within each object, the tension between the element of permanence and the element of emergency; shows how the object is a unity-without-a-mixture of absolutely distinct forms; and so it comes to think about the relationship between the in-definable forms of the possible representations of the thing and the impossible expression of its singularity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-276
Author(s):  
Carl Raschke

Abstract Despite Jürgen Habermas’ famous suggestion that the violence of history might be mitigated by “the liquidation of unconditional claims,” the issue of whether monotheistic religions and the metaphysical rationality they engender are indeed the hidden source of such violence remains an open one. This essay explores how Derrida with his project “deconstruction” sought to deal in a manner unique to philosophy with the question of the relationship between violence, the unconditional, and the ontological. It proposes that Derrida’s “Jew-Greek” dilemma, which encapsulates the problem of the “violence” of metaphysics, is resolved through Levinas’ project of disrupting Husserlian phenomenology with an alterity that is not simply a heteron that disintermediates the logic of predication, but one that challenges what is normally meant by philosophy itself.


Author(s):  
Javier San Martín

El objetivo de este ensayo es primero honrar la memoria de Vicent Martínez Guzmán, destacando sus importantes contribuciones a la filosofía. Dada su relación con el autor, ha parecido lo más oportuno centrarse en la relación de su filosofía con la fenomenología puesto que otros colegas desentrañarán otras facetas. Para cumplir ese cometido el ensayo tiene cuatro partes. En la primera se hace una presentación de las etapas de la filosofía de nuestro autor. En la segunda se expone, con bastante amplitud, por la importancia que tiene, la primera concepción de la fenomenología de Vicent Martínez Guzmán. El apartado tercero expone, aunque sea brevemente, por ser más conocido, el sentido fenomenológico de la filosofía para hacer las paces. Por fin, la cuarta comenta la posición de Vicent Martínez Guzmán respecto al ordoliberalismo de la Escuela de Friburgo, considerando la relación de este con la fenomenología husserliana.The aim of this essay is first of all to honor the memory of Vicent Martínez Guzmán, highlighting his important contributions to philosophy. Given its relationship with the author, it has seemed most appropriate to focus on the relationship of his philosophy with phenomenology since other colleagues will unravel other facets. To fulfill this task, the essay has four parts. In the first one, a presentation is made of the stages of our author's philosophy. In the second, the first conception of the phenomenology of Vicent Martínez Guzmán is exposed, quite widely, because of its importance. The third section exposes, even if briefly, for being better known, the phenomenological sense of “philosophy to make peace”. Finally, the fourth section comments on Vicent Martínez Guzmán’s position regarding the ordoliberalism of the Fribourg School, considering its relation to Husserlian phenomenology. 


2017 ◽  
Vol 39 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 263-279
Author(s):  
Ina Marie Weber

Summary The human being as a constituted objectivity is a fragile ‘figure’ who lives in through their individual and shared experience. As a constituted objectivity, it influences our experiences, actions and the constitution of our community. Nevertheless, it appears to us, who actually constitute it, as a completely independent and immutable object, as a mere fact our experience has to comply with, and as a normative representation of the human being. This paper inquires - from a phenomenological point of view - about the structure that underlies the norm at work in our experience, as well as in the high- and low-level dimensions of the intersubjective community. Indirectly, such a structure can be identified through the connection between Husserl’s understanding of normality and objectivity. My claim is that normativity can be understood as a necessary function and thus can be distinguished from objectivity and normality. Normativity appears, therefore, as a function of objectivity, which allows one to distinguish the latter from normality. As such, normativity should not be confused with an active agreement or regulation, but rather identified as a necessary constitutive structure arising from experiential intersubjective sense-borrowing performance. At the same time, due to its connection to objectivity, normativity also appears to strongly influence the social production of validity, therefore being endorsed by institutions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-303
Author(s):  
THOMAS FINEGAN

AbstractThe contemporary debate in phenomenology concerning the ‘theological turn’ raises the issue of the relationship between faith and reason. One of the foremost statements on the theological turn, that of Dominique Janicaud, is an affirmation of the faith–reason dichotomy in the context of phenomenology, specifically in relation to how thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas have abused the phenomenological project of its founder, Edmund Husserl. This article challenges the faith–reason dichotomy and shows that the role of faith in Levinas need not mark him out as a deviant from Husserlian phenomenology.


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